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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita posed serious challenges to school systems as children displaced by 
the storms attended schools across Louisiana and in most of the states of the Union. This 
qualitative case study examined the administrative challenges of one school district that received 
over 6,800 new students in less than a month. Research questions posed in the study focused on 
the planning, placement, and support of displaced stu ents, the leadership of the superintendent 
and principals in integrating displaced students into the district and schools, which problems 
arose, and whether any policies or procedures were changed as a result hurricane-induced 
mobility. An oral history methodology was used to examine the problem from an organizational 
learning perspective. The case study utilized an embedded single case design to examine the 
efforts of the central office and several schools t in egrate thousands of students into the district. 
Two distinct leadership styles emerged as driving forces in shaping the responses at the central 
office and within the schools. Evidence of transformative leadership practices combined with 
practices focused on maintenance of the status quo and attention to administrative detail served 
to stabilize the district through the year. Although no permanent administrative changes resulted 
that year the district and schools evidenced great fl xibility in taking on temporary duties, 
satisfying state and federal mandates, and addressing the needs of the displaced families. District 
and school staff managed to create a welcoming, inclusive climate with clear expectations of 
high achievement for all students, both displaced and indigenous. Test scores in several of the 
study schools declined, but the average school performance scores of the district improved. The 
single greatest problem faced by the district was the mobility of students during the year. 
Recommendations for practice and a model of crisis planning are proposed. A model of 




The eye of Hurricane Katrina crossed the Louisiana coastline on August 29, 2005 near 
the town of Buras, near the mouth of the Mississippi River and devastated the city of New 
Orleans. Emerging over the waters of Lake Borgne and the Mississippi Sound the storm made 
landfall again over the Mississippi-Alabama coastline. Hurricane Rita struck the Louisiana – 
Texas coastline 27 days later, raking the entire Louisiana coastline from the Mississippi River to 
the Texas-Louisiana state line before turning north into Texas. An estimated 200,000 to 370,000 
Louisiana students were forced to leave their schools because of the storms; 83% of the students 
were from Orleans, Jefferson and Calcasieu Parishes (Pane, McCaffrey, Tharp-Taylor, Asmus, & 
Stokes, 2006; Cook, 2006). This number reflects only public school students impacted by the 
storms of 2005. The total would be higher if private school and home-schooled students were 
included in the count.  
School districts across Louisiana and across more than 40 states of the Union received 
children displaced by the hurricanes of 2005. How schools and school districts responded to the 
challenges presented by the arrival of two hurricanes 27 days apart depended upon the 
organizational resilience of the school systems to identify and respond effectively to the 
challenges.  
According to the Saffir-Simpson scale, hurricane force winds at category 3, the 
classification of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita at landfall, can cause damage to residential 
structures and utility buildings, minor flooding of land five or less feet in elevation up to eight 
miles inland and considerable damage to vegetation (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, n.d.). A hurricane that moves forwad t ten miles per hour would cause 
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hurricane force winds to persist for up to ten hours in the area near the eye wall weakening then 
ultimately destroying structures. 
 
Figure 1.1 Katrina Wind Speed and Tidal Surge (United States Geological Survey, 2005)  
  
Hurricane force winds (74+ MPH) extended nearly a hundred miles on each side of the 
eye wall, while tropical force winds in excess of 45 miles per hour were felt as far away as 250 
miles to the east side, slightly less on the west side, bringing damage and power failures to much 
of eastern Louisiana, southern Mississippi, southern Alabama and the western Florida panhandle. 
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As the figure above indicates, high winds extended ep into Mississippi (shaded areas in orange 
and shades of light brown) and flooding was extensive along the coastlines of Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama due to wind driven storm surge (purple shading). The most damaging 
winds occurred to the east of the center of the storm, sparing large areas of low-lying central and 
western coastal Louisiana until the arrival of Hurricane Rita 27 days later.  
 
Figure 1.2 Rita Wind Map, courtesy of National Weather Service, Lake Charles (National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2007). 
 
Hurricane Rita arrived off the coast of Louisiana as a category five hurricane September 
24, 2005, weakening before it came ashore. Western Louisiana is less densely populated than the 
eastern region of the state yet still sustained considerable damage to infrastructure and schools 
near the coast and along the path of the storm.  
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Problem Statement 
The likelihood of disastrous consequences to natural events like hurricanes, earthquakes, 
wild fires, tsunamis, tornadoes, and large scale flooding increases each year as populations 
continue to grow in areas prone to such natural occurrences. Examining how districts respond to 
such displacement of populations allows us to prepare models to inform districts in the event of 
future disruptions. There is no better opportunity to study large scale disruption than by 
examining the effects of the hurricanes of 2005. 
In an era of accountability and high stakes testing the massive displacement of families 
can wreak havoc with student learning and school and district test results. From what we know 
of school community, school culture, and leadership in educational literature, we can expect the 
disruption of the lives of the families displaced by the storms to impact schools negatively as 
well. Community is built upon feelings of belonging and willingness to cooperate for common 
purposes (Royal and Rossi, 1997; Strike, 2000), but displaced families are not always seen, or 
see themselves, as belonging to the community in whch t ey find themselves. School culture is 
an enduring quality of how schools go about their business of teaching and learning. It has been 
defined as patterns of behavior that have been transmitted through the years and are accepted by 
the members of the school’s community (Stolp, 1994), but displaced families bring with them the 
memories of the culture that they left and which may no longer exist. Successful leadership acts 
in ways to define and achieve goals, but displaced families may not feel that their input is wanted 
or welcome in shaping any particular goals for the schools to which they find their children 
assigned. How community, culture, and leadership are accomplished depends on the particular 
orientation the leader or community takes and at what stage they currently exist. Communally 
organized schools were described by Bryk and Driscoll (1988) as having shared values, common 
activities, an ethos of caring, close interactions among staff, and a role for teachers that extend 
 5 
beyond the classroom. School culture was described by Deal and Peterson (1999, pp. 2-3) as the 
“unwritten rules and traditions, norms, and expectations that permeate everything: the way 
people act, how they dress, what they talk about…and how teachers feel about their work and 
their students.” School climate, on the other hand, lthough it shared similar characteristics with 
school culture, relates to a shorter time frame. Teddli  and Stringfield (1993, pp. 18-21) included 
characteristics as “student sense of academic futility, student perception of teacher push, student 
academic norms, teacher ability, teacher expectations f r students, [and] teacher-student efforts 
to improve.”   
Leadership is also a construct that defies easy definition, but in schools leadership in the 
person of the principal includes such characteristics as collaboration and shared decision making 
(Leithwood, Leondard, and Sharratt, 1998), encouraging professional development among their 
staffs (Leithwood, 1992), being a visible presence i  the school (Hallinger, 1993; Andrews and 
Sodor, 1987), and setting clear goals and expectations (Leithwood, Begley, and Cousins, 1990; 
Hallinger and Heck, 1996).  Sergiovanni (1990) describes several stages of leadership in which 
schools may at one time or other exist: a bartering sta e – essentially a form of transactional 
leadership in which the leader and the followers negotiate an exchange of something the 
followers want for what the leader wants, or any of several transformative stages: building in 
which the leader provides an atmosphere conducive for achieving higher order needs among the 
faculty, bonding in which the leader develops an atmosphere that led to shared common goals 
and commitment, or banking in which school improvements are routinized. Whatever stage of 
leadership a school occupied the day before Katrina, the school faced a vastly changed 
atmosphere in the weeks after. School community concepts hearken back to a pre-industrial 
assumption of stability that, at one extreme could describe the tightly knit but essentially closed 
culture of the Amish; but which, in twenty-first century America, no longer commonly exists and 
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is replaced by increasing diversity, self-imposed isolation – what Putnam (2007, p. 149) 
describes as “hunker[ing] down,” and struggle to pull diverse cultural threads together to achieve 
school success. How schools reacted to the influx of families and students from devastated areas 
of the gulf coast and managed to continue their mission of teaching and learning is largely a 
result of the organizational resilience of the school district and the character of the schools 
themselves. The purpose of this embedded case study was to examine the administrative 
responses to the massive disruptions caused by two category five hurricanes that struck the 
Louisiana coastline within a twenty-seven day period. How do districts and their schools respond 
to large numbers of displaced students and what do they learn from the experience? 
Research Questions 
The following questions frame this study:   
1. How did the district leaders plan for, place, and provide support for displaced 
students? 
2. How did school leadership impact the integration of displaced students into the 
existing school culture?  
3. What problems impeded district and school responses to hurricane-induced mobility? 
4. What, if any, changes become institutionalized in the district or schools’ policies and 
procedures? 
Significance of the Study 
Although Category Five hurricanes are relatively rare events, the results of this 
investigation will provide valuable insights in an effort to assist in planning early responses to 
large-scale disruptions, and in the process, perhaps offer significant assistance in planning for 
smaller scale disruptions associated with school closures, consolidations, small-scale 
catastrophes like school fires, continuing desegregation cases, and the continual flow of students 
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and their families from one school to another. Preliminary reports from Louisiana Department of 
Education suggest that test scores for 2005 – 2006 fell from the levels they had achieved in the 
2004 – 2005 school year (Lussier, 2006b) in a year in which total state enrollment fell about 
77,180 students. On the surface this would suggest that he movement of students and the 
disruptions to class time had a detrimental effect on he achievement of students in the 2005 – 
2006 school year. The Louisiana State Department of Education gave districts the option to 
calculate district scores with and without displaced students and use the better scores. Some 
districts did not count the high-stakes test results that year as gatekeepers and allowed all 
students to advance to the next grade regardless of re ults of those tests; most districts in the state 
did count the test results. Some districts’ test scores declined when the children of Katrina, many 
of whom were one, two, or even three years below grade level, were added to their testing pool 
(Cook, 2006; Pane et al., 2006). Some districts did not show any detrimental effects and 
maintained high levels of achievement while at the same time taking in numbers of displaced 
students. Discovering what policies, programs, or actions instituted by the districts or schools 
helped minimize the effects of sudden disruption on the students and the schools facilitates the 
development of models to mitigate the effects of future storms or large scale disruptions. Not 
only those students who were forced by circumstances to move were affected; Kerbow (1996) 
suggested that mobility also affected those who did not move.  
Such research will also be of value to evaluate the effects on school systems caused by 
catastrophic events. Responses to such natural occurren es are unplanned, quick and dirty, 
pragmatic responses based on intuition and experience making the qualities of leadership a 
significant factor in how the schools and the district responded to those challenges. Leadership 
qualities have been studied in hope of providing models for future leaders. Effective leaders are 
more than just managers; principals must be more transformative than transactional – that is they 
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must do more than just make deals with their faculties and staff to get results, but rather seek to 
raise faculty and staff members to higher levels of competence and imbue their efforts with 
moral purposes.  Schools also have distinct cultures, fostered by administrators and faculties that 
nurture students even under the stress of sudden change. Learning how school leaders at the 
district and school building level act to mitigate th  effects of hurricane-induced mobility, 
especially if the negative results are limited, or if the school actually flourishes in spite of the 
situation, could be useful. 
Additionally, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 (U. S. Congress, 2002) and many 
state or local initiatives rely upon standardized tsts to determine if schools are improving. One 
assumption involving those tests is that schools are relatively stable. Student mobility has 
emerged as a threat to schools with highly mobile populations and any testing assumptions based 
on student stability. If the population of a school changes as much as some studies suggest the 
test results from any given year do not represent the hard work of teachers or school programs 
for reform, but reflect instead essentially random student movement as families come and go. 
Examination of the effects of mobility may reveal whether programs that do not explicitly take 
mobility in account yield useful results for comparing schools. 
Research Methods 
 This project was designed using an oral history methodology because of the time that 
elapsed between the events of 2005 and the interviews with the participants. Interviews were 
conducted with the district superintendent, numerous central office personnel, principals, 
counselors, a librarian, and teachers utilizing a generalized protocol based on the research 
questions to keep the interview from straying from the topic without unduly constricting the 
memories and reflections of the participants (see Appendix A). 
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Limitations and Caveats 
While formulating this project, I was employed in a small, private school that, while 
already considered at full capacity, took in nearly  hundred twenty students from New Orleans 
and Mississippi. I came to know, and worked closely with, students from many schools, of 
different ages and ability levels, and shared vicariously their expressed hopes and fears while 
awaiting their return home. At the same time, relatives from New Orleans lived in my home 
while they waited for the floodwaters to recede andeventually sought more permanent living 
accommodations. I am the product of a parochial education from a rural Catholic school. The last 
thirty years were spent in similar schools teaching children from across central Louisiana.  For 
the above reasons I am aware that some likelihood of personal bias may present itself. There is a 
part of me that views public schools as bureaucracies that are slow to respond to changing 
circumstances or unwilling to address the emotional r spiritual needs of students and their 
families.  
In addition, case studies in general have been criticized for being less rigorous than other 
forms of research. In this project, the researcher will design a carefully planned research plan 
utilizing a single case embedded design with multiple embedded units and both an interview 
methodology and examination of documents to defer such complaints. Another criticism of the 
case study is the limitation on the generalizability of the conclusions. Yin (2008) points out that 
in experimental designs single experiments have been criticized for the same point.  Such 
criticism cannot be avoided except to suggest that the decision to examine several schools from 
one district will enhance the ability to apply the lessons learned to other similar situations.  
Another limitation in this research project concerns the time that has passed since the 
Hurricanes of 2005. Many of the memories of participants had started to recede and become 
confounded with more recent events and memories. Because of the passage of time I utilized an 
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oral history methodology (Ritchie, 1995) and allowed the participants to speak in their own 
voices from their own experiences. Current images and considerations may contaminate or 
become contaminated by images and memories of the past; the results must be viewed with this 
limitation in mind. Oral historians are well aware of this limitation. Ritchie (1995) asserts that 
people constantly revisit past events and revise the meanings they had ascribed to those events to 
reflect new insights. “There is nothing invalidating about this reflectivity” (p. 13).  
Theoretical Orientation 
This study was conceived as a study of the ability of school systems to react to sudden 
change. Organizational theory applies to the topic in a variety of ways and will serve as a 
theoretical foundation upon which to build this research project. In particular, of the several 
variations of organizational behavior, open systems theory fits this situation best. Rational 
models articulated in works like Taylor’s Scientific Management (1947) offered mechanistic 
visions of management. The Hawthorn studies in the 1930’s revealed a more humane aspect that 
had been overlooked by the rationalists. That aspect generally led to Natural Systems models. 
Where Taylor focused on the organization and the Hawthorn studies noted the effect of people in 
the organization, a synthesis of the two came to be known as an Open Systems perspective (Hoy 
and Miskel, 2001). Open systems perspectives consider the needs of organizations for structure 
and the needs of employees for recognition. Parsons (1960) may have been one of the first to 
understand that organizations are open to their envi onments. From an open systems perspective, 
the effects of events like Katrina and Rita can be explained because there is an explicit 
assumption that outside forces can impinge on the workings of an organization like a school.  
Organizational learning applies to this project because successful organizations and 
schools must be able to identify, respond, and address threats and challenges; learning from past 
experiences as a way to prepare for future challenges. Identifying evidence of organizational 
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learning may explain how some schools adapt to circumstances better than others. Argyris 
(1999) described the difference between single loopand double loop learning. Single loop 
learning reacts to change with an appropriate response; double loop learning questions the 
underlying reasoning behind the responses to problems. Organizations frequently identify issues 
that threaten them; they rarely question the underlying issues behind the problems and move to 
address those faulty, outmoded, or negative issues. 
Another orientation that has relevance in relation o student mobility is social 
constructivism (Liang and Gabel, 2005). Among other ings, this theory suggests that a stable 
social environment is necessary for students to integrate what they are learning with what they 
already know. When students are more concerned with where they will live, or when they will be 
forced to move again, their concerns are more personal than intellectual; learning slows, and with 
it even social development may be stymied. One exception to the deleterious effects of 
movement can be found among military families who move annually. Mobility is less an issue 
with them because their moves can be anticipated and are generally known well in advance; they 
can prepare mentally for the transition. In addition, military families have a support structure that 
is not generally present in civilian schools. Students from military families, in particular students 
of Department of Defense (DoD) schools routinely perform in the top ten percent nationally 
(Smrekar, Guthrie, Owens, & Sims, 2001). Examination of 8th grade reading and writing scores 
indicate that DoD students are second only to Connecticut students; score first or second place 
levels among white, African-American, and Hispanic students; and that the achievement gap 
between those ethnic groups is lower than among public schools (Smrekar, et al., 2001). Military 
families, though, represent a very small percentage of the school-age population. When Katrina 
struck, families were forced to move suddenly from their homes, neighborhoods, and schools. 
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The social contexts that they knew, the academic contexts wherein they functioned, changed 
overnight.  
 Significant declines in achievement could be explained by constructivist concepts or 
sociocultural theories. If children learn through some form of interaction with their environment, 
or in association with other learners or adults (Liang & Gabel, 2005), then the constant shifting 
of homes and schools that is commonplace in many large urban environments may doom 
children to gradual but predictable delays or declines in achievement. If the socio-cultural 
perspective of constructivism is correct then the social context in which a child finds him or 
herself will be disruptive of the learning process if the context at the school is significantly 
different from that of the home (Edwards, 2005) or pe haps from that of their previous school. 
Students who were displaced by the hurricanes of 2005 found themselves in different cities or 
even different states as well as different schools. Not only did their academic lives suffer 
significant disruption, their personal lives remained in crisis for weeks or months.  Either way, 
mobility reduces those contexts wherein the student ca  achieve at an optimum level or pace. If 
the school context is radically different from the ome context, the child finds it difficult to build 
new ideas on already learned concepts. In addition, f we accept that Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs operates in school contexts, then students will be preoccupied by considerations of safety 
and basic human needs before they can begin to consider academic pursuits more commonly 
found in the higher levels of the needs hierarchy. Safety concerns became prominent in the 
recent past due to a series of fights reported in some of the schools in the Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana area, and in Houston, Texas, between displaced New Orleans students and local 
students (Lussier, 2006a; Radcliffe, Ruiz, & Villafranca, 2006). Movement due to Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita and the subsequent search of stability left thousands of children at the lowest 
rungs of Maslow’s ladder for a substantial portion of a year.  
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Definition of Terms 
School Performance Score: The Board of Education assign  a rating to the schools based 
on a combination of academic scores, absences, and for grades 8 – 12, dropout rates. The scores 
are computed with 90% of the score based on test results, 5% based on absences, and, for grades 
8 – 12, 5% based on dropouts. The goal for the schools in the state is to achieve a School 
Performance Score of 120 by the year 2014. In 2005-06, the baseline School Performance Scores 
for all state schools was 85.1 and the state growth score (the improvement goal for the school 
year) was 87.6 (Louisiana Department of Education, User Guide, 2005b). 
LEAP and LEAP21: Two tests administered in Louisiana to measure academic 
achievement. The Louisiana Educational Assessment Program and the Louisiana Academic 
Assessment Program for the 21st Century are criterion referenced examinations used to measure 
student achievement against the state’s content stadards. These tests are given in the fourth and 
eighth grades. LEAP 21 was phased in to replace the LEAP in 1999. The newer tests were better 
aligned with state standards, were designed to be as rigorous as the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP), and were configured to indicate at what level students were 
performing rather than just a simple pass/fail result (Louisiana Department of Education, 
Assessment Program, 2005a). 
iLEAP: integrated LEAP test combining the traditional Iowa Test of Basic Skills with 
criterion referenced items keyed directly to the Louisiana Grade Level Expectations – “a 
statement that defines what all students should know and be able to do at the end of a given 
grade level” (Louisiana Department of Education, 2007a). The change aligned the state 
evaluation to the state’s performance standards and s tisfied the requirements of the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2002 (U. S. Congress, 2002). The iLEAP was being used in grades 3, 5, 6, 7, 
and 9 starting in the spring of 2006 (Louisiana Department of Education, 2007b). 
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Mobility: Variously defined in research, in this study it describes a student who enters or 
leaves a school one or more times after the start of the school year. This study will examine the 
effects of mobility forced upon students and their families displaced by the hurricanes of 2005 
and subsequent shifting from shelters to other living accommodations. 
ITBS: Iowa Test of Basic Skills, a test routinely used by schools to identify the academic 
progress of elementary school students. This test wa  no longer used by the district in which this 
study was conducted, but has been used in other studie  based on dates earlier than 2005-2006. 
Displaced: A student who entered or left a school because of the hurricanes of 2005. 
Students who do not attend school because the school was closed due to damage and attend the 
school upon reopening are not considered displaced. Stu ents dropped from the school’s rolls by 
the school system because of hurricane-related closure are considered displaced. 
Executive Leadership Team (ELT): the administrators reporting directly to the district 
superintendent composed of the superintendent, chief office for accountability, assessment, and 
evaluation, special assistant to the superintendent for instructional leadership, chief academic 
officer, associate superintendent for instructional support services, assistant superintendent for 
instructional services area I, assistant superintendent for instructional services area II, assistant 
superintendent for instructional services area III, assistant superintendent for instructional 
services area IV, chief technology officer, associate superintendent for human resources, director 
for communications and community engagement, advisory member/legal counsel, and director of 
equal educational opportunity (no longer staffed at this time) (East Baton Rouge Parish School 
System, n.d.). 
District Leadership Team (DLT): the administrators who report directly to the 
superintendent, and administrators who report to the ELT, including the administrative director 
for federal programs, director of exceptional student services, assistant superintendent for 
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auxiliary services, director of career and technical education,  director of magnet programs, 
director of reading, director of curriculum, director of elementary programs, instructional 
services area I, director of elementary programs, instructional services area IV, director of 
middle schools, instructional services area II, anddirector of professional development (East 
Baton Rouge Parish School System, n.d.). 
Saffir-Simpson Scale: A scale devised to describe the amount of damage from wind and 
surge effects of a hurricane. Category 3 on this scale represents wind speeds of 111 – 130 mph 
and anticipated tidal surges of 9 – 12 feet above normal. Under Category 3 conditions structural 
damage to curtain walls (non-load bearing walls) and loss of limbs and downed trees are 
expected. Category 5 represents wind speeds over 155 mph and storm surges in excess of 18 feet 
above normal. Structural damage includes complete roof failure and total destruction of trailer 
homes. “All shrubs, trees, and signs blown down” (National Weather Service, 2007).  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Research conducted in past years that have relevanc to this study comes from several 
different directions. Among the various factors that pl y a part in improving school achievement 
are the culture of the school, the leadership of the school principal and his staff, the ability of the 
school to adapt and change, and student mobility, each of which will be described below. The 
topic that has the most relevance to this study of Katrina-displaced students, however, is the 
issue of mobility, defined here as changing schools in the middle of a single school year (Rosen, 
2005; Black, 2006).  
Mobility 
Mobility is defined differently from study to study. Rhodes (n.d.) defines student 
mobility as changing school at times other than times prompted by school or program design” (p. 
1). Other researchers may see students as mobile if th y change schools at the end of the school 
year (Myers and Heiser, 1995). Most researchers count a student as mobile only if the student 
changes school within the school year – as it is defined in this study and by Engec (2006). The 
differences can lead to large variations in mobility rates. Regardless of how mobility is 
conceptualized, in general, research consistently li ks students who change schools frequently to 
lower standardized test scores than students who do not change schools. Using Louisiana school 
data from the 1997-1998 school year, Engec (2006) examined ITBS data to investigate the 
relationship between mobility and test scores. Engec found strong evidence among Louisiana 
students that linked mobility to low test scores. No information was available as to the reasons 
for the change in schools, or whether the behavioral problems that were tracked were the cause 
or result of changing schools, still, the relationship was strong and statistically significant. This 
finding is similar to that of Rosen (2005) and Mao, Whitset, and Mellor (1998) who analyzed 
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mobility in Chicago schools and among Texas students respectively. Mobility appears to be a 
problem particularly among the poor or less advantaged children. In urban settings mobility rates 
approach 50% within four years – that is, if attempting to track a cohort of first grade students, 
only half would still remain together by the end of the fourth grade (Hartman, 2006) making 
longitudinal studies problematic. Kerbow (1996) found that highly mobile students tend to 
cluster in the same schools and shuffle between schools in similar socioeconomic 
neighborhoods.  
Demie, Lewis, and Taplin (2005), and Demie (2005), report on school efforts in London 
to study mobility and identify several motives for changing school. Among the many reasons 
cited are change in lifestyle, promotion or transfer, military service, exclusion from school, or 
refugee and asylum status. Demie, et al (2005) report that students with high mobility also tend 
to have low incomes, live in poor or temporary housing, speak English as a second language, and 
often have suffered some major disruption in their lives. Analysis of their achievement indicates 
that their scores are similar to other mobile students and generally lower than those of stable 
students. Rates of mobility in London schools tend to be fairly stable over time in that schools 
with high rates of mobility tend to keep high rates while schools with little or no mobility tend to 
remain that way. Average achievement differences between mobile and non-mobile students of 
as much as 50% were reported (Demie, 2002). 
Lower elementary students have higher rates of mobility than secondary students. Among 
urban poor the numbers are typically in the low 20% range for elementary and low teens for high 
school (for Engac (2006) the numbers in Louisiana were 8-9% for younger students and 2.5-3% 
for high school students). Engec showed an average rate of mobility of only about 6% from 
Kindergarten to Twelfth grade. This is considerably lower than urban rates cited by Demie and 
others.  
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Not all families move to avoid legal trouble or to avoid paying rents as is reported in 
several of the studies cited above. Many moves are job related or change-of-life events. Young 
families may move more frequently in search of permanent jobs or to establish careers. Mobility 
issues among the poorer parents of young school children are often a move away from negative 
economic issues rather than moves toward positive economic outcomes. The data support such a 
scenario as urban mobility rates in first grade may be as high as 20% whereas secondary school 
rates are much lower – suggesting a more settled pattern (Kerbow, 1996). Black (2006) reports 
that, for some families, mobility is strategic: to attend magnet schools or avoid poor schools. 
Black also noted that the rate is not consistent within some schools or districts; changes in the 
rate of mobility of 5 or more percent per year were noted in some Massachusetts schools 
suggesting that the issue is not even predictable – a major problem for districts trying to plan 
strategically to address staffing, finances, or mobility. 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2002(NCLB) (U. S. Congress, 2002) includes 
provisions that permit parents to move their children to better schools if the schools their 
children attend score low on school accountability measures. Although the intent of the Act 
seems to encourage movement of families out of poorly performing schools, if mobility is 
harmful to students who transfer from one school to an ther the Act could do more harm to 
already disadvantaged children. Although the NCLB is responsible for some mobility, less than 
one percent of those eligible to transfer out of poorly performing schools actually do so (Black, 
2006). Those percentages are repeated in the largest school system in Louisiana since the 
hurricanes: Lussier (2007) reports that of those students eligible to request transfers from schools 
identified as failing to meet academic standards, less than one percent had actually done so. As 
of yet, no specific research has determined if the low achievement linked with mobility is a cause 
or result of mobility. Some families and students may move because the children perform poorly 
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in their previous school and are seeking a new start; for other students, their academic 
performance may have been good in the former school, but their scores fell in the new school. 
Rhodes (n.d.) cites research indicating that up to 30% of mobility was the result of district 
discipline, safety, or academic issues.  
Not all researchers agree that student mobility is he prime factor in low achievement 
(Student Mobility and Achievement, 2005); however, even one move in the four years between 
eighth grade and twelfth grade appears to increase the chances of dropping out by as much as 
50%. Suggestions offered to reduce the detrimental ffects of mobility may help when students 
are making local moves, but fail to address moves that cross district or state lines. Programs like 
Project SMART in Texas or U.S. Department of Education Project ESTRELLA, utilize 
technology to address the needs of the children of migrant workers (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2002). Staying Put, a Chicago initiative, allows primary school students to remain in 
the same school for the entire school year, even if the amily changes address to a different 
district. Similarly, secondary students may remain in the same school in which they begin their 
secondary years and remain until graduation (Kerbow, Azcoitia, and Buell, 2003). The 
Department of Defense schools, for which mobility is unavoidable, have an effective program of 
tracking student records and making accommodations for students of military personnel 
including a provision to allow personnel to remain t the same post or base two consecutive 
years if they have children about to enter their senior year in high school (Hartman, 2006). 
Studies conducted by Smrekar, Guthrie, Owens, and Sims (2001) and Bridglall and Gordon 
(2003) confirm that DoD schools have an excellent rco d of educating children who move 
frequently; for many students the moves are annual. Students in DoD schools routinely score in 
the top ten percent of schools nationwide (Smrekar t l., 2001). 
 20 
Schools in states like Texas or Georgia received thousands of Louisiana and Mississippi 
students from Katrina. Houston and nearby districts, for example, received over 20,000 students 
in the weeks after Katrina, some of whom were two or even three years below grade level 
compared to their Texas classmates (Cook, 2006). Becaus  of the influx of students some 
Louisiana districts were granted waivers for the 2005- 6 school year in which test scores could 
not be used to evaluate school progress for the NCLB accountability program. However, for the 
2006-2007 school year all schools had to meet expectations for improvement, regardless of the 
presence of students displaced by Katrina many of wh m would still be one or more years 
behind their peers academically. Most Louisiana schools no longer consider Katrina-displaced 
students to be “displaced” for the 2006-07 school year according to Everrett Parker, Student 
Information Systems, City of Baker School System (personal communication, August, 2006). 
Accountability measures may show substantial drops in districts that received many Katrina 
children simply due to their inclusion in the testing pool.  
Schools also had to adjust to social and personal issues as well as academic issues. 
Sanderson (2003) examined attitudes and expectations among faculties and students in schools 
with highly transient populations. Teachers related the feelings they had about students who 
came and went with a “kind of fight attitude” (p. 602) or that students acted as though their 
behavior did not matter because they would leave again soon. In my own classes I noted the 
apparent disinterest on the part of some students who knew they would be leaving in a matter of 
weeks or who expressed the suspicion that any work d ne in my classroom would not be counted 
when they moved to a different school or returned to their original school. Rhodes (n.d.) 
chronicles other aspects of behavior among highly mobile students including methods to handle 
situations in which the mobile students were being “tested” by their peers, but who found ways 
to identify potential friends, or attract other students into conversation.  
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Research published by the North Central Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL) 
(Student Mobility and Achievement, 2005) suggested that “mobility, combined with other risk 
factors” is not just an issue for the child who moves, it is an issue for the school, the district, and
the students who do not move (p. 84; Hartman, 2006; Schafft, 2006). Recommendations by 
NCREL and other researchers like Rhodes above include standardized curriculum, targeted 
professional development for the staff and teachers who work with highly mobile student 
populations, and attempting to minimize school or district-related policies that exacerbate 
mobility (such as redrawing attendance zones, inflexib  transfer policies, or attempts to remove 
troublesome students).  
The effects of movement are cumulative. Kerbow (1996) reported that students who 
move once suffer an immediate loss of achievement that, with no further moves, is usually 
recovered within the second year. However, multiple moves within six years generally result in 
students falling as much as one complete year behind t eir more stable peers. This effect is 
generally the same for less disadvantaged students as i  is for disadvantaged or at-risk students, 
suggesting that socio-economic status has less effect than mobility. Black (2006) noted that 
highly mobile student take four to six months to recover academically; a “factor that often leads 
to retention, truancy, and dropping out” (p. 61). 
Astone and McLanahan (1994) examined the High School and Beyond Study data to 
determine if mobility explained any of the disadvantages that students may have had in relation 
to family organization. Students living in intact two-parent families (either with natural parents 
or adoptive parents) fare better academically (in this study they graduate at a higher rate) than 
students in one-parent families, families with a step-parent, or families in which neither natural 
parent remained. Mobility among students in single-parent families accounted for 18% of the 
disadvantage, and among stepfamilies mobility accounted for 29% of the disadvantage. The 
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authors noted also that earlier studies could not ident fy any factors to explain why a stepfamily 
(with two parents and potentially twice the economic resources) should have a greater 
educational disadvantage than would a single-parent family. Their view was that mobility may 
have provided an explanation missing from other studies. 
To summarize the mobility issue: Students who move frequently for reasons other than 
advancing to the next grade as a result of promotion share a disturbing set of characteristics. 
They tend to be poor, minority students from single parent families. Their language skills (for the 
London students cited above) are rudimentary and often their first language is not English. 
Movement from school to school is often to escape a bill collector or landlord seeking back rent. 
Continually mobile students may fall as much as a ye r behind their more stable peers by the 
sixth year. One striking feature is that movement is not entirely random. Children tend to move 
from low scoring schools to low scoring schools, contradicting the assumption that most families 
move to secure an advantage for their children and co founding the basic premise of the NCLB 
Act encouraging families in poor schools to seek better schools. Most parents apparently do not 
see a way to get to better schools as only about 1% of those who are eligible actually request a 
transfer. 
The disaster of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita forced thousands to move into new 
neighborhoods, attend new schools, and for some, switch schools several times in a short span of 
time. Whether mobility is a major problem or not may depend on the factors unique to the 
schools themselves. One of the other factors that have a strong influence on schools and the 
students who attend the schools is the school’s culture and community. Mobility researchers 
frequently comment on the climate of the school that receives the new students and urge the 
schools to make the effort to welcome the new students and their families including such 
practices as including parents in open house nights, formal welcoming sessions, and assigning 
 23 
school buddies (Demie, et al., 2005; Rhodes, n.d.). When the school has a warm, welcoming 
atmosphere the new students are more quickly drawn into the school community. 
Community 
Studies identifying the importance of school culture have indicated many common 
features found in schools that have been identified as schools of excellence. Although it would 
be inaccurate to state that a school was excellent because it had a specific type of culture, the 
connections between the school’s culture and its quality are too strong to ignore. One strong 
strand within the fabric of school culture is the school community strand. Within in this 
particular area are several issues that have been studied and apply to the current subject of 
Katrina-induced mobility. Although there has been much printed, the actual research base is still 
fairly sparse (Furman-Brown, 1999). Community issues include schools as professional 
communities of educators, schools in which communities exist within the classrooms, schools 
which have close links with the external communities hat they serve, and some version of 
democratic communities. More recent writings suggest alternative notions of community based 
on differences, as mentioned by Furman-Brown (1999), including notions that spring in part 
from feminist views of community and the conundrum of discussing community in modern 
urban schools where there is considerable diversity in student populations (Strike, 1999, 2000, 
2004). 
Noddings (1992) suggests that just as families wonder what it is that would be best that 
their children know, schools need to move beyond the academic curriculum to an approach that 
emphasizes care. Furman (2004) also reminds us that education is a moral endeavor advocated 
by Dewey (1922) and echoed by numerous researchers of the 1990s. Either way, the school and 
its community, both internal and external, determine to a large degree the way students are 
perceived and treated. How that strengthens or fails to strengthen academic growth depends on 
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many factors. Considering the ongoing problem of mobility and the schools’ response to 
suddenly changing populations, every tool that can be used should be employed.  
Intergenerational Closure  
In general terms, one “tool” of school community comes from a sociological perspective. 
The value of community has been reported in numerous esearch articles. Academic and social 
advantages of schools as communities have been reported by Hunt, Hirose-Hatae, and Doering 
(2000), Coleman (1985, 1987), and Carbonaro (1998). These advantages may stem from the 
close association of students, their teachers, and school staff that create a warm, accepting 
climate. Coleman and Carbonaro in particular speak of the concept of intergenerational closure – 
or rather the increasing lack thereof. Intergeneration l closure is defined as children and their 
classmates who have parents who also know each other outside of the immediate school context. 
This creates a closed loop of relationships that provide parents alternative sources of information 
and support. Modern urban society fragments and isolates both communities and people often 
leaving the teacher-student relationship the only source of information for families about the 
school. Although Carbonaro identifies specific advantages in math achievement, Morgan and 
Sørenson (1999) report no such effect. The difference, Carbonaro (1999) argues, is that Morgan 
and Sørenson are studying whole school effects while Coleman and others are concerned more 
with the effects on individual students. The issue of closure is still unresolved, but of interest to 
researchers of mobility, and this report, because many storm-displaced and highly mobile 
families are, by virtue of their circumstances, social isolates for months at a time. Among the 
positive effects of intergenerational closure is the existence of multiple channels of information 
available to parents; the negative effects include the formation and propagation of reputations 
that could threaten equality of opportunity of those children, and the smothering effects of 
everyone in town knowing everyone else’s business - as reported by authors like Peshkin (1978) 
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who studied rural communities. If schools are “constructed” institutions designed to complement 
the “nonconstructed” institution of the family, when family institutions change, schools must 
also change (Coleman, 1987, p. 35-6). For Coleman, y of the changes weakening 
intergenerational closure have not been beneficial. C rbonaro argues, however, that if schools 
wanted to, activities to increase closure would be ch ap and easy to accomplish. 
This strand has direct application to the crisis of education posed by disasters like 
Katrina. Students who arrive in new schools because of dislocation, who may be shifted to still 
other schools as temporary housing is replaced with more permanent arrangements, will 
associate with students already in those schools, but their parents will not know each other. 
There will be a group of students for whom intergenerational closure may be a fact, and a group 
for whom intergenerational closure does not exist. It is very likely that such groupings exist in all 
schools to some degree, but Katrina and Rita shifted thousands of families – and students – 
suddenly.  
The School as a Community 
 Several common characteristics of community include shared values, common activities, 
and an ethos of caring (Bryk and Driscoll, 1988), respect, caring, inclusiveness, trust, 
empowerment, and commitment (Raywid, 1993), open communications, widespread 
participation, and  teamwork (Royal and Rossi, 1997). Benefits from such a combination of 
characteristics include improved behavior and achievement and lower drop-out rates. School 
characteristics that seem to impede the formation of close communities include bureaucratic 
inertia, politics, and buffering attempts by the staff o keep parents out of the school (Crowson 
and Boyd, 2001). Smrekar and Cohen-Vogel (2001) studied the deeply ingrained – and often 
unintentional – scripts that define how school personnel relate to parents and the school’s 
external public. They report that there is substantial evidence that “achievement and cognitive 
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development increase when effective parental involvement practices are in place” (p. 78). 
Parents, however, report that most communications with schools are negative and school-
initiated. The perception of parents, possibly because of social status or ethnicity, is that the 
school will not welcome them on campus or be interest d in their input. Whether intentional or 
not, most parents feel that social class differences contribute to a wall of separation that inhibits 
access and limits how much and how successfully parents can intervene on behalf of their 
children. If class differences are noticeable among parents who live in the community, then 
storm-displaced parents have even fewer resources upon which to draw in their interactions with 
schools. Understandably, such attitudes are subdued or absent in high performing schools. Deal 
and Peterson (1999) remind us that schools must come t  some understanding of how the school 
will interface with the community around it, whether it is to include parents in direct ways – 
class aides, committees, and task forces – or more distantly as band or athletics boosters, as 
contributors in fundraising efforts, or simply as spectators.  
The fact that very few schools are true communities does not speak well of the choices 
that most schools have made in that regard. Misunderstandings, missed signals, or conflicting 
signals – all get in the way of what should be close working relationships between the schools 
and the children’s first teachers, their parents. 
Community and Inclusion 
 In this strand of community Strike (1999, 2000, 2004) provides an eloquent and incisive 
analysis of community and the contradictions inherent in communities. He wondered whether 
any community can be inclusive without at the same ti being exclusive or illiberal. If 
communities are based on shared values, Strike questions whether those values that are shared 
are thick enough to constitute community without being too thick and prevent inclusion of those 
whose values do not exactly match. The more we stretch the fabric of our shared values to 
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include everyone, the less likely community is to ev lve. On the other hand, the more specific 
we become in identifying those values, the fewer individuals we manage to include. Strike 
reiterates many of the characteristics of community mentioned above. They include membership 
or some sign of loyalty or ownership, familial or nurturing relationships, interaction of members 
in mutually reinforcing contexts, and informal rather than bureaucratic structures. These 
communities tend to work on shared projects. The values that they share tend to be constitutive. 
Here, Strike (1999) sees a dilemma in that constitutive values tend to be thick enough to create 
community, but, in the process, become too thick to be inclusive. How are schools, most of 
which are public and increasingly multicultural, capable of becoming communities? His answer 
is to recognize degrees of association, levels of commitment, and have big-tented, but 
sufficiently vague, values to permit the type of inclusion that a liberal democracy would demand. 
Some examples of this would include smaller schools r schools within schools in which 
sufficiently constitutive values can form the basis for community. 
 In another commentary, Strike (2004) notes that although the No Child Left Behind Act 
(U. S. Congress, 2002) has language that includes parents, the Act itself is not communitarian. 
The idea of community in schools is one of local responsiveness. Strike questions whether 
schools can be responsive to local control and local needs if external – national, state, or even 
district – controls are imposed.  
 This strand of community is interesting in that it raises the crucial question of how much 
community is possible without becoming exclusive of s me members. With the aftermath of 
Katrina and the massive shifting of student populations, there are likely to be disruptions in the 
balance of the schools that host displaced students. Groups that functioned before the arrival of 
the Katrina children will have to accommodate new members, compete for attention – and 
possibly resources – with any new groups that form, or some combination of the two.  
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Balance appears to be the key in that too much of anything may be harmful. Rather than 
just a scientific or political issue, the value of c mmunity is that it holds important elements of 
interconnections between people and the purposes of ducation. This makes it a moral or ethical 
endeavor; one in which the people involved should have some input. I discuss the ethical 
implications next. 
Ethical and Moral Community Implications 
 Greenfield (2004) examined empirical studies of leadership and moral forces active in 
schools and came to the conclusion that there is a mor l force in school leadership that can be 
detected and that shapes the environment of the schools wherein such leaders practice. Principals 
who practice moral leadership often shape the school in their image and are often proactive and 
creative in finding the time to accomplish their objectives. The moral component is central to the 
work of being a principal. For superintendents, it is mportant that the values and skills of their 
subordinates be congruent with “the conventional wisdom in educational administration” (Kasten 
and Ashbaugh, 1991, p. 64, in Greenfield, 2004). The symbolic leadership of principals flavors 
the entire school and transmits to the school’s public, its staff, and students what is important and 
what the mission of the school is (Greenfield, 2004). This moral leadership is visible not only in 
what principals say, but in how they approach issue at the school. “Effective leadership is 
transformative political work,” wrote Dillard (1995, p. 558-560, in Greenfield, 2004). What 
principals do comes from their values, from their backgrounds, their lived experiences, and that 
flavors what they do and how they do it. As the pony given as a gift can be seen in different 
perspectives, a principal can see the arrival of new students and challenges as either a way to ride 
farther than before or as more manure to shovel.  
 Furman (2004) sees the ethic of community as “the moral responsibility to engage in 
communal processes as educators pursue the moral purposes of their work” (2004, p. 215). 
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Furman sees three overlapping strands in the literature, moral leadership, moral purposes of 
leadership, and ethical leadership practices. As many recent writers like Furman and Serviovanni 
(1990) state, leadership is a moral activity, based on values, and centered in the values of the 
leader. Such an individual can imbue those values into the fabric of the school.  Contemporary 
scholarship is less concerned with the what, how and by whom, and more on the why of 
leadership (Furman, 2004). Recent work reflects a “thin but growing” research base on the 
positive claims associated with building community (Furman, 2004, p. 221). The ethic of 
community is growing in importance as seen in the inclusion of ethics in the Interstate School 
Leaders Licensure Consortium (ISLLC) standards of 1996. Normally seen as principles guiding 
ethical reasoning and decision-making or as “perspectives that inform perceptions, character and 
beliefs” (Beck and Murphy, 1997, p. 33, in Furman, 2004), ethics is increasingly viewed as 
complex interaction of beliefs and behaviors. Starratt (1994, 2003, in Furman, 2004) has devised 
a frame of reference that includes an ethic of justice, of critique, and of care. This frame is later 
expanded by Schapiro and Stefkovich (2001, in Furman, 2004) to include an ethic of 
professionalism. If the ethic of justice applies equally to all, the ethic of critique challenges all 
barriers to fairness, and an ethic of caring focuses attention on the relationship between educators 
and students, then the ethic of profession binds up the three into an imperative to seek what is 
best for the student. Community standards are set by the community, “including both the 
professional community and the community in which the leader works” (Furman, 2004, p. 22). 
Educators need to be more in tune with the home life and culture of their students in order to 
develop an ethical sense of place. Educators must be better at listening; bypassing inherent 
assumptions and biases. Democratic communities are tightly woven to issues of social justice 
(ibid). Rather than seeking to maintain the status quo, schools that are ethical places actively 
seek to identify and nurture processes that bring communities together. It is in communities built 
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around a deep democracy that real justice occurs becaus  all the publics involved in the school 
are included; all voices heard. The ethic of community described by Furman (2004) and built on 
communal processes accomplish more than the heroic ff rts of individuals who often struggle 
against great odds while pursuing a vision that he or she alone sees. Although a forceful and 
talented principal can effect change in a school, such heroics rarely survive the exit from the 
scene of that principal. Only in deep democratic practices involving all the members of the 
community and all of the school’s publics can lasting change occur (ibid). 
 Ethical or moral purposes to education in the pastcen uries were nothing new to 
discussions about leadership and community. The issue is reemerging now with the efforts of 
Greenfield, Furman, Sergiovanni and others. With the current trend of dissociating religion from 
all public spheres, these and other researchers are finding the void left by removing moral 
considerations from schools difficult to fill, and the consequences dismaying. Moral or ethical 
considerations are a major component in the building of a climate of care and support in schools. 
I turn now to considerations of school climate and how it contributes to community in schools. 
School Climate and Culture 
By way of introduction to this topic I must state tha  there is a distinct difference between 
a culture within a school or school system and its cl mate. A quick glance through much of the 
literature suggests that there are many commonalities between the two constructs, but in general 
I understand culture to be a long term characteristic of a school or a district whereas the climate 
of either is likely to change, perhaps significantly, due to short term conditions. Although many 
of the research articles cited below seem to be repating the same or very similar characteristics, 
the emphasis on the short term is a characteristic of climate.  
Hallinger and Leithwood (1998) examined the impact of culture on leadership across 
cultures and note that relatively few researchers have examined the context of culture on school 
 31 
leadership. The challenge of leadership in recent yars has trended toward helping others achieve 
more leadership roles in school. A form of transformative leadership, this approach has both an 
effectiveness dimension and a moral dimension. As other research has suggested (Anderson, 
1982), distributive leadership policies tend to be associated with higher achieving schools. 
Hallinger and Leithwood (1998) report that climate shapes the environment in which faculty and 
students view learning and education. When there is a clear mission, the school is able to direct 
student learning, allocate the proper resources, and hopefully produce greater gains in 
achievement. Principals have an indirect effect on the school climate by setting high goals and 
through influencing the teachers and students to hold igh expectations. By establishing 
procedures and policies that help establish norms of high expectations, principals can influence 
school culture. The authors note that there is an American and Canadian bias against tracking 
students, preferring instead to ignore perceived differences in ability and treat all children as 
having the same ability to achieve. This preference toward equality of educational opportunity 
contrasts strongly with Asian programs of tracking students by ability and prior achievement – 
policies that have resulted in substantial gains within relatively short time periods. These gains 
not only manifest in science and math, but in literacy as well (Hallinger and Leithwood, 1998). 
The authors note that such differences spring from cultural values that make cross-cultural 
comparisons problematic. For example, in China, students are expected to be good in three areas, 
in order: “conduct, learning, and physical fitness;” a student with “good conduct but poor 
learning is unfortunate; a student with good learning but poor conduct is unacceptable” (p. 145). 
The many studies of school culture point to fairly consistent and expected findings: 
Schools with positive climates and cultures of hard work and high expectations fare better than 
schools adrift with vacillating leadership or toxic environments. When taken together, elements 
of community and school culture share a large number of characteristics. The links between the 
 32 
two are the ties that connect elements of culture with the elements of community. The following 
characteristics are gleaned from over thirty articles, many of which are included above. These 
characteristics include, but are not restricted to: shared goals, a common vision, collaborative 
decision-making and planning, close interactions and perhaps extended engagement between 
faculty and students both in the classroom and outside activities, parental involvement, high 
expectations, a habit of sharing and celebrating achievement as well as tolerance toward 
experimentation – especially when attempts are not at first successful, reflective practice, and 
higher levels of commitment. Culture, when it exhibits a positive force in the school, builds 
community among members of the school and that frequently leads to successful efforts at 
school improvement, improved morale, and also, frequently, improved achievement. 
The school’s culture transmits to the students and external community what is important 
and although the principal is not always the only player, he or she is the key player in setting the 
pace, defining the goals and expectations, and generally leading. I turn now to the strand of 
leadership and its many aspects.  
Leadership 
 Murphy (2002) rejects the old paradigm of leadership in which leaders saw their work as 
being defined by mental discipline, administrative roles, and being concerned with content and 
methods. More recently other roles have emerged as important for educational leadership. These 
include leaders being “moral stewards, educators, and community builders” (p. 13). Murphy 
urges a return to the distant past notions that education is a value-laden activity, that all actions 
taken in a school by the school leader are suffused with moral implications, that leaders should 
focus on education and not management, and that educational leaders should build community 
within their schools and closer ties with the external community. Rather than being top-down 
managers, school leaders need to lead from within a web of people. 
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 Greenfield (1995) defines effective school administration as:  
A condition wherein successful and appropriate teaching and learning are occurring for 
all students and teachers in the school; the morale f students, teachers, and other school 
members is positive; and parents, other community members, and the school district’s 
administration judge the school to be effectively fulfilling both the letter and spirit of 
local, state, and federal laws and policies. (p. 61) 
 
 Several characteristics make the difference between schools and other organizations 
unique: There is a moral component, a fairly permanent workforce, and they exist in a milieu in 
which stability is constantly threatened (Greenfield, 1995). The current crisis in Louisiana 
schools, both public and private, is the open, persisting nature of their external threats. Under 
normal circumstances schools are plagued with changes to staff, students, administrations, 
political leadership, and economic conditions that m y threaten the schools. With Katrina came a 
sudden influx into individual schools of dozens or hundreds of students without warning or any 
immediate accompanying increase in funding or other resources. Greenfield concludes that 
considering the press of issues both within and outside of the school, leadership is a crucial 
component and must be studied both as a subject of reacting to the environmental changes in the 
school and because leadership is the best way to get faculty and staff to be willing to institute and 
maintain change. 
 Slater (1995) discussed four sociological paradigms of leadership: structural-
functionalist, political-conflict, constructivist, and critical humanist perspectives. Structural-
functionalist approaches emphasize a set of skills or behaviors. Political-conflict approaches 
emphasize the power relationships in an organization and suggest that legitimacy is an important 
condition of leadership. Constructivists remind us that leadership is a relationship between the 
leaders and the led based on negotiation. Critical humanists focus on getting followers to do not 
only what the leaders view as necessary, but also to d  the right thing morally. 
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 Maxcy, (1995) urged a change from the positivist vew that still seems to dominate some 
of our views about leadership and adopt a critical, pragmatic approach. Maxcy urges us to 
recognize the cultural context in which the current generation of researchers exists: A more 
pluralist culture that is “profoundly unsystematic, unstructured, and disorienting” (p. 477). 
Rather than being fixed in a specific tradition, bound within a framework that restricts our vision, 
researchers need to look beyond the forms and inquire about how we think as we do about 
leadership. Leadership is not just efficient, rational, or effective means to an end; it is suffused 
with value and should be seen in its relationship to democracy as liberating for the marginalized 
voices of groups hitherto excluded from the discussion. Maxcy sees leadership as a process that 
has an emphasis on how we engage in practices that mirror the current way of life that in 
schools, as in life, are undergoing profound change.  
 Although transition is not the specific analog to what happened to schools in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas, change is. From here w  move on to the attributes of the 
leading factor in managing school change, the principal. 
Principal Leadership 
Years of research to discover what it takes to be asuccessful principal have led to long 
lists of attributes linked with success. Some of the most eloquent voices in that field of research 
include Thomas Sergiovanni and Kenneth Leithwood. Major themes that have emerged over the 
years have included the moral/ethical aspect of being a principal and transformational leadership 
in the person of the principal. Both authors, and many others, have much to say on both topics.  
Sergiovanni (1982) listed ten principles of quality eadership in his article by that name. 
The first principle is the prerequisites, those leadership skills needed to develop and maintain 
competence. Such skills would include conflict management tactics, management principles, and 
knowledge of team management principles and group processes. Among the strategic principles 
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are leadership antecedents. These include: perspective, principles, platform, and politics. Other 
strategic principles cluster around the meanings of leadership: purposing, planning, persisting, 
and peopling. The final principle is patriotism: The norms and beliefs to which staff, parents, and 
students give their allegiance. As Sergiovanni (1982) states: “Organizational patriots are 
committed to purposes, they work hard, believe in what they are doing, feel a sense of 
excitement for the organization and its work, and fi their own contributions to the organization 
meaningful if not inspirational” (p. 332). This analysis, evidence of which is amply found in high 
performance organizations and in Japanese industrial experiences in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
emphasized the interrelated nature of the principles. 
Andrews and Soder (1987) in a brief, but intriguing article indicate that principals who 
act as resource providers, an instructional resource, communicator, and a visible presence in the 
school provide support to the notion that a strong principal can have a positive effect on student 
outcomes. The effects of their presence are felt gratest among those schools with large numbers 
of free or reduced price lunch students – a proxy fr low income students. African-American 
students also benefited more in schools with leaders who were identified as strong. Principals 
identified as being strong instructional leaders were also associated with improved reading and 
mathematical achievement, again primarily among minorities and low income students. 
Implications for policy focus on pre-service training, selection, continuing education, and 
evaluation of principals to ensure that the pool of p tential principals and cadre already in 
service are used to fullest benefit of the students a d district. Another interesting comment by 
Andrews and Sodor was that teachers should be seen as a “legitimate source of data regarding 
principal behaviors” (Andrews & Sodor, 1987, p. 11).  
Leithwood, Begley, and Cousins (1990) attempted to i entify areas in administration that 
needed additional research. The authors noted that the research on principal practices in relation 
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to outside influences and influences internal to the school were relatively scarce. Principals’ time 
was mainly taken up in administrative activities. Among the many findings gleaned from their 
review of the literature were items that noted the connection between certain leadership styles 
and effective school leadership. Four styles were identified: leadership that focused on 
interpersonal relationships and positive climates, l adership that was focused on student 
achievement, leadership that was focused on program structure, and leadership that was most 
focused on attention to administrative details. Theauthors noted that the most effective 
administrators appeared to be those who were problem solvers; administrators who were most 
concerned with managerial duties appeared to be the least effective. They also noted that 
practices associated more with managerial practice app ared to be the most common. From an 
administrative point of view, running a tight ship and satisfying the demands of the organization 
held higher importance than the more interpersonal activities. The more effective principals cited 
in the studies were focused on the goals of the school, particularly those goals that dealt with the 
achievement of the students. Effective principals set high standards and worked to develop a 
common understanding of those goals among their faculties. Effective decision making processes 
included participatory practices that involved parents and faculty. Understandably, such practices 
generate more loyalty among staff, particularly among secondary teachers (elementary staff 
loyalty was also noted, though less conclusively). Obstacles identified in some of the research 
suggest that many of the obstacles to good practice are xternal to the principal. Other obstacles 
included some teachers, teacher autonomy, collective bargaining, hierarchical structures, and 
community influences. Lack of clear expectations and school complexity were obstacles that 
were considered internal obstacles to the principal. 
The role of the principal in building effective schools was also studied by Hallinger and 
Heck (1996, 1998). After noting troubling contradictions in the results of two earlier reviews 
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(Bridges, 1982; Bossert, et al., 1982), the authors p int out that most of the early research lacked 
theoretical underpinnings and frequently were focused on different aspects of administrative 
effects. The relationship between principals and achievement are complex, indirect and “not 
easily subject to empirical verification” (1996, p. 6)  Recent work in the area, especially when 
using more sophisticated designs linked to theoretical models, supports the thesis that principals 
do make a difference in student achievement. Principals do not have a direct influence upon the 
students; they have indirect influence that is internal to the school. They set norms of high 
expectations, policies that support those norms, and influence and support teachers in their work. 
The most influential effect found consistently in the study was goal-setting. 
Sergiovanni (1996a) noted that it is predominately he job of the school leader, in most 
cases identified in the person of the principal, to set the tone for the school. Leaders typically 
have nine tasks they must perform: Purposing, maintaini g harmony, institutionalizing values, 
motivating, managing, explaining, enabling, modeling, and supervising. If these tasks are taken 
in total to mean a moral position to lead students into adulthood with the skills needed to succeed 
then the job becomes a moral practice. Leadership then becomes true pedagogy whereas the 
school, directed by its leaders, leads students out of childhood (educere) and into adulthood 
(educare) (Sergiovanni, 1996a). Sergiovanni ends with the statement that leadership as pedagogy 
calls for leader and led to be called to higher leve s of commitment, the same phraseology found 
in discussions of transformative leadership althoug he does not use that term specifically. 
 Whitaker (1997) noted that effective schools researchers have consistently found that 
effective schools have effective and visible principals. Effective principals are instructional 
leaders who model as well as teach good practices. Three common features of instructional 
leadership are that principals are active and people riented, operate within a network of other 
principals, and had a mentor early in their career. Good principals are also resource providers, 
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are caring and attentive to the needs of the staff, are an instructional resource for their teachers, 
are good communicators, and are a visible presence in th  school. Effective principals do not 
lose focus on the reason for the school: student learning. 
 Short (1998) examined several aspects of empowerment. In her comments on principal 
empowerment she identified characteristics of principals who seek to expand the leadership in 
their schools. Principals of empowered schools spend l ss time trying to pull the school in a 
particular direction: Empowerment means “more feet running in the same direction” (para. 12). 
Short believes that transformation of schools will occur only in empowered environments. 
Leithwood and Jantzi (2000) replicated an earlier study on principal and teacher 
leadership effects on student engagement and report somewhat disappointing results. Principal 
leadership appeared to account for a small – only about 8% – but significant portion of the 
variance, and teachers accounted for even less of the variation in explaining student engagement 
with school. In discussing the implications of the study, the authors noted other studies that 
reported similar low findings and remarked that researchers seeking findings to support their 
arguments for more teacher leadership were not finding particularly supportive results. Rather 
than focus on only the contribution of the principal or of the teacher, the authors note that the 
process is more complex and that school change requires a multi-dimensional strategy, not just 
an emphasis on teacher leadership or of principal leadership. In addition to the findings, the 
authors comment that connecting leadership to teaching devalues both teaching and the concept 
of leadership as well.  
 The fit between the principal and the needs of the faculty was examined by Gooden 
(2000). As a result of the court case Rose v. Council for Better Education (1989) the state of 
Kentucky was ordered to overhaul the entire education system and produce a more equitable 
system. Research in educational change has found that one necessary ingredient was the 
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innovation advocate. Several studies indicated that though principals can serve in that role, 
teachers can be more influential in that role. A supportive principal and a collaborative working 
environment between teachers and between the teachers and principal were necessary. From this 
study two major conclusions were reached: There must be a comfortable fit between the 
leadership style of the principal and the perceived n eds of the staff; and time must be taken for 
collaborative working relationships to evolve. Additionally, a relatively stable staff is necessary 
for the trust and cooperation to develop. Gooden (2000) reported in detail on two of the schools 
in the study and observed that had the principals in the study served in other school instead of 
their own, implementation would not have proceeded as well due to the expectations of the 
faculties in each school. Each principal was a good fit; in the right place at the right time. 
 Hallinger (2003) noted that in more than one model f leadership (instructional and 
transformative) effective principals were found to focus on: Creating a sense of purpose, setting 
high expectations and a culture of improvement, creating a reward structure that reflected the 
school’s goals, organizing a range of activities that stimulate the staff to further their 
development, and being a visible presence in the scool (p. 343). Differences between the 
models are also noteworthy. Instructional leadership might for example emphasize first-order 
change – modifications to the practices of teaching, whereas transformative leadership focuses 
more on second-order change – a “reformulation of the system and its capacities” (Lyddon, 
1990) or what Levy and Merry (1986, in Townsend andTwombly, 1998) term 
“multidimensional, multi-level, qualitative, disconti uous, radical change[s] involving a 
paradigmatic shift” (p. 77) . Similarly, transformative leadership emphasizes empowerment over 
coordination and control, and shared control versus an individual locus of leadership. Hallinger 
(2003), citing recent research by others, noted that the conceptualization of leadership is more 
complex than earlier assumed. Hallinger cited it asa “mutual influence process” (emphasis in the 
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original), in which leaders respond to changes in the environment: “the leader’s behaviours are 
shaped by the school context” (p. 346). Hallinger takes this point farther, suggesting that the 
appropriate model of leadership accommodates the context of the school and moves responsively 
to the needs of the school. If instructional leadership is needed, leaders should use the proper 
behaviors. At-risk schools may require a more top-dwn approach, but sustained improvement 
requires that schools and their staffs must take more ownership of the improvement process and 
thus begin a journey to a more transformative leadership process. This is transformation in a 
different sense, a more developmental approach. 
 Principals have been viewed as essential to the succe s of schools. Until recently, most of 
the empirical studies have had mixed results, suffered from oversimplification and therefore 
suspect results, or have lacked sufficient theoretical support. More recent studies suggest that the 
leadership of the principal is a crucial factor in setting the tone and climate of the school. Since 
much of the work done is focused on school change or school improvement, the premise of this 
study is indirectly applicable because most studies seek to understand what happens when 
change is deliberately initiated. This study is concer ed with what happens to schools when 
circumstances beyond their control force change suddenly.  
District and Board Leadership  
Leadership qualities also must exist at the next level up, at the superintendent and district 
board level. Black (2007) reminds us that effective schools and student achievement are 
correlated with effective superintendent leadership. Five actions that have been shown to lead to 
improved student achievement are goal setting, setting objectives for improved instruction, 
securing school board cooperation for initiatives, monitoring progress, and securing resources 
(ibid).   Much of the recent literature concerning leadership at the district level parallels concepts 
found at the building level. Bryant and Houston (200 ) report that building teamwork between 
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the superintendent and the school board is necessary to improving student achievement. Like the 
leadership characteristics found in good principals, school boards needed to cooperate with 
superintendents to establish a vision, set standards an  assessment practices, encourage 
collaboration between boards and the superintendents, a d establish a proper climate. Bingler, 
Blank, and Berg (2007) describe the efforts to reconnect the New Orleans Schools with their 
communities. The connection with neighborhoods had been lost in New Orleans before the 
hurricanes of 2005, a combination of the “economic and social collapse” that Adamo (2007) 
credits to “realignments of the Reagan era” (p. 44), and the lure of huge sums of federal funds 
and the tinkering of federal judges during the desegregation case there (Caldas and Bankston, 
2005). Bingler, et al. (2007) cite examples of other cities in America – Cincinnati and St. Paul 
specifically – with similar decayed inner city schools that were revitalized by ground-up 
approaches that embedded schools within a larger community context that made the schools not 
just the 8 – 3 educational one-use institutions, but 24-7 community centers. The ambitious vision 
was not universally accepted, as Adamo (2007) relates, after the Recovery District took over 107 
of the public schools in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. All of school employees had been terminated 
by the school board following Hurricane Katrina; Orleans Parish was starting with a clean slate. 
FEMA regulations required that all equipment in damaged schools be removed; Orleans started 
the school year with few schools, little or no equipment, and few certified staff members.  
 Hofman, Hofman, & Guldemond (2002) examined the sector effect of public and private 
schools in terms of the differences in governance structures. What makes this study unique is 
that, among other things, schools in the Netherlands are funded by the state equally whether they 
are public or private. In this context, researchers may isolate somewhat more effectively the 
influences of governance structures on the schools and therefore get a better view of how that 
would affect student achievement in math. Results indicate that Catholic schools did not have the 
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highest SES or IQ levels but they did achieve the highest math scores out of all of the 
denominational groups examined (public, Catholic, Protestant, and neutral schools). One variable 
that seemed to have a significant impact on math achievement was the influence of community 
members on school board decisions. The stronger the community members influence upon the 
school boards, the higher the math achievement score . Among Catholic schools there was more 
contact between staff and parents and less bureaucracy. A possible explanation was the 
likelihood that Catholic schools were more “adjusted to parents’ wishes and are more in line with 
the pupils’ home environment” (p. 267). Effective leadership and coherence “within schools 
produce a sense of community that, in turn, shapes conditions in schools that positively affect 
student achievement” (p. 268). In this context, community is in part the communications between 
parents and school officials, and between parents and the school boards. 
 Opfer and Denmark (2001) also examined the relationships between school boards and 
parent and community groups. Three models are discussed briefly: administrative control, 
professional control, and community control. In general, most reforms in terms of community-
based control have resulted in little or no substantive change. Opfer and Denmark (2001) also 
note that the literature on school change suggests tha  if community based reforms are enacted, 
increased social capital would result. In order for this to occur, according to Coleman (1990, in 
Opfer and Denmark, 2001), three conditions must be present: “a high degree of closure in the 
relationships among different kinds of actors in the school, stability among the actors in the 
school, and group norms that reinforce the public-good aspect of the school” (p. 104). 
Unfortunately, the results of the research suggest that school boards do not always create those 
conditions. 
If “social capital and school community require closure, stability, and norms that 
reinforce the public good” then the evidence from this study is disappointing (Opfer and 
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Denmark, 2001, p. 116). The differing views of the relationship between principals and boards 
suggest several problems. Principals and board members both claim that no interference by 
school board members occur in the schools, but examples of interference abound. The principal 
is in an ambiguous position somewhere between compliance with board directives and his or her 
position as school-based decision leader (ibid). This suggests an inherent role ambiguity.  
 The implications of this are fairly serious. Most boards are political rather than social and 
may lose sight of their function as representatives of the community. They may remember their 
position relative to the community at election time, but their activities, sometimes supporting, 
sometimes interfering with school business, belie the rhetoric. Non-public school boards are 
more accountable to their support communities who, if dissatisfied with the progress of the 
school, may vote with their feet and remove their ch ldren. For private schools, this defection can 
have serious implications for the financial health of the school. Until the accountability programs 
mandated by the NCLB Act (U. S. Congress, 2002), public schools did not have an equivalent 
economic lever hanging over their heads unless they ne ded a bond issue. 
There is a strong strand, however, in recent literature toward leadership that goes beyond 
the simple administration of rules and policies toward the development of human capacity. This 
strand is transformative leadership – as termed by Burns (1978) in his now classic study: 
Leadership.  One of the most prolific writers on that topic is Kenneth Leithwood. I will now 
review some of the research on transformational leadership, as the topic is now termed. 
Transformational Leadership  
For Leithwood (1992), the dominant theme for the 21st century should be 
transformational leadership. Leithwood noted that, rather than the Type A, top-down, centralized 
hierarchies, schools should bear a similarity to Type Z organizations which function best through 
consensual relationships. Schools are complex systems composed of interdependencies that 
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require facilitative leadership to make the best use of the talents and training of their staffs. 
Transformational school leaders studied by Leithwood and his associates have three goals: help 
staff develop collaborative professional cultures, fo ter professional development, and help 
teachers solve their problems effectively. Effective school leaders make a concerted effort to 
view problems from different perspectives and view problems in the specific perspective of how 
it affects the goals for the school. By involving school staff in open communications about 
school issues, transformative school leaders avoid tak ng easy, canned solutions that may create 
problems later. Leithwood also noted that transactional leadership does not make the same kind 
of lasting changes as transformational leadership (transactional leadership is characterized by a 
quid pro quo transaction between a leader and the led). 
Leithwood (1994) described expectations about leadership and school restructuring. A 
recent focus in research in the 1990s and early 2000s has been the concept of transformative 
leadership. Leithwood argues that first and second order change is necessary for school change 
to succeed. First-order change is the change in core technology of the school. Included in this 
may be the application of knowledge about constructivist learning models and improved 
instructional techniques. Second-order change is about changing the culture of the school before 
it strangles the incipient changes in core technologies. Restructuring failures are frequently 
caused by procedures practiced by recalcitrant leadership not committed to fundamental changes 
in the thought processes involved in running the school. Some of those procedures may be 
similar to the defensive practices discussed by Argyris (1999). Leithwood (1994) also cites 
transformative effects of leadership that seek to improve the potential of school personnel 
through collaborative culture and empowerment, professionalism, and shared decision making. 
Transformative leadership seems well suited for the task. Leithwood noted that the individual 
tenets of transformational leadership are not especially new. What is perhaps most noteworthy of 
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this concept is that attention should be paid to all facets of transformative leadership. It may be 
that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts in his area. Leadership that is transformative is 
value-added. Activities that appear managerial, that are essentially routine in nature, but which 
are infused with particular meaning by the leader can become transformational. 
 Jantzi & Leithwood (1996) examined leadership in schools from a cognitive science 
perspective. From the discussion of this study, Jantzi d Leithwood noted that acting like a 
leader, at least to the faculty of the school, may count for more than who the leader is. Being 
seen to do positive things for the school carries wight. Another finding of their study was that 
some school practices seem to marginalize the influe ces of effective leaders. For example, 
institutional practices of moving effective principals every few years inhibit the positive 
influences that such leaders can exert on a school and its faculty. A third assertion that gender 
may play a part in both the role of the leader and that of the followers was suggested as possibly 
misleading due to the predominance of women in teaching and leadership positions in the 
elementary schools examined in this study. 
 Jason (2000) argued that transformational leadership i  uniquely capable of flourishing in 
multicultural settings. As Burns (1978) noted, transforming leadership seeks to raise both the 
leader and led to higher levels of motivation and morality. In a multicultural setting, found in 
most urban and suburban areas or in rural settings u dergoing consolidation or desegregation, the 
unique talents of a transformational leader are an asset. Jason observed that transformational 
leaders are open to change and realize that personal (and personnel) development and school 
improvement are connected. Such leadership encourages and supports the development of 
democratic interaction and consensus, involving the entire faculty in decision-making. This 
would be crucial in preparing the way for the development of a multicultural program. Research 
constantly reinforces the notion that empowerment is a consequence of transformational 
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leadership. This theme is also found in research foused on business leadership. This type of 
leadership benefits the school because it creates a learning environment in which the teachers 
model their own learning for students, feel appreciated and safe, and where issues are decided 
with sensitivity and attention to multiple perspectives. It is an ethical school, a school in which 
diversity is celebrated and respected, and that leads to deeper learning.  
Geijsel, Sleegers, Leithwood, and Jantzi, (2003) examined the effects that 
transformational leadership seem to have on the commit ent to reform on the part of teachers in 
school settings. This study built upon the work of Bass and Avolio (1994, in Geijsel, et al, 2003), 
among others, whose four dimensions of transformation l leadership were: idealized influence, 
inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. Of special 
interest were the importance of vision and intellectual stimulation as they apply to teachers. The 
assumption behind the study was that transformationl leadership would influence teachers’ 
commitment to reform efforts in the school which in turn would motivate the teachers and lead to 
improved student outcomes.   
Professional development for school leaders is briefly discussed by Kochan, Bredson, 
and Riehl (2002). The authors cite several barriers to effective professional development. One is 
the nature of the work itself which requires leaders to seek immediately useful information at the 
expense of more difficult to acquire knowledge that comes from critical reflection. Another issue 
is the apparent reticence to admit that principals need more professional development. 
Accountability mandates from district, state, or federal levels also distract principals from 
focusing on innovation. Principals need to be model learners, stewards of learning, and builders 
of community. The authors urge more professional development practices for principals, seeking 
ways to motivate principals to want to improve their practice, formal structures to engage 
principals in reflection, peer interaction including mentorships, graduate programs, and learning- 
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focused sabbaticals. Training needs to be applicable to their roles as school leaders and should 
lead principals to be model learners bringing their schools to higher levels of performance. 
Because many school principals still practice their art the way their principals did in the 
past, Crow, Hausman, and Scribner (2002) urge a reshaping of the role of principal to reflect a 
postindustrial world. There is a tension today between the requirements of standardized testing 
and accountability on one hand and the apparent need to change the paradigm to more inclusive, 
innovative strategies on the other. The desire for collaborative communities of learners requires 
that principals become collaborative instructional le ders, build professional communities, build 
shared commitment among faculty, and foster shared decision making. The authors also note that 
because there appears to be a growing market orientation, principals must be prepared to market 
their schools to parents and build civic capacity in the schools while still satisfying the demands 
of accountability measures. 
What is not stated in the above summaries is the otr end of the continuum of 
transformational leadership – that is the transactional side. It appears that the two concepts are 
not mutually exclusive and that principals can and often must exercise some of each (Somech 
and Wenderow, 2006). In transactional leadership the principal bargains with his staff to get 
specific activities done. The transaction is a trade-off of some contingent reward – something 
teachers want – for services performed in the school. It may be that any given school has a 
balance of the two, but that transformational leadership elicits more dedicated followership and 
more successful – and sustained – change (Leithwood, Leonard, and Sharratt, 1998; Geijsel, et 
al., 2003).  
 Fullan (2001) pointed up several curious elements of leadership that may seemingly 
contradict conventional wisdom, among them: charismatic leaders are short term solutions to 
problems, heroes on white chargers do not build strong organizations that survive their 
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departures, and that leaders should seek opportunities to encourage leadership in those below and 
around them. What is needed, Fullan argues, is leadership that must be developed at many levels 
and that leaders must master five core capacities: “moral purpose, understanding the change 
process, building relationships, knowledge building, and coherence making” (p. 137). 
Bridging and Buffering  
Leithwood and Prestine (2002) discuss several approches to leadership at the school and 
district level and present a case study summary of one successful effort. In that report, though, a 
single comment seemed appropriate to this theme of bridging and buffering. “Leaders must 
buffer staff from counterproductive policies, build school improvement initiatives that address 
external reforms, and meet the needs of the school’s students and parents” (p. 11).  
DiPaola and Tschannen-Moran (2005) described the concepts of bridging and buffering 
as they apply to administrators who either attempt to identify useful resources outside of the 
school and integrate them into school processes, or seek to isolate the school from perceived 
dangers outside of the school. In this study, the DiPaola and Tschannen-Moran attempt to discern 
whether bridging or buffering is more effective in improving student achievement and school 
development. Bridging activities appear to be more supportive of the mission of the school, but 
buffering strategies seem to have a negative impact on s udent achievement (Hoy, Tarter, and 
Kottkamp, 1991).  
From an economic perspective, the concept of bridging and buffering fall under the 
resource dependence theory as means of securing needed resources to accomplish the purposes 
of the organization. Johnson (1995) sees buffering strategies as a means of reducing uncertainties 
by protecting organizational boundaries. Bridging, on the other hand expands organizational 
boundaries, decreasing dependence on limited resource providers by involving other providers in 
cooperative ventures.  
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Some schools may try to limit harm to the system by buffering the school from farther 
impact by parents or community members after the arrival of Katrina students. Similar efforts to 
buffer communities were seen as communities refused to allow FEMA trailer parks in their 
neighborhoods out of fear of increased crime, or by arguing that their neighborhoods could not 
support additional population pressure on existing infrastructure (Nelson, 2005; Pitchford, 2005). 
To summarize: In the research cited above, leadership is a diverse area of study that the 
many differing images and concepts, some apparently contradictory, can cause more smoke than 
light. Of the several concepts that repeat throughot the research base, in personal reflection, and 
in commentaries, the most frequently mentioned was professional development, both for 
faculties and staff, and for principals. This single concept is followed in decreasing order by goal 
setting and establishing a clear vision – or visioning, encouraging collaboration among faculty, 
staff and other stakeholders. To this concept is added the related idea of peer assistance. Other 
concepts that show frequently in the literature are shared decision-making, principal’s support of 
faculty and staff, the principal’s ability to secure and provide adequate resources, involve 
external community cooperation, create or nurture a climate for empowerment, and maintain 
open and frank communications with faculty, parents, and external community stakeholders. 
Themes that appear less frequently include setting high and clear expectations, peer support, 
recognizing the moral purpose of the school, involving others in goal setting, encouraging or 
inspiring commitment, purposing, and being an instructional leader. One theme that was 
conspicuous in its absence was maintaining a stable staff, though that concept appears in 
literature on community and culture, one would expect a school principal, or other school 
leaders, would find their efforts supported more by a relatively stable faculty and staff. One 
finding frequently cited in the literature is the adv ntage students have when in contact with the 
same teachers for extended time – often combined with team teaching. If faculty turnover is 
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severe the odds are the school is suffering some deeper problem of which leadership may only be 
a part. 
Organizational Theory 
Classical Theory  
Four general models of organizational theory have em rged in the past. Classical 
organizational theory is probably best represented in the works of Frederick W. Taylor and Max 
Weber. The major driving force in Taylor’s writings are both predictable and surprising in that 
he not only strove to improve efficiency for the employer, but also to improve the prosperity of 
each employee by improving the efficiency with which each employee worked to reach his 
potential, as well as higher wages to improve his liv ng conditions. This mutual benefit would 
seem rationally comprehensible, but in the history of management and working class in America 
and Europe, division was the norm, not cooperative development for mutual prosperity. Taylor 
believed that the rational approach to management would reduce inefficiency and help not only 
improve in production, but also to improve the living and working conditions of the employees 
(Halsall, 1998). Planning was taken out of the domain of the craftsman and placed firmly within 
the management domain where it would benefit from scientific approach to improved efficiency 
(Max Weber, n.d.). 
Along the same lines, Weber described three types of relationship between the worker 
and his employer. Weber preferred using a rational approach, described as the ideal form and 
termed bureaucracy characterized by systematic discipline, rules that are consistent and 
universally followed, leadership by officials chosen for their expertise and clearly defined 
hierarchy. The other forms described by Weber include the traditional form, in which leadership 
is based on patrimony, tradition, and feudal relationships; and a charismatic form where 
leadership is exercised by virtuous individuals who gain their leadership through heroic actions 
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and who gain followers by force of personality. What is interesting in this view is Weber’s 
discussion of the cycle through which enterprises pass, usually starting with a charismatic leader 
and entrepreneurial structure then, as they grow in size, the ventures inevitably transition into a 
bureaucracy. Once the bureaucracy solidifies and begins to suffer from the negative effects 
common to bureaucratic forms the business transitio into a traditional, feudal form leading to 
disillusionment and eventually revolt from those working in the business. This revolt raises up a 
new charismatic leader who decentralizes the busines , r turns to the entrepreneurial phase 
wherein success first appeared and the cycle continues (Max Weber, n.d.).  The history of Apple 
Computer is an example of this cycle in which founders Jobs and Wozniak built the company 
only to be pushed aside as the company grew in size and complexity and bureaucracy replaced 
entrepreneurial spirit. After years of drifting and floundering in a rapidly maturing market, Jobs 
returned to revitalize the company.  
Classical organizational theory emphasized a mechanized view of work done by workers 
who follow impersonal orders from expert managers in large bureaucracies. Although Mary 
Parker Follett tried to introduce the element of more democratic control and paying attention to 
the psychological needs of the worker (Natemeyer and McMahon, 2001), the general trend at the 
turn of the Twentieth Century was toward a rational system that did not fully take into account 
the personal wishes of the workers. 
Human Relations Theory 
 The aspect of psychological effects and workers wishes came to a focus with the 
Hawthorne studies of the 1920s and 1930s. This has been referred to in the literature as the 
human relations approach. In this development of administrative theory, researchers began to 
recognize the human element to work and the studies mentioned above revealed that most 
rationalistic theories did not take into account the feelings or sentiments of the workers. In 
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addition, the writings of Kurt Lewin, a refugee from Nazi Germany, helped create the field of 
social psychology and introduced ideas of group dynamics (Daniels, 2003). In conjunction with 
Lewin, Lippitt and White studied leadership and found that, of the three types – authoritarian, 
democratic, and laissez-faire, the democratic style of adership did not result in the most 
production, but did result in the highest quality, satisfaction among workers, and team 
cohesiveness (Boje, 2000). 
Behavioral Science Theory.  
This model of organization theory came from the work f Argyris and Maslow among 
others, and was known as the behavioral science appro ch. This approach considered all the 
major components of the organization while emphasizing contingency leadership, organizational 
culture, systems theory, and transformational leadership. Maslow is perhaps the most 
recognizable name in this phase of organizational theory. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs has not 
been empirically proven, but provides a satisfactory, intuitive explanation for the forces that 
drive behavior. Students, for whom the concept of fo d and shelter are daily concerns, are not 
likely to rise above the lowest rungs of the needs pyramid to the levels of self–esteem and 
eventually self-actualization.  
Argyris and Schön (1996) developed an idea that was at first “repugnant” to some in the 
field (p. xvii) that organizations were institutions that could learn. Whether all institutions could 
learn is no longer an issue, but rather whether the learning that occurs is productive or even 
desirable. Among the many intriguing concepts discus ed was the idea of single-loop learning 
(similar to a thermostat, discover an error condition and act to return conditions to an error-free 
state) and double-loop learning (question why the situation is the way it is and whether it should 
remain that way). In dealing with error conditions and means to rectify errors, Argyris (1999) 
noted that sometimes there are routines that act to hinder efforts at finding solutions. Often these 
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efforts to maintain the status quo are invisible and u -discussable. Some problems exist and 
cannot be discussed because the organization cannot cknowledge that policies or procedures 
within the organization create the problem. This is termed defensive reasoning. One form of this 
defensive reasoning in schools might be to overlook or refuse to accept the possibility of conflict 
between faculty and staff of a school and the central office. On the local level, conflicts between 
departments within the school, or between elementary and middle or high school staff, would be 
“un-discussable” because such conflicts would not be acceptable in a “good” school. 
Post Behavioral Theories.  
The most recent development in organizational theory is termed post-behavioral. This 
current trend is broad-based and includes issues such as democratic community, transformational 
leadership, moral leadership, and values and ethics, all of which have been described above. Also 
commonly found in post-behavioral science are critical theory, contingency leadership, and 
studies concerning gender, race or ethnicity and class.  
Most of the issues discussed in organizational theory were initially studied in the context 
of business practices and had limited relevance to education. Lunenburg (2003) and Maxcy 
(1995) reminded us that the rational or positivist system has long dominated educational 
administration. Positivistic attitudes are implicit in A Nation at Risk (National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, 1983) and the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 (U. S. Congress, 
2002). Post-modern efforts include such qualitative methodologies as ethnographies, case 
studies, and naturalistic inquiry.  
 As we attempt to understand the changes wrought by the arrival of devastating 
hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, or any other natu al or man-made disaster, we may realize 
that not all change is bad, sudden, or for that mater, undesirable. Schools react to change every 
day, every year, as students enter, mature, graduate or transfer, and occasionally die. Faculty 
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members gain teaching experience, marry, have children, and eventually retire or die. 
Administrators come and go. Change is a constant factor. One perspective on change that needs 
to be examined is how schools instill the needed skills to make use of what experience teaches as 
the years progress. One way to look at that is through an organizational learning perspective. 
Organizational Learning.  
Organizational learning may be defined as the way a group of people improve their 
capabilities to accomplish a task (Senge, n.d.). Senge postulates five “disciplines” of 
organizational learning: personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, team learning, and 
systems thinking.  
Leithwood and Jantzi (1995) examined school responses to policies initiated at the 
district and provincial level in Canada. An organizat onal learning perspective was used to 
determine why some schools react better to certain init atives than other schools. Schools with 
collaborative or harmonious cultures contributed to organizational learning. Conclusions drawn 
from the study include the following points: 
• Teachers learn mostly from informal contacts with fellow teachers and from their 
own classroom experiences. When problems come up requiring some form of in-
service training teachers do not usually initiate th  activity and often the process 
leaves teachers isolated in their efforts to make sense of what they learned.  
• District efforts are frequently underestimated – that is downplayed in terms of their 
effectiveness – but can have some effect on teacher learning, usually in association 
with effective policies and practices directed toward teacher development programs.  
• A crucial part of organizational learning is a coherent sense of direction. When there 
was a clear direction in which the school was moving teachers were able to make 
sense of a large number of initiatives. Even when teachers remain relatively isolated 
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in their classrooms, if the school is clear about its d rection the teachers can gain 
some benefits from organizational learning initiatives. 
• Some sources of sense-making in schools were relativ ly innocuous. Goal-setting 
efforts, sometimes for clearly short-term goals, may provide a sense of direction that 
persists into the longer term. Other sources include the culture of the school and 
vision of the principal as to what the school could become.  
Some schools reacted well to initiatives at reform; others were not so receptive, as 
described below. The success of organizational learning initiatives depended on many variables 
not the least of which were the climate of the school and the policies in place in the school. 
Principals play a large role in setting each.  
 Leithwood, Leonard, and Sharratt, (1998) continue earlier research on organizational 
learning by trying to identify those conditions that foster organizational learning. Five conditions 
are identified: a stimulus, out-of-school conditions, in-school conditions, leadership, and the 
outcomes. Results of the study suggested that leadership effects were frequently indirect, that 
school structures that encourage collaboration, shared decision-making, and cooperation 
facilitated organizational learning. Conditions of “uncertainty, lack of stability, and 
impermanence” often challenged organizations with centralized “planning, control, and 
direction” (p. 267-268). If a basic purpose of organiz tional learning is for schools to be able to 
restructure or reculture themselves, then they must have the capacity to be largely self-directed. 
Organizational learning is not successfully imposed from the outside. Members of the 
organization must have the flexibility and freedom to explore and collaborate on problem 
solving. Transformational leadership seems to accomm date those conditions best.  
 In the context of this research, organizational lerning may show some promise in 
explaining how well schools reacted to sudden change. If the school had a culture of learning 
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how to handle change and how to sustain effort, it may go a long way to explaining how well 
some schools dealt with events like the aftermath of natural disasters.  
 Goldring, Crowson, Laird, and Berk (2003) examined the change process of transitioning 
from schools under court ordered desegregation to ui ary status. The focus of their examination 
was the process of how to dismantle one policy while simultaneously initiating a new policy. The 
authors noted that leadership during transition is a poorly understood and little-studied topic. In 
their examination of schools in transition to unitary status, they note that three major themes 
have emerged: Transition from one policy to another can induce a real sense of loss; schools in 
transition must be able to adjust their framework t incorporate the new realities of reframing the 
vision of school as community within itself to one of existing within a geographical community 
with which it must reconnect; and finally, a sense of direction for the school that can, at the same 
time, see a leaving from an old reality while going to a new reality. Findings in this examination 
of leadership in transition reinforce the findings of Sergiovanni (1996b) regarding developing 
communities as relationships, place, and mind, and Fullan (1991) regarding the need to prepare 
the school in order to achieve lasting change. Sometimes instructional leadership means 
establishing the “social fabric…before getting to the work of instructional leadership” (Goldring, 
et al., 2003, p. 486).  
Summary 
Because of time constraints, this review of the litera ure was not comprehensive and does 
not represent all the research to date on these major themes. What is represented here is a 
generous slice of the empirical research spiced with reflections and commentaries of 
practitioners in the field. The consensus is fairly clear that schools are porous entities influenced 
from both within and without. The context and climate of the school dictates to some degree 
what can and cannot be easily accomplished. The presenc  of a strong or weak principal, in 
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juxtaposition with the climate, enables or dooms efforts at sustaining change processes or 
imperils the stability of an otherwise well function ng school. With the unfortunate arrival of a 
category 3 hurricane on the southeastern quadrant of New Orleans, followed within a month by a 
category 3 hurricane on the southwestern quadrant of Louisiana, this investigation will be 
concerned with change that is unplanned and unwanted. How do climate, culture, and 
community enable schools to respond to the sudden arrival of new students from devastated 
areas of the Gulf Coast? How does the formal and informal structure of the school, largely the 
result of the leadership practices of the principal, superintendent, or district policy influence the 
way schools respond to sudden change? Did the school need changes to the formal structure to 
accommodate the sudden arrival of displaced students and faculty? One year later, did those 
changes, both formal and informal, still remain in place? Were the policies that already were 
struggling with “normal” mobility of students sufficient to deal with the sudden flood of 
displaced families that resulted from Katrina and Rita? This study will attempt to determine how 
a district and several schools responded to the pressu s and strains of new students arriving with 




 The purpose of this single embedded case study is to examine a school district impacted 
by the arrival of large numbers of hurricane-displaced students to determine how the district 
administration and the schools responded to challenges of receiving, placing, and teaching 
thousands of displaced students. The case will comprise the school district and the embedded 
units of analysis will consist of the central office and each of several schools selected within the 
district that received displaced students. This chapter will contain four sections. The first section 
will describe the design used. Section two will describe the criteria for the sites identified for the 
study. Section three will describe the procedure fo selecting units for the case study. Section 
four will describe the types of data collected for the study. A summary concludes the chapter. 
Design 
Research questions dealing with “how” and “why” types of questions focusing on 
contemporary events are appropriately answered with case study formats (Yin, 2008). This study 
will use an embedded single case design as described in Yin (2008). The primary unit of analysis 
is a school district located in a mid-sized city in South-central Louisiana. This district was 
selected because it received more displaced students who met the federal definition of 
homelessness than any other district in the state – o her than the devastated districts near New 
Orleans whose populations shifted over a course of veral months from flooded schools to 
schools in higher areas. Embedded units of analysis within this study included the central office 
administration and several schools in the district. Five schools were initially considered, but two 
schools did not have sufficient populations of displaced students in 2005 and were removed from 
the case. Schools that had displaced populations of at least 9% at some point during the year 
were included in the study 
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 One rationale for using an embedded case study was to try to understand how the district 
was able to absorb thousands of displaced students in a two week period and why some schools 
responded well to challenges and improved their School Performance Scores (SPS) while others 
did not. This district was selected because in the we ks following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
the district received more students than any other dist ict in Louisiana except one of the 
devastated districts. By examining several schools in a single district, this study sought to 
identify commonalities and relationships that might avoid detection in a holistic case study. It 
also offered a greater chance to detect strategies to help maintain high levels of achievement in 
those schools.  
As Stake (2006) mentions, the situation will have influence on the activity under study, 
but because the activities of schools and the school climates are largely shaped by the leadership 
and conditions present in the schools, more than one site is required to gain a general 
understanding of the effects of Katrina upon schools in the study area. For that reason, three 
schools within a single district were ultimately chosen.   
Site Selection 
 Three schools comprised a group of schools whose administrators indicated a willingness 
to participate and had received large numbers of displaced students during the 2005-2006 school 
year. The initial choice of schools in the study sought to ensure a range of school circumstances 
and provide a rich source of data without making the project unmanageable. Another factor that 
was used in selecting schools was the School Performance Scores (SPS) of the schools. School 
Performance Scores are calculated using the results of s andardized tests administered in March 
each year, the number of absences, and for grades eight through twelve, the number of drop-outs. 
Standardized test scores account for 90% of the SPS. This project examined schools that had a 
broad range of School Performance Scores in 2005-06 ranging from a gain of over nine points to 
 60 
losses exceeding eighteen points. Schools selected for the study were PS-814, PS-813, and PS-
802. The changes in the SPS highlighted an intriguing combination of the large influx of 
displaced students and either large improvements or declines in SPS. Table 3.1 indicates the 
general school demographics as represented by October 3, 2005. That date represents the official 
report from the district to the State Department of Education. The data were taken from the 
Pentamation database, a commercial database used by the district in the 2005 – 2006 school year. 
Table 3.1. Selected Demographic and School Performance Scores for 2005-06 School Year. 
October 3, 2005 PS-802 PS-814 PS-813 District Total 
No. of Students 450 699 1,031 52,518 
% African-Am. 81.77% 65.67% 58.29% 78.18% 
% At Risk 52.44% 49.21% 53.83% 59.57% 
% Exceptionalities 10.44% 12.45% 10.67% 10.27% 
% ESL 1.11% .87% 3.92% 2.81% 
% Displaced 18.44% 13.88% 9.60% 12.34% 
SPS Change ‘06 -11.2 +9.7 -16.0 +0.2 
Accountability scores for the study schools in the 2005-06 school year, published in the 
fall of 2006, varied from an increase of 9.7 points (PS-814) to a decline of 16.0 points (PS-813). 
The average for the district that year, calculated using the data from the same reports (Report # 
10380) available on the State Department of Education website, was a gain of 0.2 (Louisiana 
Department of Education, 2007c). PS-814 Elementary improved a total of 9.7 points while 
hosting displaced students amounting to 13.88% of their population during the 2005 school year. 
PS-813 Middle suffered a decline of 16.0 points with a displaced student population amounting 
to about 9.6%. The percentages of displaced students at the schools were calculated by dividing 
the number of displaced students by the total school p pulation as reported October 3, 2005. 
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The three schools in the study had demographics that were slightly lower than the general 
demographics of the district. Kerbow (1996) pointed out that families tend to settle in areas with 
the same socio-economic characteristics as the neighborhoods from which they originally came. 
Many families had no choice in where they were settled. Many of those families were settled in 
and still remained in the same trailer parks two years after the hurricanes. Other families settled 
in with relatives who lived in similar neighborhoods to those in which they had lived before the 
hurricanes. Most of the displaced students attending the study schools were not from FEMA 
trailer parks, but from large subsidized rent apartment complexes in the schools’ attendance 
zones. 
Participant Selection 
 Selecting participants for this study was accomplished using purposeful sampling. 
Purposeful sampling is preferred in this study because, as Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest, 
certain subjects and participants can provide the most relevant data to the situation under study. 
Three individuals at the central office that I thought would be most useful as participants in this 
study were the superintendent, the chief academic Offi er (CAO), and the director of technology 
(IT). The superintendent was selected as a primary source of information concerning the 
planning for and support of displaced students entering the school system. The superintendent 
was also able to provide names of other personnel ivo ved in the planning and support of the 
displaced students. Using this snowballing method of sampling interviews were arranged with 
most of the executive leadership team members and several other individuals directly involved in 
the planning. Interviews were arranged with Executive and District Leadership Team members: 
the assistant/associate superintendants for instructional services (AS Area I – assistant 
superintendent of the elementary schools, AS Area II – middle schools), the director of equal 
educational opportunity (EEO), the director of human resources (HR), the director of child 
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welfare and attendance (CWA), the assistant superintendent for auxiliary services (SAS), and 
chief business operations officer (CBO). Other participants of the central office and school board 
staff included the school board vice president (BVP), the homeless liaison (HL), and the program 
analyst who was in charge of assigning students to the schools (PA). Schools selected for the 
study were schools that received large numbers of displaced students amounting to nine percent 
or more displaced population of students at some point during the 2005 – 2006 school year. 
Participants at the school level were principals, guidance counselors, teachers, and a librarian. 
 Before beginning the formal process, however, I contacted the district superintendent 
then school principals of the target pool of schools t  determine their willingness to participate in 
the study. This step was necessitated by a district policy requiring approval from the University 
Institutional Review Board before considering granting permission to perform the study. A 
formal letter of introduction to the Superintendent preceded the first formal contact with the 
superintendent. This communication included information about the researcher, an overview of 
the project, the significance of the findings, contact information, and a formal request for 
permission to conduct the study. Once their cooperation was assured I began to schedule 
meetings and interviews that would be necessary to develop an understanding of the participant 
schools. Copies of the letters are included in Appendix C. 
 Upon making formal contact with the principals of the participating schools, I requested 
interviews with each principal, each school counselor, and two or three members of the faculty 
who were present in each of the schools during the 2005-2006 school year. Faculty members 
were selected upon the recommendation of the princials of the schools. Faculty members also 
had to agree to participate and could remove themselves from the study at any time. Participation 
in the project was inconsistent across the study schools in that one school had only one member 
of the faculty willing to participate while another school supplied six volunteers. Interviews with 
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the faculty members lasted about 20 – 30 minutes. Interviews with principals lasted between 50 
and 90 minutes. Interviews with central office staff also lasted between 50 and 90 minutes. 
All participants were asked to sign consent forms before being interviewed. The consent 
forms stated the general purpose of the study and advised the interviewees that participation was 
voluntary, that confidentiality would be preserved in the final write-up, and that the interviewees 
had the right to withdraw from the study at any point without fear of repercussions. A copy of 
the consent form is available in Appendix B.  
The interviews were conducted on site by a team consisti g of the lead researcher and 
two assistants. The assistants involved in the resea ch were retired educators, each with over 
thirty years of experience in the field of education. One research assistant, a tenured Professor of 
English, recently retired from University of Louisiana at Lafayette; the other research assistant is 
a retired teacher and school administrator in St. Landry Parish, Louisiana. 
Data Collection 
 Two main types of data were used in this study: email correspondence and interviews. 
Since two years had passed since the hurricanes, most of the hardcopy materials requested of 
central office personnel and principals were no longer available. The primary source of hardcopy 
information was archived emails from the three primary central office sources: the 
superintendent, the director of information technology, and the chief academic officer.  To 
reduce the volume of material requested, emails addressed only to principals, Executive 
Leadership Team (ELT) members, and District Leadership Team (DLT) members as a group, 
from the superintendent, director of IT, and the chief academic officer were examined for the 
period from two days before the date of the hurricane to September 29, 2005 – the date of 
maximum displaced enrollment. 
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Interviews comprised the second major data source. Since the study is an embedded case 
study, interviews were requested with district officials: the superintendent and other personnel 
involved in the planning and execution of procedures to sign up, assign, and support the 
placement of displaced students. At the school level, int rviews were requested of principals, 
guidance counselors, and teachers from each school. One librarian also volunteered to 
participate. The primary focus at the school level was the principal, with interviews of guidance 
counselors, the librarian, and faculty serving as triangulation 
Oral History  
All interviews were conducted using an oral history methodology. The interviews 
consisted of a semi-structured format that allowed the interviewee much latitude in relating his or 
her experiences of the hurricane year while keeping the topic focused on the issues covered by 
the research questions. The oral history format is ppropriate because two years had passed since 
the arrival of the hurricanes. Much detail was lostin the intervening months or years, but 
significant impressions and insights had time to form.  
Oral history as a method has an ancient history, dating back to the works of Herodotus, 
generally acknowledged as the first true historian. Study of the great figures of history has been 
the most common approach; however, focusing on the average person has become increasingly 
common, as demonstrated by the Federal Writers’ Project, a part of the Works Progress 
Administration of the 1930s (Library of Congress, 1997). As Charlton (2006) explains, often 
“largely under- or even undocumented” people can reveal important themes (p. 4). In his 
discussion of the oral history as evidence, Grele (2006) expressed the tension between the 
traditional positivist historian’s position that historical documents like transcriptions of 
interviews are evidence, and the post-positivist understanding that the interviewer and the 
interviewee co-create a document. Grele states that “i  was clear that oral histories were 
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documents of the here and now about the then and there, fusing past and present in a complex 
web of interpretation” (p. 58). It is interpretation which concerns me in this project. It is 
precisely because the issue of currency may give the reader pause as years have passed since the 
arrival of the hurricanes of 2005 that the oral history perspective is relevant.  
Practitioners of oral history recognize that district administrators, and principals, staff, 
and faculty members of the schools impacted by the s orms of 2005 will have had time to 
assimilate the emotions and memories of that frantic year and come to some understanding of 
what occurred. Rather than a formal interview process where the interviewer may be tempted to 
direct the interview, where the researcher’s intentions are uppermost (Clandinin and 
Connelly,1994), in this study the interviews pose general questions, seek to clarify vague 
memories, expose and challenge contradictions, and evoke “assessments of what it all meant 
then and what it means now” (Shopes, 2002, p. 3), what Clandinin and Connelly (1994) suggests 
allows the participant’s intentions to be uppermost. Le t (n.d.) describes the emic perspective as 
focusing on “the intrinsic cultural distinctions that are meaningful to the members of a given 
society” (para. 2). In this project, it is importan to understand the activities of administrators and
faculties of the case study district and schools and how they described their activities during the 
hurricane year. Their assessments of what happened then and what it means now will tell us 
much of what they learned from the events of 2005 and after. It takes time for those assessments 
to form. Chamberlain (2006) reminds us that our memories and narratives are under constant 
reassessment and revision. “Lapses of memory have to b seen not as weaknesses in an oral 
account, but as evidence of the revisioning self” (p. 393). 
Interview Protocol  
This project ultimately will seek to understand theadministrative responses of the district 
and several schools to the new populations – answering the following questions. 1. How did the 
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district plan for, place, and provide support to the displaced students? 2. How did the school 
leadership impact the integration of displaced students into the existing school culture? 3. What 
problems impeded district and school responses to hurricane-induced mobility? 4. Did any 
changes become institutionalized in the district or schools’ policies and procedures? All 
interviews were audio recorded. Interviews with keyp rsonnel – the superintendent, chief 
academic officer, and director of information technology in the Central Office, and principals of 
the selected schools were transcribed, and rechecked for accuracy. Recordings were saved in 
digital form and multiple copies preserved. Interviws with other central office members of the 
ELT, DLT, and counselors of the study schools were transcribed. Interviews with faculty and the 
librarian were summarized. 
 The interviews with the superintendent and other key district personnel occurred after 
formal contacts were made in late October 2007. Times and places of the interviews depended on 
the participants’ schedules, but all took place in the participant’s office or a quiet conference 
room nearby. The interviews took up between an hourand an hour and a half with additional 
time later for member checking and follow-up questions or to follow up on leads revealed in the 
initial interviews. Central office interviews were conducted in November and December and 
concluded in January of 2008. Follow-up interviews were conducted late in the spring and 
summer of 2008 as participants could schedule time to meet. Some questions were very specific 
in nature and were answered in brief emails. The interviews from the central office focused on 
the planning for the arrival of the displaced students, what problems occurred and how they were 
solved, and whether any changes had to be made in procedures or policies of the district. 
Questions were also asked about issues of student mobility before and since the storms, 
leadership, and what was learned from the experiences of 2005. 
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 Building principals were contacted for initial meetings shortly after receiving formal 
approval from the district, to answer any questions about the project, and to set up convenient 
times to conduct interviews. Interviews at the schools ccurred in late November, 2007, ending 
in early December. Most interviews with the principals lasted over an hour and occurred in their 
offices or nearby quiet spaces. Principal interviews were transcribed and checked against the 
original recordings for accuracy. The interviews with principals focused on questions about the 
planning and placement of the students in the schools, known and unexpected issues that arose as 
students began to arrive in the schools, how the scool integrated the new students into the 
culture of the school, what issues of discipline arose, how the school planned for and how the 
students performed on the standardized testing that year. Other questions dealt with mobility 
issues before and after the hurricane year, whether any changes were made to school policies, 
and what reflections the principals had about their leadership style and what they lessons they 
had learned from the experiences of that year. 
The counselors, librarian, and faculty members were interviewed starting in November, 
2007. Interviews were conducted in the schools at times most convenient to the participants, 
depending on their duty schedules, or after school urs as was most convenient for the teachers 
and principals. The interviews with teachers and librarian were conducted in classrooms, 
teachers’ lounges, or the school library. Faculty in erview durations depended on the amount of 
time participants had available, but generally lasted between 20 and 30 minutes. Participants 
were provided with pseudonyms when they were quoted, therwise their comments were 
summarized. Interviewees were asked if they would be available for a follow-up interview after 
the initial analysis was concluded in the event thacl rification or more detail was be needed, as 
well as to afford the interviewee the opportunity to correct any errors or confirm the meanings 
initially ascribed to the data. This member-checking by the participants served to reinforce the 
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credibility of the project. Member checking was conluded by the summer of 2008. Questions 
posed of the counselors paralleled those of the princi als, but also included their specific 
functions as guidance counselors, their assigned activities that year, and what type of leadership 
they observed in their principals that year. Teachers were asked about their teaching routines, 
style, classroom discipline, and any changes they had to make to accommodate the displaced 
students in their classes. They were asked about the leadership style of their principals and 
whether they had learned or changed anything that persisted into the following year. 
 The researcher and two research assistants conducted on-site interviews with faculty 
members to shorten the duration and lessen the disruption of normal school activities. Interviews 
with the faculty members and the counselors were conducted the same day that the principals or 
the following day when there was not sufficient time to interview everyone. 
 After the initial rounds of interviews in 2007, it became clear that many other members of 
the central office were deeply involved in the planning for the arrival of displaced students and 
the support of those students. Interviews were expanded to include other members of the 
Executive and some District Leadership Team members, focusing particularly on individuals 
whose names were specifically mentioned in planning process. In the end I interviewed 16 
individuals from the central office. I withheld their names from this report. 
Review of Documents 
  District communications by email from the superintend nt, chief academic officer, and 
director of information technology addressed to school principals, ELT, and DLT were requested 
for the days immediately before and for the entire month following the landfall of Hurricane 
Katrina. The initial purpose for the emails was to erve as triangulation for the information 
gained in the interviews. Triangulation of data sources provides a more consistent picture (Yin, 
2008), especially when looking at the cases where individuals in the school context will be more 
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knowledgeable of what is happening at the school than e researcher. Since it would be 
impossible for me to understand everything in the limited time context of this study it was 
important that first and subsequent impressions gained from the participants were confirmed. 
Stake (2006) suggests three or more confirmations of each major impression to insure fidelity to 
the context. Information from these documents was used to shape some of the questions for the 
interviews and to pinpoint which central office personnel would be most valuable to interview. 
As the interviews progressed, it became necessary to construct a descriptive chronology of the 
events of September 2005 because many of the memoris of the participants were confused, 
contradictory, and muddied by the passage of time and subsequent events. The emails were used 
to construct the chronology and it is provided in Appendix D. 
Comments on the increased discipline problems made by s veral participants led me to 
visit the office of child welfare and attendance where I requested and examined the expulsion 
records of the study schools. This occurred in the spring of 2008. Cursory examination of the 
records helped corroborate the comments of several principals, counselors, and faculty members 
and also shed light on what part displaced students played in school disturbances.  
Identification 
 Participants and schools in the study were identifid by pseudonyms, even though many 
of the participants were well known figures in the district at the time. Schools were identified by 
identification numbers rather than their names. 
Pilot Study 
 I conducted a pilot study in order to sharpen data collection procedures, test the 
appropriateness of a written survey, the interview protocols and guiding topics, and ensure that 
the research assistants helping with the interviews gained the necessary familiarity with the 
interview questions and equipment. Interviews were conducted with three principals, two 
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guidance counselors, a director of curriculum, and seven faculty members of three schools in the 
district and in surrounding districts.  After the interviews, each participant was asked to comment 
on the clarity of the questions and the conduct of the interview. These interviews were recorded 
and reviewed; procedures for later interviews were r fined to improve the questions, 
presentation, and follow-up procedures of the main study. The written survey was piloted in two 
schools, and volunteer faculty members agreed to discuss the instrument after completing the 
survey. The pilot study was conducted as the 2007-08 school year began. Schools involved 
included a small private school and one public school fr m each of three nearby school districts. 
As a result of the pilot study I discovered that a survey intended for faculty members in 
the selected schools designed to reveal elements of sch ol climate, culture, and evidence of 
principal leadership did not yield much useful data. Discussions with the participants revealed 
several flaws in the survey that failed to identify he desired characteristics of climate and 
leadership. The universal reaction from all the post survey interviews led me to reconsider the 
usefulness of the survey as a tool, and instead I incorporated several items into the interview 
guiding questions to tease out some characteristics of limate, culture, and leadership from the 
principals, counselors, and faculty in the study schools. 
Analysis 
 Starting in November 2007 officials at the central office, principals, counselors, and 
faculty members of the selected participating schools were interviewed. Following preliminary 
examination of the interviews, unanswered questions remained and a second round of new 
interviews was initiated late in the spring of 2008 in an effort to answer the questions and include 
other individuals who played an important part in the planning and placement of students during 
the hurricane year. Interviews were recorded using d gital recorders and lapel microphones, 
saved to several separate storage devices as secure backups, and the interviews of principals and 
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most central office personnel were transcribed. Interviews with some staff members occurred 
late in the spring of 2008 and were summarized because the interviews were conducted to 
answer very specific questions that arose from the analysis of the earlier interviews. Several 
interview transcriptions had to be checked against the original recordings when errors in 
transcription were discovered that threatened the accur cy of the analysis. Reviewing the 
transcripts took many weeks before analysis could begin with confidence that the data were 
accurate. 
 Before analysis of individuals could be started an accurate chronology of the events in the 
district was necessary. Because so much time had passed since the hurricanes of 2005 memories 
had grown uncertain and participants were contradicting each other as to times and places. To 
avoid any more confusion I compiled the emails from the superintendent, chief academic officer, 
and director of technology batch-addressed to all members of the ELT and DLT, principals, and 
board members into one coherent sequence of events against which I could compare notes from 
the various participants.  
 The initial analysis of interviews was focused on the general answers to the research 
questions, attempting to identify the facts, by comparing facts revealed in each interview to 
interviews of other participants, and comparing statements against emails and the chronology. 
Some minor discrepancies surfaced during this initial review of the data. In some cases the 
discrepancies and contradictions were internal to the interview under examination and could 
have represented a deliberate effort to minimalize problems at the district office or school, 
deceive me about events, or, as I believe to be the mor  common reason, the participants were 
remembering events or connections that had at first eluded them, but, as the interview continued, 
old memories resurfaced. Most participants exhibited fuller, more detailed recall as the 
interviews progressed and memories began to firm up. Some instances of contradiction were also 
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detected when comparing responses of several partici nts from the individual schools or when 
comparing statements of participants at the central office. Because many of the participants were 
focused on their specific duties, many contradictions may represent a difference in perspective 
and not a deliberate effort to deceive me.  
 After the initial round of analysis revealed differences and contradictions in fact, and 
because some of the comments of principals and central office supervisors noted a surge in 
discipline issues, I examined the expulsion records from the study schools. Although the 
memories of serious discipline problems were vague, in general they were on target and revealed 
an increase of discipline problems over the previous year, a trend that actually increased the year 
following the hurricanes. 
 Clandinin and Connelly (1998) speak of the landscapes that encompass schools and the 
narratives that describe such landscapes. Knowing what happens at any school in this district 
must come from a variety of sources and must view the landscape from a variety of directions; 
like the elephant and blind men, there are many versions that must all be taken into account. 
There are many narratives that must be included in the description of this landscape. Each view 
carries with it messages of context and experience. However, no two narratives are alike, and in 
order to get a coherent view of the events at the various schools that comprised units of the case, 
I had to tease out common themes and attempt to make sense of them. 
I began a second round of analysis attempting to ident fy specific themes that emerged 
from the data. In this round I read through the scripts of each participant several times, 
identifying answers to the research questions in the narrative and collecting the statements that 
addressed each question. Then, as statements, phrases, or individual words emerged from the 
interview text as significant I grouped and categorized, using emic descriptors when they 
emerged, otherwise assigning categories that seemed appropriate. The process then proceeded 
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into clustering of the statements and phrases that appeared to have something in common which I 
identified as a central theme for that cluster. In order to “see” the relationships I drew concept 
maps, clustering similar items together and connecti g them to other themes. In the end, each 
school experience – each limited landscape in Clandinin and Connelly’s use of the term – 
revealed three to five major overarching themes. Reponses of each participant from either the 
central office or any of the three study schools were compared to other interviews from 
participants associated at that particular site for confirming or disconfirming themes. Most of the 
information gained from the examination of the emergent themes confirmed the “story” of the 
participants with few, if any, major differences. Like the story of the blind men trying to describe 
the elephant, each participant viewed the “elephant” of Katrina from varying perspectives and 
although the general consensus was very similar, each s w a different aspect of that challenge. 
Discrepancies that crept in were minor and could be explained as lapses of memory, confusion as 
to the timeline, or focusing only their own part of the “elephant” through the lens of their own 
experiences without knowing what was going on across the hall at the central office or at another 
school down the street.  
After examining each embedded unit of the case, writing up a description of that unit, and 
then considering how it all fit together, I wrote the case summary for the entire district. Then I 
turned my attention to themes that emerged from the analyses as being similar or dissimilar. 
There I noticed that, based on the focus and language sed in the interviews, two different views 
of the “elephant” took vague shape. The similarities and differences are discussed at the end of 
the chapter.  
The description of the central office unit of the case is described in Chapter 4. The 
description of the individual school units of the case are described in Chapter 5. The case 
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analysis of the entire district and the discussion of similarities and differences among the units of 
the case is incorporated in Chapter 6. 
Summary 
 This project used naturalistic, single case embedded design to study how hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita impacted schools in the east-central region of Louisiana. Central office 
personnel and several schools that received large numbers of Katrina refugees were examined to 
determine how they responded to the influx of students and whether they maintained their scores 
or lessened the harmful impact of hurricane-induced mobility on their school accountability 
ratings. Data were acquired from each school and the central office including archived emails 
and interviews with superintendent, and other key prsonnel in the central office, principals, 
counselors, and teachers. Interviewee selection was a purposeful sampling of administrators and 
other school personnel using a snowballing methodology. Principals and the superintendent were 
contacted and from their recommendations additional participants were selected based on their 
positions, activities, and degree of contact with dsplaced children or their role in planning and 
overseeing operations designed to get students into ch ols and providing support for the schools 
that received the students. Themes and categories were developed through the analysis of the 
interviews and document analysis that revealed conditi s present in the district and schools that 
fostered – or failed to foster – academic excellence. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS: CENTRAL OFFICE UNIT 
In this chapter the focus will be on the examination of the central office unit of the case. 
The research questions posed in this study covered four main questions: How did the district plan 
for, place, and provide support for displaced students? What problems impeded district and 
school responses to hurricane-induced mobility? What, if ny, changes became institutionalized 
in the district policies and procedures? To answer those questions I interviewed the 
superintendent and many members of the central office staff to attempt to understand how the 
district rose to the challenge of educating thousand  of displaced children. The schools were 
selected for inclusion in the project based on the siz of their displaced populations and school 
performance scores for the 2005-2006 school year.  
In the central office summary below and for each of the study schools the research 
questions will be addressed in order: Planning, placement, support, problems, and the changes or 
accommodations impelled by the arrival of displaced students. In Chapter Five unit summaries of 
each of the study schools will be reported. An overall case summary will follow in Chapter Six 
noting commonalities and differences among the schools and the central office.  
Central Office Unit Summary 
Primary interviewees from the central office were th superintendent, chief academic 
officer (CAO), and information systems director (IT); others interviewed from the central office 
included each of the assistant/associate superintendants (AS Area I – assistant superintendent of 
the elementary schools, AS Area II – middle schools), the director of equal educational 
opportunity (EEO),  the school board vice president (BVP), the homeless liaison (HL), a 
program analyst who was in charge of assigning students to the schools (PA), the director of 
human resources (HR), the director of child welfare nd attendance (CWA), the assistant 
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superintendent for auxiliary services (SAS), and chief business operations officer (CBO). 
Additional information is gleaned from emails acquired from the central office, specifically 
batch emails sent to all principals, board members, executive and district leadership team 
members, and staff from the superintendent, chief academic officer, and director of technology 
covering the dates August 27, 2005 through September 29, 2005.  
Central Office Chronology, August 26 – 31, 2005 
Most members of the central office were aware of the magnitude of the threat that 
hurricanes posed to the school system after suffered the effects of Hurricane Andrew which 
struck Louisiana as a Category 3 storm on the 26th of August, 1992. Although that storm did not 
strike the district directly, the effects of the hurricane caused serious physical damage to the 
school system and the city. There were many in the sc ool system that had some experience to 
direct the planning for the hurricanes of 2005. TheBVP recalled the school system had had to 
replace the roofs of several of the campuses and buil ings after Hurricane Andrew and thought 
that the system would be in good shape to weather the arrival of Hurricane Katrina. 
 “We knew it was going to be big here” the superintendent stated. It was the 
superintendent’s responsibility to make the determination of whether or not and for how long to 
close the schools. Some of the schools in the school system were designated as shelters. 
Although it was technically possible to open schools while being used as a shelter, it was not 
likely that the schools would open with displaced families there.  The CAO did not recall any 
specific conversations or meetings about the hurricane on the Friday before, but mentioned that 
the director of facilities would be directly involved in damage assessments and helping 
determine which schools would be able to re-open. The SAS remembered meeting with her staff 
on Friday the 26th of August to verify contact numbers and begin plans for an evaluation of the 
facilities, particularly the food storage areas andfreezers, if needed, as soon as the storm passed. 
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The IT director sent emails to principals about the efforts to secure the network system by getting 
equipment off of the floor, unplugging everything, and warning of the likely disruption of 
network and telephone systems from the impending storm. Shortly after that he forwarded to the 
district leadership team (DLT) a list of emergency phone numbers and web addresses submitted 
to him by the public information officer. The superintendent, although out of town early that 
weekend on a personal trip, had assigned two employees, including facilities director, to attend 
meetings of the office of emergency preparedness (OEP). As early as Saturday midday they 
knew that the district would be receiving some signif cant effects from the storm, at that time 
spinning up to category five strength in the Gulf of Mexico. The time frame for the main effects 
of the storm was correctly identified as late Sunday night and early Monday morning. 
Communications between the superintendent and IT director continued through the weekend 
both by email and cell phone. Sunday, as the storm approached, the superintendent was 
constantly updated by various staff members, and was reminding the staff and principals that at 
least four of the schools in the system had been designated, or were on standby, as emergency 
shelters as of 11 AM Sunday while the storm was still 19 hours from landfall.  At that point the 
superintendent advised school personnel that the schools would be closed two days and, after the 
passage of the storm, as soon as it was safe to do s , damage assessments would be made by the 
director of facilities and site administrators. An hour later, around noon on Sunday, a list of 
hurricane tips was distributed to administrators and staff. The CAO recalled that everyone 
“hunkered down” and waited out the storm.  
The superintendent began monitoring the situation as early as 3:30 AM on the morning of 
the 29th of August. The decision to close the schools due to storms is made very early in the 
morning to allow communications with the news agenci s before the early morning programs on 
radio and television. Most participants noted that closing school Monday, the day the hurricane 
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struck, was expected and that reopening would depend on damage assessments and availability 
of power. 
 As soon as the worst effects of the storm had passed, full time personnel from auxiliary 
services began to assess damage and determine the condition of the various buildings in the 
school system. Power was out in large areas of the ci y, but school board personnel were already 
in the process of transporting food from cafeterias without power to warehouses that still had 
power. ARAMARK, the company contracted to maintain the schools, and the facilities crews 
were inspecting buildings for leaks or damage. Food service was already trying to locate new 
vendors to replace the former food vendors who were from the New Orleans area and were no 
longer responding to efforts to contact them. The op rations side of the district was in feverish 
activity from late Monday and into Tuesday before th other district officers began to plan 
meetings the following day, Wednesday August 31st. 
 The superintendent remembered the days immediately ft r the storm as being filled with 
“meetings after meetings after meetings.”  The superintendent sent out an email to the DLT, 
principals, and board members late Monday night, August 29th, urging site administrators to go 
out and inspect for damage. Tuesday was largely taken up in damage assessments. No school 
board meetings had been planned yet. Power was out thr ghout most of the city and the central 
office was without power except for the IT department which had battery backup systems and its 
own gas-driven emergency generator. The network, telephones, and email in that part of the 
building were operational. The CAO recalled lots of c mmunications that day. Email was out 
unless the recipient was lucky to have had power resto d early. Landline telephones were 
working because land lines are independently powered by the telephone company (which had its 
own battery backup and generators). Cell phone service was spotty and overwhelmed by the 
increased volume of calls from New Orleans area displaced families as well as the heavy volume 
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of local callers. At that point, the extent of the flooding in New Orleans had not yet become fully 
appreciated. In the superintendent’s email the evening of the 29th, the superintendent noted that a 
meeting would be held at the office on Tuesday the 30th, to assess the extent of damage and 
consider reopening the schools. No mention was made yet of any impact of the children of 
Katrina on the school system. At this point I will leave the chronology and address the research 
questions in order. Because the first research question had three parts I will describe each 
element of the question separately. 
Planning   
 The academic side of the district began to address the problems posed by the hurricane 
and its aftermath Wednesday, August 31st. The superintendent and other staff members arrived at 
the central office to find the building dark and locked except for the IT department. The first 
meeting of the executive leadership team (ELT) was moved to an elementary school nearby 
because they had electrical power. The atmosphere at th meeting was variously described as 
somber, emotional, and somewhat chaotic, but the participants quickly rallied and began problem 
solving; assessing the current situation, identifying problems, and then focusing on finding 
solutions to those issues. Preliminary decisions had to be made, but information was needed 
before any decisions could be reached. The homeless liaison advised the assembled staff that 
hurricane-displaced students fell under the definitio  of homeless children under the Stuart B. 
McKinney-Vento Act, the Education for Homeless Children and Youth Program (1987, 1990) 
and specific requirements had to be met according to federal law. Under the McKinney-Vento 
Act a child is classified as homeless if they (a) shared housing with other families because of 
economic hardship or loss of housing, (b) lived in motels, hotels, trailer parks, or camp grounds 
because of lack of alternative housing, (c) were using areas not normally designated as a 
nighttime residence such as park benches, (d) or wh were living in cars, abandoned buildings, 
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or other public spaces. Such children were entitled to free transportation, free lunch and 
breakfast, and admission into the school regardless of the lack of documents required of all other 
non-homeless students (U.S. Department of Education, 2002). After a briefing on the Stewart B. 
McKinney-Vento Act (1987) the ELT and as many of the DLT members as could be found 
began to plan for the expected arrival of displaced stu ents into the school system. From the start 
the district focused on accountability and documentation: Who was in charge of what, and how 
was everything going to be documented? The basic form used to enroll students was a one page 
form from the homeless office. The director of child welfare and attendance recalled being told 
that the first printing would produce 5,000 copies and she remembered thinking they would 
never need that many. Eventually the district received over 11,000 completed or partially 
completed forms.  
 Before leaving the elementary school that day the superintendent met with the media and 
assured the people of the city that the district was preparing a plan to register displaced children 
into the school system. Thursday, September 1st, the meeting site was changed from the 
elementary school to a conference room at the “Station” for an emergency school board meeting. 
The “Station” became the temporary central office headquarters. The ELT, DLT, and most 
principals were in attendance as the school board met and voted emergency powers so the 
superintendent could conduct school business without calling additional board meetings; the one 
major stipulation was that the board leadership be kept informed about decisions being made. 
This proved to be decisive in reducing the workload. The CAO noted that by reducing the 
amount of work dedicated to preparing for board meetings, the district staff effectively freed up 
half of their productive time to devote to handling the problems at hand. 
 The first step in the process was to develop procedures to handle a large influx of 
students, develop forms to document what was done, and identify legal or procedural roadblocks 
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and correct them. The Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act drove the solution to the problem of 
developing procedures; the law is explicit in what c n and cannot be done in serving homeless 
populations (1987). Forms were developed for transfers, transportation, and school assignment; 
all were printed on colored paper to help identify the level of school and speed the sorting 
process. Federal and state mandates had to be examined and any obstacles to the process of 
registering and placing thousands of new students had to be removed. The district’s legal counsel 
helped to identify and clear obstacles with the various state and federal authorities. One of the 
most important issues was consulting the federal district judge overseeing the resolution of a 
long-standing desegregation case. Strict guidelines a d enrollment caps were in place limiting 
the number of students who could attend the various schools in the district and those caps had to 
be relaxed if the district was going to be able to absorb displaced students from hurricane-
stricken areas without at the same time violating the provisions of the Stewart B. McKinney-
Vento Act (1987). 
 Meetings were held two or three times a day in that first week after the hurricane in order 
to develop and fine-tune procedures for enrolling students into the system. The superintendent 
insisted on having a plan in place and specific individuals with designated duties. While the 
superintendent was constantly in meetings with the various departments in the city and the OEP, 
the central office staff worked on identifying problems and developing solutions. The CAO 
described the daily routine that settled into place ft r about a week as starting with a morning 
meeting to review the previous day’s decisions, then after a day of work an afternoon meeting 
reviewed what had been accomplished, identified what as not working, and considered 
adjustments. At the end of those long days, the CAO would return to his office to summarize 
what had been identified as problems, what issues were still under consideration, and what 
decisions had been made. These summaries were then sent to all ELT and DLT staff, school 
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board members, and principals in what later came to be called “Midnight Missives.” By the 
Saturday after the hurricane the district had establi hed a rough outline of the procedures that 
would need to be followed to enroll students, had identified the main obstacles to reopening the 
schools, had located new sources of supply and support for the daily operations of the district, 
and had already begun to register new students. The district had begun to transport displaced 
families from the several schools in the district then being used by the Red Cross to larger 
shelters at the convention center downtown and scattered across the city. The schools needed to 
be repaired, provided power, and supplied with the materials and furniture to accommodate new 
students. “We did a lot of work within the first 24to 48 hours, making decisions and setting up 
processes,” the CAO recalled. Registration started as early as Thursday for people who could get 
to the central office and at the “Station” to register their children. Teams of central office 
personnel were pulled together, briefed, and sent to the various shelters around the city to 
encourage families to sign up their children, as well as get a general feel for how many students 
the district should plan to educate. Transportation had to be arranged to carry students from the 
shelters to the schools. The CAO took up residence at the “Station” for the three or four days 
leading up to Labor Day. Many of the “midnight missives” were actually transmitted as late as 
nine or ten PM. According to the CAO, one of the most significant decisions made early on was 
whether to disperse the displaced students or to concentrate them in a few places. The human 
resources director recalled that several options were considered, but the initial option of dispersal 
was chosen. Dispersal or concentration was debated efore the full extent of the numbers of 
displaced students was actually known. Both options had problems: dispersal would mean 
greater problems with transportation; issues like restructuring routes, extended drive times, and 
finding drivers and buses would present significant problems; on the other hand, concentration 
would alleviate some of the transportation issues, but would violate specific provisions of the 
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Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act (1987) and could cripple the district with high rental, 
construction, and equipment costs to convert large empty buildings into learning spaces. The 
child welfare and attendance and the homeless offices were “vitally involved” in the planning 
because of their intimate working knowledge of the Act and its requirements. The district 
ultimately settled on a mixed response, reopening two schools specifically for displaced students 
and dispersing the remaining. The CAO noted that the wo schools housed only about 10% of the 
displaced students.  
 As the planning progressed schools were slowly being brought back online with electrical 
service. The district had fared well considering the devastation a hundred miles to the east 
because it was on the lee side of the storm and missed the worst winds and rain. Trees were 
felled by the wind, broken limbs knocked out power ac oss the city and some minor flooding and 
roof damage was reported. The media was constantly updated with the plans for the reopening of 
the schools and with registration plans. The superint ndent also made use of the telephone 
notification system to inform the parents of school plans. Because power was spotty, some 
principals and DLT members did not get the earliest messages; many took it upon themselves to 
contact the central office when and as they could. Chain of command was used to disseminate 
decisions and procedures to be followed upon reopening the schools. ELT members made 
decisions and informed the principals through the assistant superintendents. Phone calls, personal 
contacts, and emails, went out to principals who then instructed their staffs as to the procedures 
to be followed.  
 The superintendent was in constant touch with the OEP because the school system in the 
city was the largest employer. “Once I opened school,” the superintendent stated, “that was 6,000 
people on the street again; and 600 buses” – and over 48,000 students. Streets had to be cleared; 
signal lights had to be repaired; power had to be reconnected to the schools – all of which would 
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restore a “sense of normalcy” back to the city.  PS-816 Middle School and PS-8124 Elementary 
School (school designations changed) were already in the process of being converted for other 
uses and had to be returned to service as elementary schools. Whatever had been done in the 
conversion process was swiftly reversed and the spaces made useful for instruction again. The 
work was completed by contractors working “24 – 7;” some of the time was donated by the 
workers to get the schools ready in time for the displaced children. Also, the schools had to be 
equipped, supplied with the proper materials and furnit re, reconnected to telephone and data 
services, and staffed. The two schools would house displaced students from shelters; they were 
staffed with displaced teachers and administrators. This technical violation of the Stewart B. 
McKinney-Vento Act (1987) – concentrating some students rather than dispersing them to 
schools that they would otherwise have attended – was forced by the circumstances and 
conditions in the district, but was also considered an appropriate course of action in that the 
faculty and staff, being displaced, would provide a stronger empathetic connection to the 
children because the staff would have had the same exp riences as the children. 
 Teams continued to visit the shelters and enrollment forms began to flow back to the 
central office. Personnel were assigned to handle cal s and donations from concerned people, 
schools and school districts across the nation, and from outside of the country. The director of 
equal educational opportunities was assigned the task of keeping the records and contacts of 
donations and requests to help, a task that grew enormous very quickly. Warehouse space had to 
be reserved for the literally tons of materials sent to the school system and personnel worked 
hours loading and unloading materials. Responding to the requests to help was a major chore that 
took up much time with as many as 400 emails arriving daily from across the nation and 
employees were often staying as late as nine or ten O’clock at night trying to reply. The director 
of EEO was also part of the approximately 20 staff members who visited the large shelters 
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downtown to encourage people to sign up their children. This group assisted in helping displaced 
families locate and be reunited with family members who had been separated while being 
transported and was responsible in part for reuniting over 100 families with lost family members, 
many of them small children who had been separated while being transported, or who were sent 
to different shelters.   
 The emotional impact began to tell as staff members would lose control of their emotions 
and have breakdowns while driving to or from work, or when confronted by an irate parent over 
a decision that had been made. There was great pressure to get the schools open the day after 
Labor Day to reestablish some kind of “normalcy.” As the applications for enrollment began to 
mount, staff members were called to the central office to key data into the database. A program 
analyst (PA) had the task of assigning the students to schools that had capacity to take new 
students. The registration was centralized at first, but quickly spread out across the entire district 
and parents were encouraged to bring their children to the nearest school to fill out enrollment 
forms. The forms were then collected and taken to the central office to the data entry personnel 
to key the information into the system. A significant feature of the “Midnight Missives” was the 
updated count of enrolled and assigned students. The data were compiled into spreadsheets and 
were attached to emails to all principals, DLT, and ELT members. The updates would go out 
several times a day in the first two weeks, settling into a routine of an AM update and a PM 
update disseminated by the IT Director.  
By Labor Day evening all schools had been reconnected to the power grid and were 
ready to re-open. Displaced students would not begin arr ving until the following week in order 
to give the school assignment PA time to ascertain which schools could begin taking in new 
students, time to get a broad idea of the numbers for the purpose of ordering sufficient food and 
supplies, and time to arrange for uniforms and other clothing for the new students, most of whom 
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had only the clothes they had packed or were wearing when they left the hurricane-devastated 
areas. 
Placement  
In the first several days the district designed and distributed several protocols for 
enrolling the displaced students. There were templates for telephone contacts with parents, 
routing request forms designed to help with transportati n, school uniform request forms, and 
enrollment protocols to account for the lack of documentation that plagued registration efforts. 
There was also a “Frequently Asked Questions” document to be shared with all enrolling 
families. 
Already mentioned was the strategic plan for dispering students across the entire district. 
The CAO was adamant about several points concerning the strategic plan: the timing of the 
arrival of students, the decision to disperse the sudents, and the effects of that decision. 
Displaced families arrived in the city in two distinct waves. The first wave began to arrive two 
days before the storm arrived; families drove themselves out fully expecting to return a few days 
later. The CAO recalled that researchers from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette requested 
and received data on the first several thousand applic nts and discovered that the demographics 
of the families were essentially no different from the demographics of local city natives. The 
second wave arrived almost a week later and represent d people who could not, or would not, 
leave the New Orleans area before the storm. The first wave quickly found living 
accommodations and settled in for the several months it ook to drain and start restoring services 
to New Orleans and its environs. The second wave did not have the financial resources to 
purchase or rent accommodations and had to live in shelters or FEMA trailers. They had little, if 
any, choice in where they settled. They arrived by bus at a shelter and many departed soon after 
for other shelters, shelters in other cities, or shelters out of state. Regardless of whether the 
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demographics of the second group were different from that of the first wave, their later arrival 
and reluctance to be separated from their children m ant that many enrolled later, in some cases, 
months later.  
A second point made by the CAO was that Houston, Texas, which ultimately received 
about 20,000 displaced students and their families, chose to concentrate large numbers of 
displaced students in relatively few of the schools nearest the shelters and that decision led to 
immediate resistance from the local school communities. The CAO noted that this district chose 
to spread students across as many schools as were conv nient to the shelters without straining the 
bussing capacity of the district. This had both positive and negative impacts on the system. The 
pain of taking in so many students was spread across most schools in the system; unfortunately, 
dispersal also meant that not only did the displaced students suffer disruption, but to some 
degree, almost all local children had to suffer some disruption and make their own adjustments 
as relatives moved in and shared living spaces with them. The CAO insisted that in spite of the 
disruptiveness caused by the arrival and constant shifting, the decision to disperse was “the right 
thing to do.” 
 Initially the enrollment centers included the instruc ional resource center next door to the 
central office and the “Station.” The plan quickly grew to include teams to enroll as many 
students as possible from shelters and was broadened to include all schools in the district. Emails 
from the IT Department requested updated information on any new shelters, or changes to 
existing shelters, so that school board personnel wou d be able to reach every family and every 
student. Families were encouraged to enroll at the nearest school to their current address. An 
email alerted the central office to the rumor that d ta entry personnel would be paid at a reduced 
rate. This was quickly corrected by the superintendent. Workers would be paid the appropriate 
scale for overtime. Most of the workers worked a full day at their normal jobs then reported to 
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the central office to continue data entry until nine PM. Daily reports tracked the growth of the 
applications. On the first day back to school for local students, September 5th, the district had 
already accumulated enrollment forms for about 3,200 students. By the following Monday, 
September 12th, the day displaced students began reporting to their assigned schools, the rough 
enrollment count had risen to over 6,500 students. The superintendent commented that the 
district had enrolled another entire district in a m tter of two weeks. The school board vice 
president, commenting at the October 20, 2005 school board meeting, stated that the feat was 
even more remarkable; the average district size in the United States was under 3,000 students, he 
noted; this district had enrolled the equivalent of two school districts in about two weeks. 
Support 
A third part of the research question concerns the support that the schools and the school 
system received in their efforts to provide what the displaced families and students needed. 
Much of the support that arrived was unsolicited.  The director of EEO was assigned the task of 
keeping records and responding to inquiries and donati s. The task quickly became 
overwhelming as hundreds of calls and emails poured into the school system. The superintendent 
recalled that the phones were “ringing in here likeit was the White House; it never stopped, with 
people calling to offer help.” Individuals, schools, school districts, schools from out of state and 
some from out of the country offered money, materials, – every conceivable thing that could be 
of use – and a lot that could not be used. So much was coming in or being offered that the district 
had to post instructions on its web site about where to send materials, clothing, uniforms, books, 
and money. Some contributions were useful and accepted such as construction materials and 
monetary donations, but others like clothing, food, l  computer equipment and outdated or 
unapproved text books were not accepted. When useful materials were offered the district was 
happy to pay the shipping. Some districts rented trucks and delivered the materials directly. 
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School board members and administrators drove throug  the night to deliver materials from 
distant states. One memorable occasion the donors left North Carolina the day before Hurricane 
Rita struck and arrived to find the city once again feeling the effects of a category 3 storm system 
and undergoing power disruptions, but made the delivery anyway. A U-Haul truck from a district 
in Pennsylvania arrived the day after Hurricane Rita, having been delayed in Mississippi by the 
arrival of that hurricane. 
A second major source of support for the district, after a series of meetings between 
FEMA and the superintendent and staff, came in the form of fully stocked portable classrooms as 
requested by the superintendent. Construction began shortly before the Christmas break. This 
continued through December and January with the first classroom ribbon cutting ceremony being 
held at PS-802 January 17, 2006. Ultimately, FEMA provided 78 fully equipped classrooms on 
30 school campuses. What was unique about that arrangement was that FEMA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers transported or built many of the temporary buildings on the campuses. The 
usual procedure was for schools to build the classrooms then for FEMA to reimburse the schools 
for their construction costs. The superintendent did not want to go that route because of prior 
experiences with the slow rate of reimbursements from FEMA. Given the prior experiences that 
the superintendent had had with FEMA, the urgent need for classroom space, and the uncertainty 
of what other financial burdens would appear, the superintendent was firm in a desire to get 
FEMA to build the classrooms. The district was fortunate in that no other large districts were in 
the position to advance their own plan to build capacity; the district, in effect, helped write the 
plan that FEMA used.  
A third aspect of the support that the district provided to the displaced families involved 
the lengths that the various administrators and schools went through to provide what families 
needed. Already mentioned above was the assistance provided in reuniting families separated by 
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the exodus from the New Orleans area. Assistance was also provided on an ongoing basis by 
teams of staff headed in general by the directors of the child welfare and attendance and 
homeless liaison offices. Staff members were regular visitors to the shelters across the city and 
later to the large FEMA trailer parks trying to identify families that had not yet registered their 
children in the school system. The teams returned frequently and maintained direct contacts with 
people living in the trailer parks because families continued to come and go in large numbers. As 
the students began to attend the various schools it became clear that some families did not want 
to release their children into the care of the school system. Many families needed additional 
assurances, as did some of the children, and in the first weeks the school system allowed parents 
to accompany their children to the schools on the bus to be reassured of the safety of the 
campuses. Some parents preferred to keep their children close by and utilize makeshift schools 
there in the shelters, but the district made a strong effort to encourage the students to attend the 
public schools. The children, and their parents, needed “a little bit more security” in the 
beginning. Special needs were identified and appropriate assistance was provided. By the end of 
September the CAO reported in his “Midnight Missive” that the school had processed 8,976 
applications to enroll and had assigned 6,821 students to schools. The superintendent urged 
schools to be ready to provide students with uniforms; “they may come to school one day 
without a uniform; by the second day they should have it.” “Students will not look displaced,” 
the superintendent insisted. 
Problems 
 Problems faced by the district in implementing its programs fell into several major 
categories: Physical space and materials problems, staffing problems, legal and procedural 
issues, mobility issues, discipline and a variety of lesser miscellaneous issues. Each of these will 
be covered in more detail. 
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The immediate problem that the district faced was dmage assessment and repair of 
storm damage. This was the main concern of the first day after the passage of the hurricane. 
Most schools were without power for the first several days. In that respect the district fared well 
and by reopening day, September 6th, all schools were open to receive their regular students. 
Registration continued for displaced students through the weekends and week of September 3rd 
through 12th. It was increasing apparent as time passed that the district would have to absorb 
thousands of new students as the situation in the New Orleans region became better known. The 
extensive flooding of the city meant that the children would not be missing school for a few days 
but rather weeks or months. As the director of CWA noted, the initial printing of 5,000 homeless 
applications was far short of the actual number that was needed. As the number of applications 
swelled, the district had to locate materials, desks, and classroom space to accommodate the new 
students. The district contacted other school district  across the state and across the country for 
surplus desks, textbooks, and other materials. Initially three schools had been identified as 
shelters used by the Red Cross to temporarily house displaced families. When it was apparent 
that the displaced families would not be returning because of the extensive flooding, the 
superintendent closed the shelters in the schools and contacted the mayor and other key 
community leaders to transport the families to shelters in other locations. This freed up space at 
the schools, but did not improve the growing shortage of classroom space. Class size limits 
across the district were relaxed and the average class size grew between three and four students 
per class; this was still under the state’s maximum limits, but was a noticeable increase. Every 
grade level experienced increases in class size, but the district managed to hold the numbers 
below the state maximum. 
Some of the issues about locating materials were solv d sooner than most expected as 
donations began to flood into the district from other states, and some from other countries. The 
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flood of materials became a problem in turn as the district had to allocate warehouse space and 
personnel to handle the influx. Much of the material w s useful, much was not. That posed a 
problem for the district in that it took time and personnel to sort through the donated materials 
and separate what could be used from what was not useful. Some of the materials arrived within 
days of the hurricane; shipments continued to arrive as Hurricane Rita came ashore along the 
Louisiana-Texas border about three weeks later. Clothing and food were offered, all of which 
had to be turned away. The district forwarded much of t at aid to charities like St. Vincent de 
Paul. Monetary donations were also being offered to the district and the various schools. 
Although the Director of EEO was responsible for acknowledging and keeping track of 
donations the superintendent recognized that donations and contributions were also going 
directly to schools and asked principals to acknowledge each donation that they received. The 
donations tracked by the central office were possibly the smallest portion of what was donated to 
schools, principals, and teachers directly as cash or gifts and were not reported to the central 
office.  
Locating materials and furniture was not the largest problem the district faced; there was 
also a shortage of classrooms, faculty, and staff. As soon as teachers from New Orleans realized 
that the city would not be reopening the schools any time soon they began to apply with the 
district to work. Lists of applicants were assembled and incorporated in spreadsheets provided to 
principals. By March of 2006 the district had hired 314 additional employees, 269 of which were 
teachers. Of the 314 new employees, 286 were hired between Katrina’s landfall and the arrival of 
the displaced students in the schools. Another related issue was one of finding place in the school 
to house new classes. Some schools were forced to utilize gyms and auditoriums as additional 
learning spaces. As the CAO explained, when a class size grows over the maximum, a new 
teacher is needed, and that means finding space, furniture, materials, and text books. Ultimately, 
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the space problem was partially alleviated by the construction or delivery, by FEMA, of 78 new 
classrooms.  
By far, the most serious and persistent problem faced by the district in the weeks after the 
hurricane was locating more buses and drivers. As the student numbers mounted, the district had 
to provide new routes to the two reopened schools and additional routes from shelters and trailer 
parks to the other schools in the district. The superintendent recalled being interviewed by CNN 
and making a plea for drivers. The HR director also recalled making the rounds of morning news 
programs. Although the district had some spare buses, most of those were older and not always 
fully road worthy; but the worst problem was the lack of experienced drivers. The superintendent 
contacted the Orleans Parish superintendent for infmation about their bus drivers assuming that 
there would be many drivers willing to relocate and work for the district. They received none. 
The district had to accommodate an increase of almost 6,800 newly enrolled students with a bus 
fleet that had been adjusting to a downsizing district that was losing students to newly created 
and neighboring school districts. In the years before the hurricane two small school districts were 
created in the parish, taking with them almost four thousand students.  To compensate for the 
lack of drivers the district considered and eventually opened a third tier for 23 bus routes. The 
third tier used the buses that delivered students to schools set to start classes at 7:00 or 7:30, 
turned around and picked up students who would attend schools that started their classes at 8:00 
or 8:30, then start a third route for schools opening at 9:00 or 9:30. Thirteen new buses were 
eventually added, buses were leased, and almost all of the school routes were lengthened. The 
HR director noted that most of the new drivers had to have additional training before starting 
work. Many had been driving trucks or long haul rigs, but were not accustomed to carrying 40 or 
60 children who needed to be watched while at the same time watching the road. Night training 
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was initiated to certify the drivers quickly. Where buses were unavailable, parents were asked to 
bring their own children to school.  
Legal and procedural issues posed by the arrival of so many students had to be resolved. 
The district was at the time still under the jurisdiction of the federal district court as part of the
desegregation case that had been litigated since the 1970’s. Schools had enrollment caps and 
district lines had been drawn for the purpose of balancing students along ethnic lines. These 
enrollment caps had to be removed in order to accomm date the new students. The district legal 
counsel was tasked with the job of identifying all legal roadblocks to increasing class sizes and 
placement of displaced students. Within days of the hurricane the district court had removed the 
enrollment caps. The district also had to overlook the attendance zone boundaries as schools 
started to fill up and space could no longer be found for children within the attendance zone. 
Buses sometimes passed up schools within that attend nce zone and brought students to the next 
school with space, sometimes passing two schools before unloading. This would continue to be 
an issue as families left shelters or found other accommodations, putting the bus fleet under more 
strain trying to keep up with the shifting population.  
Another issue that proved to be problematic was the absence of documentation. Students 
registering in the district are usually required to pr vide birth certificates, immunization records, 
transcripts, and proof of residence documents. Most displaced families had none of those 
documents. The Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act (1987) requires schools to accept homeless 
students without any of the usual documentation. The lack of documentation posed a problem to 
the district in that they had no way of knowing in which grade to place the students, what 
services to provide, or how to accommodate any special needs unless the parents informed them. 
The issue was partially resolved when the State Department of Education provided historical 
academic data to the district, but the data were incomplete in that it did not cover every child, or 
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lacked the most recent information. The district, lke the individual schools receiving the 
students, had to accept the word of the parents, some of whom were not sure, or even aware of 
what services had been provided to the children. Some f the caregivers were grandparents or 
other relatives who had no knowledge of the accommodati ns to which the children were 
entitled. The opportunity to deceive the district was not lost on some parents who misrepresented 
the grade level of their children. Some of the staff registering the children recognized the 
attempted deception by the look on the children’s faces. One staff member recalled warning 
parents that they could check the state database about their child’s prior placement even though, 
at the time, the information was not yet available.  
A related issue was the students who had not attended school in their former districts and 
had little or no interest in attending schools in aew district. There are no specific numbers 
available for absent students. School principals were instructed to attempt to determine how 
many students were definitely not planning to attend their schools (designated “No Shows”) so 
their reserved seats could be reassigned. Students who had been registered, but who were not 
attending were kept on the rolls because, considering the problems with transportation, they may 
not have been able to physically get to the schools. “No Shows” was the label applied to students 
whose guardians specifically stated that the children would not attend the school. 
There were great difficulties in locating parents who could not be contacted after 
originally enrolling their children. Families had moved on to shelters out of state, had found 
relatives willing to take them in, had moved to different school attendance zones, or simply 
chose to keep their children out of school. From emailed reports in mid-September the numbers 
were mounting. Of the roughly 5,500 students enrolled, only about half were “warm bodies” – 
physically attending – and only 350 were confirmed “No Shows.” 
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A minor issue in that it was not mentioned often, but one which the superintendent 
considered important was the attempt to buffer the schools from the constant intrusions by news 
media and later by academic researchers interested in studying the effects of the hurricanes on 
the students and their families. Such buffering is common in that the superintendent and 
principals are vitally interested in keeping their schools on as normal a routine as possible. 
Constant requests to interview students, family members, and teachers, if accepted, would have 
disrupted the school routine and exacerbated the lost instructional time that all the schools were 
facing. “We had to protect the kids from the media,” the superintendent noted, “it was just a 
disruption to the [school] day.” Multiple sources at the central office used the phrase “normalcy” 
as a desired outcome of the effort to get schools back open. Constant interruptions prevented a 
sense of “normalcy;” and, in reference to the media, there were also concerns about the reportage 
of school incidents. “Sometimes the media gets it mixed up a little bit,” the superintendent noted; 
it was a common sentiment among many of the staff interviewed in the district as well.  
Matters of discipline more often than not violated he sense of normalcy in ways that had 
little to do with any clash of cultures between displaced and local students. Examination of the 
expulsion records of the study schools were revealing. Of the 110 students who faced expulsion 
hearings from the study schools only six were displaced students (5.45% of the total hearings). 
One student was an elementary student, the rest were middle school children. The most common 
infraction was disobedience/or disrespect although there was great variety in the infractions that 
led to the expulsion hearings. There were only two major breaches of peace in the district, one a 
fight during a pick-up basketball game in May of 2006, the other a more serious incident, brawls 
between displaced students and local students that lasted two days in September of 2006. The 
great majority of expulsion offenses concerned local r neighborhood issues, or, as the CAO 
noted, “universal” issues like “talking to each other’s girlfriends or boyfriends.”  
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A consistent problem that confronted the district was the constant, relentless mobility of 
students. This issue had much to do with the shifting of families to and from shelters, or in the 
chaotic early weeks of the crisis, the struggle to locate missing or separated family members, 
find relatives who had room to take in displaced families, or the shuffling from shelter to trailer 
park that marked the entire fall of 2005. The superint ndent insisted on tracking the displaced 
students so the district could recover any reimbursable expenses. Several factors combined to 
make tracking of students problematic.  In the earli st days, when families were being 
transported from refugee centers in the New Orleans area to shelters in the city, many families 
came into the centers, registered with the Red Cross, filled out applications to enroll their 
children in district schools, and then were shifted to ifferent shelters, shelters in other cities, or 
shelters out of state. The applications were collected and processed, but lacking current 
telephone numbers or up-to-date addresses, many of the families could not be contacted again. 
For some time they were still counted as enrolled. The district PA – the district school 
assignment officer – assigned the children to schools and then it became the schools’ 
responsibility to contact the families to complete th registration process. Thousands of students 
may have fallen in that category of having enrolled but not registered; for weeks there was no 
way to know for certain what happened to most of them. Other families remained in the shelters 
for weeks before finding more permanent housing in the city. Their children were enrolled, 
assigned, and many were transported to the schools where some semblance of a “normal” routine 
could begin. Some families filled out applications, but may have never intended to allow their 
children to leave the shelter out of fear of separation or fear of the unknown quality of the 
schools to which their children had been assigned. Another problem of registration was the 
impatience of some families who wanted their children in school, but because the central office 
was processing hundreds of applications a day, or because of outdated contact information, they 
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were not immediately informed of the school assignme t. Many of those families went to 
another school and applied again, creating a duplicate record that was not always immediately 
recognized as a duplicate.  
There was no way to know for certain how many children of school age lived in the 
district and were not attending school at all. “We w re sending a bus to where they were and 
they weren’t getting on it,” the IT Director stated. The superintendent echoed the sentiment. The 
superintendent knew that many students in the district were not attending school, “I see them at 
different times during the day,” adding that it was difficult to plan for “the number of parents 
who did not hurry to put their children in school.” The superintendent spent hours at shelters 
talking with parents, assuring them of the safety of the schools, and the need to get the students 
into a normal routine.  
A minor issue that was problematic of the program to enroll and educate the displaced 
students was the resentment of local students for all the attention that the displaced students 
received. “Students that were here before…thought they were the forgotten kids,” the 
superintendent stated. The attitude was “what about us, we’ve had to adjust also.” As the year 
progressed, the strain on staff, faculties, and stuents mounted and resentment began to appear 
more often in behavior and even voiced in occasional comments among over-stressed faculty or 
staff. 
  Another casualty of the storms of 2005 was the lost instructional time in the district. 
Hurricane Katrina cost the district five instructional days with at least one other day lost to 
Hurricane Rita; a total that does not, on the surface, ppear to be great, but the effects of the 
turmoil of enrolling, dropping, and adding, or simply not attending school for weeks or even 
months was worrisome. The district was attempting to start new programs as the year opened and 
the storms cost the district anywhere between 60 and 90 days in which to implement the new 
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programs. Two major district-wide initiatives were planned that year. One initiative was a state 
mandated program called the comprehensive curriculum, an effort to get all instructors teaching 
the same subject to be within a few days of each other in the timing of their lessons. This was a 
response to the acknowledged mobility issue that plagued the system before the storms. If every 
teacher of a particular subject was within a few days of each other, then students who transferred 
to different schools in the district would not be as f r ahead or behind their classmates when they 
entered their new classes. The strategic accountability plan was also in the implementation phase 
as the storms struck. This plan had three overarching objectives: to increase student achievement; 
to promote safe, caring, and service-oriented schools; and to improve communication and 
community engagement. It was this initiative that the CAO felt had been most seriously delayed. 
The storms, he noted, “had set us back a good year.” By the time things had started to settle into 
a routine in the district several members of the central office attended a two day retreat with their 
partners in the Stupski Foundation to plan ways to get back on track with the initiative. The 
Stupski Foundation is a California-based organization that works with superintendants and their 
executive teams in urban school districts to improve school districts holistically (Stupski and 
Stupski, n.d.). Unfortunately, there was little time left to implement the plan because students in 
Louisiana undergo their iLEAP and LEAP testing in mid-March. Instead of focusing on the 
initiative since August of 2005, the district could return to the plan only in the spring and had, at 
best, two and a half months rather than the expected seven months to implement the program. 
The CAO noted that there had been none of the anticipa ed improvement that year. 
Accommodations and Changes 
This question concerned any changes made by the district n response to the crisis. 
Several differences in procedure emerged as the district began to feel the effects of large 
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numbers of registrants for school that September. These changes generally fall into three general 
areas of concern: School board level actions, stateand federal actions, and school level actions.  
The first of the three areas was the decision made by the school board to vote 
extraordinary powers to the superintendent. This action alone made it possible for the district to 
react to events quickly and effectively without returning to the school board for permission to 
proceed. Events were moving very rapidly in the first weeks and the superintendent had to make 
a series of decisions that ordinarily require school b ard approval. In particular, two schools had 
to be opened that had earlier been closed and were und r renovation when the storm hit New 
Orleans. Suppliers had to be located to replace the vendors who had been based in the New 
Orleans region. Decisions had to be made concerning class size and locating space and staff for 
the schools that would be receiving large numbers of displaced students. All of these decisions 
needed to be planned, implemented, and evaluated on the fly and waiting for school board 
meetings for approval was not an efficient option. The school board met Thursday, September 1, 
2005 to vote extraordinary powers to the superintendent. For the following 30 days the 
superintendent could act as long as she kept the school board leadership apprised of what was 
happening. The board vice president recalled that the extraordinary powers were renewed at least 
once. The emergency powers expired November 20, 2005. 
A second area of change was in the area of satisfying state and federal guidelines 
concerning the desegregation case that at the time was still under federal court supervision. 
Schools had enrollment caps in place at the time, and although most schools were under the caps 
at the start of the year, some schools, because of planned, and court authorized, changes to 
attendance zone or repurposing schools to magnet status, were at or over the limits significantly. 
PS-813 Middle was already greatly above the limit because the district was building a new 
middle school and was positioning itself to adjust attendance zones the following year. 
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Regardless of the status of the schools in August, by September, with thousands of children in 
shelters or living with friends and relatives, the schools would have to find accommodations for 
those above and beyond the established limits. Within a week the attendance caps were removed 
and the district was free to make what changes weren eded.  The normal registration 
requirements of documentation concerning age verificat on, immunization records, residency 
requirements, and proof of grade level and services were waived for any child deemed homeless 
under Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act (1987). The district had to accept the parent’s word for 
all of the usual information. The state had to grant waivers “automatically” due to the 
requirements of federal law. “You don’t know what grades these kids were in and so there was 
some testing and there was just some trust, too,” stated the superintendent. The CAO’s 
recollections were in agreement, adding “you have to take what they say and act on it…[but, 
some] people misrepresented what grade [their children] were in.” 
Schools also had to make changes to basic operating procedures as the displaced students 
began to arrive. School times in a few schools had to be changed to accommodate the changes in 
transportation service because of the shortage of buses and drivers. For several schools in the 
district a third tier of routes was created to make more efficient use of the buses they had. Class 
size limits were relaxed that year as schools filled the few gaps in their enrollment and the 
numbers continued to mount. The CAO noted that the district had to increase the average class 
size from the pre-hurricane ratio toward the state’s maximum. In this case for grades K – 3, the 
minimum was increased from 26 – 1 toward the state ratio of 28 – 1; for grades 4 – 5 the district 
ratio rose from 27 – 1 toward the state ratio of 35 – 1; for grades 6 – 12 the ratio rose from 29 – 1 
toward the state maximum of 35 – 1. The actual numbers in the classes were held below the state 
maximums, and varied from school to school and from week to week. Students were bused from 
their address of record to the closest school with space, sometimes violating the attendance zone 
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boundaries. This shifted somewhat in the spring of 2006 as shelters began to close and families 
found other residences, and as FEMA classrooms became available. The attendance zones did 
not shift that year, but some families were allowed to request transfers to schools closer to their 
new addresses as classroom space came available. McK nny-Vento (1987) requires districts to 
allow students to remain in the school in which they first register, but with cooperation of, and at 
the request of, the parents, students can be transferred to other schools – in this case, schools 
with space closer to their new residences. Many parents took advantage of those transfer 
opportunities, shifting their children once again. 
No new administrative structures were created to handle the crisis. One ad-hoc committee 
was formed to plan with FEMA for the purpose of authorizing and placement of temporary 
classrooms to ease the overcrowding that was developing in many of the schools in the city. The 
committee had to project where most of the displaced students would eventually settle and 
request classrooms for the most likely affected schools. By November 2005 the sites had been 
chosen and new classroom construction or delivery of trailers was underway. 
One final accommodation to the usual procedures in the district was a special waiver 
granted to students of Ben Franklin Magnet School in New Orleans. A group of parents 
approached the district administration with a request to keep their students together at one of the 
magnet high schools in the city. This request was not u usual - many parents attempted to get 
their children into the district’s magnet programs, but as a general rule, magnet programs are 
strictly limited in size and were generally always at full capacity. This particular group of parents 
was accommodated in their request after a meeting wth the superintendent. The children had 
been identified as gifted, deserved the services, and one of the magnet schools that provided 
those services had the room. 
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No permanent changes were incorporated in the operational procedures of the district. All 
of the operations that occurred during the hurricane year fit within the current operational 
structure. Some staff members took on additional, temporary duties for a few months. Members 
of the ELT took on some additional responsibilities in their general area of expertise, but those 
functions gradually transitioned back into normal operations as the influx of students began to 
subside and many of the families began to move backto New Orleans and the other affected 
areas. None of the interviewees could cite any permanent differences in procedures or policy in 
the district, noting that the structures already in place were sufficient to accomplish what needed 
to be done.  
All interviewees were asked if there were any recommendations that they could make to 
improve procedures in the event of another similar crisis. In this area there were suggestions 
from all interviewees. The superintendent noted that t ey should be adjusting their emergency 
plans in all the schools to account for sudden increases in student population. Improved 
documentation was also mentioned as the superintendent looked back on the hurricane year and 
noted sadly that they had few, if any, photographs or other forms of documentation to show what 
the district accomplished in the fall of 2005. The CAO added that there should be a standing plan 
to meet immediately after an event like Katrina at  secure, powered site to begin planning for 
recovery efforts. He felt that a whole day had been lost [the Tuesday after the hurricane] when 
the district could have gotten “one more day ahead of the curve.”  
Additionally, in reference to data on district students, a centralized data warehouse that 
would hold all data on all students in the district would help schools identify the needs of the 
students and could be accessible to any administrator or teacher who needed to know about their 
students. The superintendent also noted that a statewide database would facilitate student 
registration and new employee hiring. The homeless liaison also had a broader vision of a 
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statewide database holding all the identifying information on each child. The IT director spoke of 
constructing a disaster recovery site that would serve as a back-up data repository updated daily 
and which could function in a limited fashion as a network center if the main computer center 
went down. He expressed the concern that if the district lost the main computer center it would 
lose data on all of the students, accounting, bookkeeping, payroll, and HR capability. The district 
would be seriously crippled.  
Another recommendation from the child welfare and attendance director was to have the 
IT department equip an emergency site with computers and equipment in a facility large enough 
to handle large crowds.  This “one stop shop” would have school staff sitting at tables to take 
applications, answer any questions, submit the application, and inform the parents at that time to 
which school their child would be assigned, which bus would be running, and where and when 
uniforms would be available. In addition, staff members and other professionals could be there to 
take care of all the other needs that the parents may have – medical, psychological, physical – all 
located in the same center. The AS I, who first arrived in the district as the crisis was unfolding, 
recommended updating the emergency plans because the dis rict was in close proximity to major 
cities near the coast and was in harm’s way, but also suggested counseling services ready not 
only for the students and parents, but also for faculty and staff. 
There is also evidence of what did not change. In particular two points were mentioned 
by the superintendent: testing and discipline. Maintaining standards were mentioned by others at 
the central office and some faculty members as well. The superintendent made the decision not 
to suspend LEAP and iLEAP testing that year, even though the state later gave them the option. 
“[We] did not know at what level many of our new students came to us,” the superintendent 
noted, “…the concern was: How effective would our testing be?” But the district gave the tests 
and informed teachers and students that the LEAP would count. That decision was not popular, 
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and the state later decided to allow the system to calculate the accountability scores with and 
without the displaced students and count the better of the two scores. That year the scores were 
mixed with some schools including the displaced scores in the calculations and others not.  
Discipline was another area that remained consistent. “We did not lower our standards of 
discipline,” the superintendent stated, “…we kept the same rules we have of zero tolerance…. 
When you have the large numbers of students you have to maintain…as tight a control in the 
discipline as possible, because you had more students in the class.” The district did suffer 
through an increase in discipline problems. There were more kids, and “so, kids may have kind 
of acted out a little bit more than they normally would have.” In one of the study schools there 
were more discipline issues that year as expressed through an increased number of expulsion 
hearings that year, at the middle school level. Comparisons of the expulsion records across the 
years before and after the hurricane reveal that in 2005-06 the schools in the study had 
approximately twice the expulsion hearings than the year before, a trend that actually increased 
the year after the hurricanes, increasing from a combined 56 hearings in 2004-05 to 110 the 
2005-06 year, and 127 in the 2006-07 year. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS: SCHOOL UNITS 
 Interviews were conducted at the three participating school sites. The interviews focused 
on the research questions: How did the school plan for, place, and support displaced students? 
How did the leadership of the principal impact the int gration of the displaced students into the 
culture of the school? What problems impeded the scools’ responses to hurricane-induced 
mobility? What, if any, changes became institutionalized in the school’s policies and practices? 
School principals were willing to give up time to describe their memories with most interviews 
lasting over an hour during school hours. The central office provided printed reports of the 
school’s demographics during the period of hurricane-induced displacement. Five specific dates 
were selected for examination because those dates refl cted school populations at important 
points in the school year: August 11th, (opening day); August 26th, (the Friday before the 
Hurricane Katrina); October 3rd, (the date that districts report school demographics to the State 
Department of Education); January 3, 2006, (the first day of the second semester); and May 10th,
(the last reporting date for the year). Each date offers an important snapshot of what was 
happening in each school through the course of that year.  
Another general note for the schools below is the apparent anomalous changes in at-risk 
rates as the year progressed. Students identified as homeless are automatically provided free 
lunch status, but as the year progressed the district began to examine the actual status of the 
families. In addition, evaluations of free and reduced lunch status are only reported twice a year, 
at midyear and at the end of the year. That may explain the large changes in the percentages 
reported below as students identified as having free or reduced lunch status are described as 
being “At Risk.” Additionally, because the schools were still under federal supervision in a long-
running desegregation case, each school was limited to a maximum number of students. This 
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number, identified as a consent decree cap, is used to calculate the number of seats available in 
the school in the 2005-2006 school year. It is the “Seats Available” figure that is provided in the 
school level tables below. 
PS-802 Elementary School 
 Interviews were conducted at PS-802 Elementary December 6, 2007. The lead 
investigator interviewed the principal, the investiga ng team members interviewed several 
faculty members at the school and the school librarian. The school counselor was no longer at 
the school and could not be interviewed. Although only two complete recordings of the 
interviews were obtained due to recorder problems, the team took notes and the responses 
included in this summary are based in part on the written notes and the complete recordings that 
were obtained. PS-802 is a small elementary school in an upper middle class neighborhood along 
a tree–lined boulevard. At that point in the city several attendance zones converge and several 
schools are lined up along the boulevard within a mile and a half of each other. The walls of the 
hallways are covered with pictures, awards, student art, and colorful bulletin boards. Interviews 
of the faculty were conducted in a large, well-equipped library. The team was greeted promptly 
at the door by a courteous clerk, and the interviews began immediately. Principal Coryn was 
cordial and appeared comfortable with the interview, providing a frank and succinct assessment 
of the hurricane year with little evidence of confusion, though she did admit that not all of the 
memories were altogether pleasant. The interview took place in her office. Faculty interviews 
were conducted in the school library. 
 School demographics were taken from reports generated by the central office and some 
of the information is summarized in Table 4.1 below. 
 PS-802 opened the school year on August 11th, with 353 students and room for only ten 
more students as established in the consent decree caps. Of that number 284 were classified as 
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black students and 69 were non-black (the only ethnic designations identified in the report). As 
reported in Table 4.1 above, this corresponds to a percentage black population of 80.5%; the 
district-wide average was 76.4%. Free and reduced price lunches at the school – a common 
measure of poverty and identified here as at-risk – amounted to 65.7%, slightly below the district 
poverty rate of 68.5%. 
Table 4.1 Demographic Snapshots of the School Year 2005-2006 – PS-802 
 PS-802 Elementary 11-Aug 26-Aug 3-Oct 3-Jan 10-May 
Population 353 355 450 427 425 
% Black 80.45% 80.28% 81.78% 81.26% 83.06% 
% At-Risk 65.72% 63.38% 52.44% 78.92% 76.00% 
Seats Available 10 8 -87 -64 -62 
% Displaced   18.44%a 12.89% a  12.22% b 
Mobility   36.89% a 65.56% a 91.78% a 
Note. a Percentages calculated for % Displaced and % Mobility were derived by dividing the 
number of displaced and the number of adds plus drops by the school population as of October 3 
numbers submitted to the State DOE. b Displaced data was not available for schools on the last 
day of class. The value provided was taken from a report generated using data from April 4, 
2006. 
 
 By October 3rd, 95 students had arrived at the school, an 18% increase in under a month. 
The at-risk rate changed from 63.4% to 52.4%. Mobility for the school increased dramatically. 
By January the school had a 69% rate of mobility. By the end of the school year, the mobility 
rate was 97% and at-risk rate had settled at 76%. The population of the school was 425 by the 
last day of school, 72 students more than the initial s udent count. 
Planning 
 Planning for the influx of students started with a general meeting of principals and 
secretaries the Wednesday after the hurricane struck New Orleans. Communications between the 
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central office and the principals initially were bytelephone. Planning for the arrival of the 
children then moved to the individual campuses where the principals would instruct their staffs 
and faculties of the overall plan and any modifications that would be necessary for the particular 
campuses. The PS-802 Elementary staff members were advised by faculty meetings, memos, and 
one-on-one meetings with the principal. The principal met initially with some of her “key 
teachers” to begin the planning process. “Lots of planning” took place to find the necessary 
materials and prepare for the displaced students who would be arriving a week later.  She 
described her approach as collaborative, usually involving discussions with teachers and 
planning through problems in group sessions. She knew that she had room for some additional 
students and eventually got about 100 new students, bu  materials for the students were needed. 
Teachers began to put together packages for the new children, drawing on left-over resources 
from an earlier grant, locating PS-802 Tee-shirts, and any uniforms that they could find. PS-802 
children were recruited to act as “welcomers” and were paired up with new arrivals to help them 
learn the campus, locate the lunchroom and library, and meet their new classmates.  
Placement 
As the first students arrived they and their parents were brought to the library and 
presented with their packages and told to put on their PS-802 Tee-shirts right away so they 
would not stand out. The packages also included gift cards so the parents could purchase 
anything they needed. The gift cards were suggested by the Assistant Superintendent for Area I 
(Elementary Schools). As the school librarian noted: “Once you’re here, you’re [a PS-802] 
student.” Parents were invited to participate in school activities through several events built into 
the school calendar. The principal noted that parents, as a general rule, appeared to welcome the 
invitation to join in school activities by attending the Thanksgiving lunch, Christmas Program, 
Mother’s Day Tea, and Book Fair.  Such school functions were attended by a large number of 
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the displaced families. The school was located in an attendance zone that was generally occupied 
by working poor families. Many parents held two or three jobs, therefore, could not normally 
attend many school functions. Displaced parents seemed determined to help their children 
achieve “normalcy” as quickly as possible, and having the time and desire to do so, attended 
many of the functions in large numbers.  
Support 
Support for the displaced families and students came from many directions. Within the 
school the staff assembled the welcoming kits that included school essentials, school tee-shirts, 
uniforms, and long pants. Some teachers and the school ounselor went shopping for whatever 
materials the students lacked and assembled everything into the kits. The principal recalled an 
evening when she felt that some stability had arrived at the school and the displaced families at 
the school were invited to attend a gathering. On this evening more donations were distributed, 
and parents were given the opportunity to show their appreciation in a video that the school 
made. Parents were given the opportunity to say thank you, but most “didn’t know who to tell 
thank you to.” The resulting video was burned to DVD and sent to donors so they would know 
that their effort to help the displaced families was appreciated.  
I CARE, described as providing “prevention education  students in the areas of alcohol, 
tobacco, other drugs, violence, crisis response and management” ( ICARE, n.d.), provided 
counseling services to the students with visits two times a week, or more often when called. 
These services were made available to students whenfaculty or staff noticed unusual stress or 
reactions. The support was needed, as many faculty and staff noticed the emotional problems in 
some of the students.  
 Students at PS-802 pitched in to help the new students. In addition to the “welcomers,” 
students in the classrooms paired with the new students to help show them the ropes. Since no 
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special classes were created for the displaced studen s, they found themselves mixed in with the 
regular classes, sometimes four or five to a class. Students in those classes sat with them to help 
get them “on track” and “up to speed.” They were told hey were PS-802 students and the same 
high expectations for behavior and achievement was expected of the new students. Students at 
the school tried to teach the new students “the way e do things at PS-802.” The students and 
teachers were sensitive to the new students and tried to relate to them and make them feel 
welcome. Teachers and staff were also under much stress in their own personal lives. Some 
faculty members had spouses involved in operations in New Orleans that continued for long 
hours through the fall of 2005; some in law enforcement, others helping restore electrical power. 
Many had family living with them who were displaced by the storms. 
 Support also came from FEMA when new trailers were moved onto the campus. 
Donations poured into the school from around the state as well as from across the nation. The 
volume of materials coming in was “overwhelming,” and, as the principal related, kept arriving 
even during Hurricane Rita. A truck loaded with donations from a school in North Carolina was 
personally driven down to PS-802 and arrived the day Hurricane Rita made landfall. Principal 
Coryn directed the truck to the school and helped unload as power started to fail in parts of the 
city. The principal treated the driver, a principal from North Carolina, and her daughter, who 
helped drive the truck, to supper while the outer bands of the storm raged across the city. The 
truck had been loaded with toys and athletic equipment for the students at PS-802. Letters and 
gifts arrived from as far away as Taiwan, with an offer to begin pen-pal relationships with 
students at the school. One “gift” that was not disributed was an air pistol that resembled an 
automatic weapon. Principal Coryn marveled at the thoughtfulness of the Taiwanese children, 




 Several comments in the discussion pointed to a comfortable working relationship 
between the principal, the faculty, and the school c mmunity. The principal mentioned meetings 
at the school with her staff to plan for the arrival of the new students and the initiative taken by 
several of the staff members to find resources and clothing for the new children. Additionally, 
Principal Coryn described her style as collaborative, nvolving her staff and faculty in decision-
making at the school suggest a high level of compassion and a comfort zone of shared 
responsibility frequently cited in research as transformative, and as conducive to building school 
community. Expectations were high for discipline and cademic achievement, in spite of the rash 
of discipline issues that appeared early on in the fall of 2005. Communications with the faculty 
were open and productive. Communications were open also with the parents, but circumstances 
in that year were such that most of the year and next w re taken up in mourning for what was 
lost. Faculty and staff had to deal with the long term effects of the grief and unresolved anger. “It 
was real hard to deal with and try to constantly be supportive” in the face of parental anger over 
academic problems or discipline issues.  
 On the positive side, the school made use of what tools they had to teach to the children. 
Principal Coryn used data analysis to understand the weaknesses and strengths of the students 
within in the school and how to address those weaknsses. Participation in school activities was 
open to all parents, but because of the high poverty in the area many parents were working and 
could not attend school functions; displaced families were not working could attend academic, 
social, and sports functions at the school. 
 Any faults that appeared were associated with inexperience. Principal Coryn noted that 
2005 was her first year as principal at PS-802. The biggest weakness that emerged from our 
interview was her attempt to relieve the pressure on her faculty by taking on much of the burden 
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of handling the donations and gifts that deluged the school after the hurricane. Rather than call 
around and seek help from the PTO and local churches, she tried to take on the task herself. “I 
was a fairly new principal…and I probably would now reach out and say ‘we’ve got to get some 
help so let’s get some people in here, I can’t do all this.’”  
Problems 
The volume of donations and requests to help proved to be a mixed blessing at PS-802. 
No one was expecting the overwhelming volume and was generally lacking the space to store the 
materials sent to the school. The school was located in an area populated by many working poor, 
the principal did not want to ask too much of the local parents in helping sort out the materials. 
This proved to be, in retrospect, a problem. “We just didn’t have a lot of help…it was just 
overwhelming keeping up with the donations.” Parents were having a hard time and struggling 
financially, she “didn’t want to create any…antagonism or…animosity” by involving local 
parents in distributing the donations to displaced families. Teachers were just so “exhausted with 
huge classes” and “kids constantly coming and going, coming and going” that she felt she had to 
try to handle things herself. Although there were loca  churches – one directly across the street 
from the school – she did not call them for help, though help would most likely have been 
happily granted. 
 Teachers had to deal with classes that had grown larger than they were accustomed to 
teaching. Teachers also had to face the daily frustrations resulting from constant mobility; the 
head count in the classrooms changed almost daily; “if it didn’t,” noted a third grade teacher, “it 
was amazing!” Some classes grew by as much as a third, notably the second and third grades. 
The special education class grew from six to fifteen. Many of the children had not been in school 
for weeks. In January, some 10 to 12 more students arrived; they had not been in school since the 
hurricane struck in August. We “didn’t have a large population of kids in the 4th grade;” the 
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principal stated, “the kids that came and went in the 4th grade caused problems for…our existing 
kids…we knew we lost instruction with them.” The “problems” were not discipline issues, rather 
it was that the students were far behind their peers academically and the teachers were worried 
about what effect that would have on their testing. When testing time arrived, most of the 
displaced 3rd graders scored unsatisfactory on the iLEAP. Third grade test scores plummeted. In 
contrast, 85% of the local PS-802 kids did very well, but not enough to counter the effects of 
testing the students who had missed so much school. Teachers recalled that the students coming 
in seemed to be focusing on things elsewhere and not on school.  
 The constant turnover of students that year created disruptions everyday in which 
teachers would have to stop, introduce the new students, and “show them the ropes.” This 
activity continued from the beginning of the school year through the fall and spring semesters. 
While walking down the hall on May 1st , only a few weeks before the end of school, the 
principal still heard teachers explaining to students “Okay, now, here’s the rules of the 
classroom.” The hurricanes played a larger part in the affairs of the school than just sending 
nearly a hundred students in September. School demographics changed that year and after. The 
large apartment complexes in the attendance zone began to house more poor families who 
attended the school; and as the poverty rose, mobility rose. “The last two years, it has been 
horrible,” Coryn stated, and that is why “[our] test scores don’t really mean anything.” 
 District-wide mobility rates were reported at 46%; “I sincerely doubt that,” the principal 
stated. Some schools in the district have mobility ra es of 100% or more. The most stable schools 
in the district still have mobility rates of 40% - 50%. During the 2005-2006 school year at PS-
802 the mobility rate was 97%; by the end of the year, out of a final population of 425 students, 
253 students had entered the school and 160 had dropped from the school. Only 10 of the 60 
students in the 5th grade started at PS-802 and still remained there trough the end of the year. 
 115
 Emotionally, the toll of the hurricane year was very heavy. Some students reported that 
they had many relatives living in their apartments and houses. One parent described living in a 
house with 70 relatives and friends. Children were st ssed with family, crowded living 
conditions, attending new schools (for the displaced) or attending a much more crowded school 
(for the local children). The stress was felt in several ways, both by the children and later by the 
parents. Discipline issues described in the interviews arose at two separate times at the school. 
Although the school had few fights before the hurricane, after Katrina local students had more 
discipline problems after the arrival of the displaced children. Interviewees speculated that local 
parents, fearful of the influence of displaced children from New Orleans, urged their children to 
stand up for themselves and not be pushed around. The kids “were very defensive,” Coryn noted. 
Many of the students and faculty were unsure of howthe displaced children would react when 
they arrived. Later, the displaced children began to show signs of stress and especially their 
parents began to show the stress. They took “their anger out on us.” Every little incident became 
a major battle it seemed;  
they blew it all out of proportion…everything that we called them about…it was our 
fault, and what were we doing to their child? They ad no problems before they came 
here, now they had all kinds of problems!  
 
The school had one counselor and I CARE sent counselors on a regular basis, but the 
school “didn’t have a whole lot of support system” in place in the beginning, and the students 
were brittle emotionally. There were many instances of children crying – “fall on the floor 
crying.” They lacked what the principal described as emotional resiliency.  
Accommodations and changes 
When asked if any changes were made because of the hurricane, several points were 
noted: other than changes in registration, dress codes were relaxed because of the shortage of 
available uniforms, and the overcrowded conditions f rced the school to add new classes. In the 
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latter case, a new class was created for one of the grades and a new, inexperienced teacher was 
placed in a classroom with local children because, in the view of the principal, if the teacher did 
not know the system yet, at least the children were familiar with the system. Unfortunately, the 
new teacher left at spring break and the children had to be shifted and spread across the other 
classes in that grade. That unfortunate circumstance o ly added to the mobility within the school 
that year, in part prompting incidents that the principal described earlier, still struggling to 
establish a routine and class rules in May. At some points in the year, even the uniform codes 
were overlooked when students arrived in jeans rathe  than the school uniform. The reaction 
from the staff occasionally was one of “you know, go with it, [at least] he’s here!” Considering 
the overcrowded classroom conditions and the constant turnover there was nothing the school 
could do about the situation.  
 No permanent changes came about as a result of thehurricanes of 2005. No new 
administrative structures were put in place, no newpolicies. When the deluge of students slowed, 
“normalcy” of a sort returned. Lessons learned from the experience were not administrative 
lessons; but personal reflections and observations looking back on a difficult year. A third grade 
teacher noted that they needed to review procedures more, the librarian wished for more time to 
arrange and issue materials and books, and more flexible scheduling to handle the overload that 
she faced as book coordinator. The principal reflected on her choice not to get more people 
involved in the handling of the volume of donations and to help around the school. She also 
marveled at the desire among strangers to “cut to the chase and impact kids” rather than go 
through charitable agencies. We need to “get back to people – to – people.” In terms of the 
displaced parents, it was gratifying to see people “ov rwhelmed with loss…pull themselves up 
by the…bootstraps…and march on…for the kids’ sake.”  
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What made the school able to take the stresses of constant changing classes and turmoil 
was the comfortable relationship between the principal and the staff at the school. “[Working 
together to solve problems] was not anything new to us;” the shared leadership relieved some of 
the leadership stress. Everyone bore part of the burden. 
PS-814 Elementary School 
PS-814 Elementary School did not have many faculty or staff members present in the 
school at the time of the hurricane who volunteered to be interviewed. The principal, Ms. 
Anderson and one faculty member, who had just return d to the school from Alaska, were the 
only interviewees from the school. The school counselor agreed to be interviewed, but was a 
displaced teacher from a New Orleans Magnet school wh  had spent the hurricane year at PS-
8124 Elementary and could not be included in this study.  Ms. Anderson and faculty member 
Ms. Heath were interviewed November 16, 2007.  
PS-814 is a typical sprawling elementary school with broad hallways, shiny tile floors, 
and walls covered in pictures of award-winning faculty and staff members, pictures and 
certificates of proud students, and a multitude of student artwork. A burbling fish pond greets the 
visitor at the front entrance of the school. The school is nestled in a quiet upper middle class 
labyrinthine neighborhood in which the unwary traveler could easily circle several times before 
exiting and once had a majority white student body, but in later years large rent-controlled 
apartment complexes were constructed or folded into the attendance zone to achieve an almost  
55% African-American and 58% at-risk student body.  
Demographic data were summarized from reports generated at the central office and are 
reported in Table 4.2 below. 
 PS-814 started the school year with a population that was over the consent decree caps 
and remained overcrowded through the year. The percentage of black students did not change 
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substantially through the year and remained below the district average. The number of at-risk 
students varied greatly between 49.2% and 71.1% throug  the year, but as explained above, was 
heavily influenced by the arrival of displaced students and twice-annual reporting of free/reduced 
lunch statistics. The school had a maximum displaced student percentage of 13.9%, a percentage 
that declined slowly as the year progressed. Mobility in the school was relatively high, starting at 
41% in October and rising to 88.1% by April. 
Table 4.2 Demographic Snapshots of the School Year 2005-2006 – PS-814 
 PS-814 Elementary 11-Aug, ‘05 26-Aug, ‘05 3-Oct, ‘05 3-Jan, ‘06 10-May, ‘06 
Population 611 606 699 647 625 
% Black 54.98% 63.37% 65.67% 67.39% 69.44% 
% At Risk 58.10% 58.42% 49.21% 71.10% 67.68% 
Seats Available -42 -37 -130 -78 -56 
% Displaced   13.88% a 9.59% a 7.58% b 
% Mobility   41.49% a 67.38% a 88.13% a 
Note. a Percentages calculated for % Displaced and % Mobility were derived by dividing the 
number of displaced and the number of adds plus drops by the school population as of October 3 
numbers submitted to the State DOE. b Displaced data was not available for schools on the last 




 The principal, Ms. Anderson, noted that she planned for the arrival of the students with 
the assistance of some teachers and her secretaries in egistering new students. Registration at the 
school was opened Saturday, September 3rd, with students arriving Monday, September 12th, ten 
days later.  After being informed of the district’s plan, communications between the principal 
and the faculty consisted of advising the grade levl chairman and each would in turn advise the 
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faculty of that grade level. Principal Anderson noted hat grade level chairpersons met regularly 
in grade level meetings with the rest of their teams.  
Placement 
 Over two hundred displaced students were registered into PS-814 Elementary School and 
placed into classes there.  Families were asked if they were displaced by Hurricane Katrina or 
later, by Hurricane Rita. Members of the school staff and PTO officers assisted in the registration 
process. Students were administered diagnostic tests and placed in classes. Principal Anderson 
advised parents of the status of their children’s placement. She reported that families were “most 
appreciative.” Some were “surprised” by the low results of those placement tests, while other 
parents were not. Most communications between the princi al and the faculty was informal or 
through grade level chairpersons though there was at least one meeting after school where they 
were warned that the problem of taking in more students was going to be a bigger issue than they 
had earlier believed. As the children and families b gan to arrive, Ms. Anderson noted the 
desperation of the parents and their relief at being accepted into a safe environment. Although 
the school could not immediately create more classroom space for the students, they could and 
did hire new teachers, some of them displaced teachers. 
Support 
 Students at PS-814 were supported in several different ways. Initially, there was great 
support from the staff and the faculty of the school. S me had assisted in registering the new 
students, all made room in the classes for new students, all were sympathetic and empathized 
with the students.  Ms. Anderson recalled “rally[ing] the troops” to get uniforms and materials. 
Although they were not trained as counselors, teachrs at the school could listen to the students, 
although most of the students did not seem to want to talk about their experiences.  
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 Another source of support for the school came from outside of the school system. Ms. 
Anderson recalled as they were signing up students tha  Saturday a young couple came in and 
offered her $100 in cash. Ms. Heath noted the blessing that year in the form of interns from 
Louisiana State University in the school who provided “extra hands,” and “extra help.” One 
student teacher in particular provided the support that one distraught child needed to get through 
the day; taking the child for walks before school and soothing her so the child could enter the 
classroom and be ready to learn. 
 Professional counseling and psychological assistance was provided to the school that year 
and the next as counselors were visiting the school twice a week. One psychologist, or certified 
counselor, in particular provided a “grandfatherly,” comforting presence as he held group 
sessions with displaced students weekly. Although some of the assistance was months in 
arriving, they remained a fixture at the school for the remainder of 2006 and into the 2006-07 
school year. Professional assistance was readily available and teachers were encouraged to 
recommend students for counseling.  
 Another area of support at the school came from various forms of federal assistance. The 
school was eligible for grants for materials, and i that year the school became eligible for a 
grant that ultimately supplied them with Smart Boards and Elmo cameras. Later that year, FEMA 
provided a two-classroom trailer to relieve some of the overcrowding. The classrooms came fully 
equipped with all the materials for the teachers to begin work. 
 A common form of support at the school in the past was the presence of paid tutors for 
students in the school facing difficult LEAP tests. These tutors were generally available for 
fourth graders as they prepared for the high stakes test  in March of that school year. Other tutors 
were also provided after school in 2005-06 because the displaced students were often functioning 
below grade level. This assistance was appreciated by anxious parents. Ms. Anderson noted that 
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the efforts paid off in improved test scores that year, though she did note that the displaced 
students at the school did not have to be and were not included in calculations. The test results 
were significant indicators of the efforts of the school, however, because the school the following 
year (2006-07) generally maintained their scores with the displaced student population included 
in the calculations. 
 One final area of support, which also could be classified a problem, was the tremendous 
volume of assistance in the form of school materials that soon began to arrive at the school. 
“Crates of boxes” containing knapsacks, school materials, papers, pencils and other items began 
to arrive in large numbers. This was a mixed blessing in that they had to find space to store it all. 
There were boxes of materials in the halls of the school and that any student needing anything 
had access to the largess.  
Leadership 
Several comments suggest a high degree of leadership and strong empathetic relationship 
between the principal of the school and the staff and students. Several comments in the interview 
pointed to an active leadership role of the principal, but also revealed a great deal of 
volunteerism among the school community. Teachers and secretaries volunteered to help sign up 
new students, local families gathered used uniforms and assisted in signing up the new students. 
The school community did not need much encouragement when the principal “rallied the 
troops.” The casual reference to the work done by the Parent-Teacher Organization in the 
weekend open registration and the assistance in putting together of kits for the children suggest a 
close working relationship and strong connection betwe n the principal and school community 
that is often urged by scholars of school community, but not often witnessed. Research 
consistently suggests that good schools are led by principals that set high expectations, focus on 
student achievement, and communicate effectively; those schools are more successful 
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(Leithwood, Begley, and Cousins, 1990). Such a school also tends to have low teacher turnover, 
and PS-814 evidenced that characteristic as well. In the interview, the principal admitted that in 
2007-08 she had more turnover than ever before with three retirements and three faculty leaving 
to follow their husbands to new job postings. 
The school was organized with grade level teams meeting weekly and cross curricular 
meetings to keep the faculty focused on problem solving and coordinating their activities. Grade 
level committees helped disseminate information and kept focused on the needs of the children. 
Another feature of this school’s connection with good teaching practices was the use of 
diagnostic and standardized test scores of the children and the parent-teacher conferences to 
inform and advise parents of their children’s academic status. Teachers’ lesson planning was 
directed by the results of the diagnostic tests and on-going formative evaluations. Expectations 
were clear: “We laid out the goods,” Ms. Anderson stated. The tone was no-nonsense; “you have 
what you have” and the school’s mission was to take“th m as far as you can go.” Parents were 
told “we’re here for business. We’re not policemen; we are not wardens; we are here to teach. 
They are here to learn. If they don’t want to learn, they are not going to keep others from 
learning.” Urging the parents to work with the school as a team, Ms. Anderson stated, works 
“99% of the time.” 
There was a lot of hard work and good teaching going n at PS-814. The School 
Performance Score for the 2005-06 school year increased 9.7 points, exceeding the goals for that 
year. 
Problems 
The research question regarding problems in serving the displaced student population that 
year includes several categories of issues at PS-814. On a purely personal level, there were 
physical issues of living in a city that was side-swiped by two deadly hurricanes within a month. 
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Dealing with much heavier traffic flow meant, for some, extra hours behind the wheel getting to 
and from school. Storm damage and power outages, common across the entire district, even 
though the school itself was not seriously affected, plagued many of the faculty with intermittent 
communications and power issues for days after the storms. Emotional issues centering on 
relatives who were caught in the turmoil in New Orleans or other storm ravaged areas were 
common issues among both faculty and staff, not just for the students. Some members of the 
school community had relatives who were displaced, missing, or crowded into their homes while 
waiting for some resolution to their housing circumstances. One PTO officer at PS-814 had 25 
additional people in her home; the school secretary w s hosting 12 family members. Ms. Heath, 
who was in her second year of DROP looking forward to retirement, realized that she could no 
longer afford to start her life over on only a retir ment check. 
 At the school, the new students brought their own personal baggage with them. Ms. 
Anderson noted their demeanor as being that of robots and that 99% of the students were not 
problems. Some children were frightened, withdrawn, or quiet; some afraid to come into the 
classroom, or who cried daily. Ms. Heath noted the students who were not always ready to learn, 
who functioned below grade level, who had “educational deficits,” or whose problems had to be 
assuaged before the day’s lessons could begin. Discipline issues rose that year. The participants 
were reluctant to identify the issues as being storm related, calling them family issues instead.  
 Children came into the school needing a safe, stable environment. The principal 
repeatedly referred to creating a safe place, a stable environment, any kind of routine that would 
help the students feel secure. Unfortunately, not all students come from stable home 
environments. Tthe school may have seemed “surreal” to some students. In spite of the efforts to 
create a safe harbor for the students, the turmoil surrounding the placement of students, the 
constant shifting from shelter to shelter, or leaving the city for other states then returning, meant 
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that the school did not return to any semblance of normality that entire year. Particularly chaotic 
were the first three weeks after Katrina when the head counts changed daily. For some of the 
children, the value of an education seemed to be very important – particularly to those who 
arrived at the school early on in September. For thse who came in later, education did not seem 
to be as important to the students or their families. Those who arrived later, Ms. Heath stated, 
were more likely to be unruly; they had fallen out f a daily routine. Some had been “drawn from 
pillar to post.”  
 Some problems were also blessings in disguise as for faculty members that year there was 
precious little time to worry about their personal difficulties. There was no time to dwell on the 
past, Ms. Heath stated, that was a “blessing of being mployed.” She, like all displaced teachers, 
was too busy keeping up with lessons, trying to learn the comprehensive curriculum, and trying 
to understand the goals and objectives of the district to have time to worry about their former 
homes and lives.  
 For the students, some blessings in disguise of failure involved the students who did not 
return to New Orleans or other storm stricken areas. Those who stayed “grew in leaps and 
bounds” the following year, progressing much farther t  year after the hurricanes as things 
settled into more predictable routines. Many parents also noted the improvements and some even 
remarked that they were pleased to be in the new district. Ms. Anderson was pragmatic in 
viewing that year: In terms of the LEAP testing, “you have what you have.” 
 Another problem at the school was a decline in parent involvement. This could have been 
a combination of factors which could have been unrelated to the storm or its aftermath. Many of 
the students at the school came from addresses close to the school. The large apartment complex 
that sent over two hundred students to the school was over a mile away, but for parents with 
limited or no transportation, that may have seemed far to walk. For parents still at shelters in the 
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fall of 2005, it could have been many miles away and most of them had no transportation. On the 
positive side, when the school hosted a Family Pride Night at the school “hundreds attended.” In 
absolute numbers, PS-814 housed over 690 students, but the reality was that over 990 students 
entered the school, and two hundred or more left. Keeping accurate records and trying to teach to 
the child was a major effort. 
Accommodations and Changes 
 The question concerning changes in the school policies or procedures yielded no data. No 
mention was made of any changes to the uniform codes, registration requirements, or any 
standard procedures at the school. The lack of notice included the interviewee from the staff. As 
Ms. Anderson noted “we carried on carrying on.” 
 The research question about lessons learned at PS-814 did yield some comments. As the 
result of the tremendous influx of students, the school was awarded a grant of over $27,000 to 
equip classrooms with Smart Boards and Elmo projectrs. This allowed teachers to use different 
modalities and gave them the ability to teach children who were tactile or kinesthetic learners. 
Many students were not readers and the Smart Boards allowed teachers to approach treating 
reading deficits in ways heretofore impossible. Thekids “came to life” with the new 
technologies. 
 Several recommendations concerning the events of the hurricane year included Ms. 
Anderson’s wish that a trained psychologist be posted at the school. She noted that not only the 
122 displaced students still at the school, but the regular students “needed somebody…this once 
a week, or…two-a-weeks, just doesn’t cut it.” Ms. Heath commented that she found the students 
much more resilient than adults.  
 Issues at PS-814 are interesting in light of the fact that the school absorbed hundreds of 
students that year and still improved test scores ov r nine points. Even though displaced students 
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were not counted in the spring 2006 scores, the fact remained that all of the students, displaced 
and local, endured the turmoil of students coming ad going, of handling the emotional 
rollercoaster that was everyday life in a crowded el m ntary school, of the crowded classroom 
conditions, of constantly changing faces in the halls nd classrooms, of the stressful testing and 
anxious waiting for high stakes results that largely brand a school as adequate or inadequate. 
Remarkably, the following years’ results confirmed the test results of the spring of 2006. 
PS-813 Middle School 
 PS-813 Middle School was visited in November of 2007, over the space of two days. 
Many interviewees in the initial visit were faculty members freed from their teaching duties for 
the interview by an assistant principal who sat in their classes. The principal, counselor, and 
some faculty of the school left for their assignments at a new middle school the year following 
the hurricanes and had to be located and interviewed lat r. Interviews were conducted with 
teachers Mr. Curtis, Mr. Winston, Ms. Deering, Ms. Jeffries, Mr. Reid, Ms. Denman, and 
Assistant Principal Ms. Teel. Principal Thatcher and Counselor Ms. Torries were interviewed 
later at their new positions.  
PS-813 Middle School is located in a well established area of Baton Rouge. The 
demographics of the area had gradually changed with the growth of the area and the 
development of 640 units of rent-controlled apartments, the majority of which were occupied by 
lower middle class minority families; the composition of the school had gradually changed over 
the years to a mostly minority student body. The school had a large campus with broad hallways 
kept clean, with few pictures or examples of student art. Several chairs and a table were 
positioned opposite the door to the office just inside of the main entrance to the school. In spite 
of the somewhat Spartan appearance of the school, te faces in the office were friendly and the 
school staff greeted visitors quickly. There was a businesslike air of efficiency that almost 
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seemed brusque, but later as visitors and students left he secretaries were willing to chat 
informally about their jobs. Many of the staff in the office had recently arrived at the school 
because the former staff members had departed to join their principal at a new middle school that 
had opened up in 2006. 
Demographic data were summarized from reports acquired from the central office and are 
presented in Table 4.3 below:  
Table 4.3 Demographic Snapshots of the School Year 2005-2006 – PS-813 
 PS-813 Middle 11-Aug, ‘05 26-Aug, ‘05 3-Oct, ‘05 3-Jan, ‘06 10-May, ‘06 
Population 933 921 1031 981 907 
% Black 54.98% 56.68% 58.29% 60.24% 57.66% 
% At Risk 58.84% 59.07% 53.83% 66.06% 59.98% 
Seats Available -133 -121 -231 -181 -107 
% Displaced   9.60% a 8.73% a 8.15% b 
% Mobility   25.51% a 48.79% a 74.88% a 
Note. a Percentages calculated for % Displaced and % Mobility were derived by dividing the 
number of displaced and the number of adds plus drops by the school population as of October 3 
numbers submitted to the State DOE. b Displaced data was not available for schools on the last 
day of class. The value provided was taken from a report generated using data from April 4, 
2006. 
 
 The school was a large school with a high population already far above the consent 
decree caps as it started the school year. The school was overloaded in preparation for the 
opening of a new middle school the following year. Crowding was partly the result of zone shifts 
preparing to align the new attendance zones for the following year. After the storm passed the 
school began to receive displaced students immediately, and in the official numbers submitted to 
the state department of education in early October, th  school reported a 9.6% displaced student 
population. Demographically, the percentage of black students increased temporarily from about 
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54% to slightly over 60% before settling back to abut 58% by years’ end. The number of at-risk 
seemed to shift also as the year progressed, but generally settled back at about 60% - within one 
percentage point of their starting point in August. The mobility rate at PS-813 Middle was high 
and was described as always high. By the end of the year the school’s mobility rate stood at 
about 75%. 
Planning 
 The school, like other schools in the district, dismissed Friday, August 26th, with the 
principal admonishing both faculty and students to keep up with the news to learn when to return 
to school. After the storm passed, but particularly fter witnessing the news from New Orleans, 
faculty, staff, and administration knew that this was no ordinary storm and aftermath. Power had 
failed over large parts of the city and PS-813 Middle was also without power. The day after the 
passage of the storm, Principal Thatcher traveled to the school to inspect damage and discovered 
that the gym was being used as a Red Cross shelter. Two days later families began to arrive at 
the school to register their children. The administration and staff were provided with registration 
forms and they were told to forward all forms to the central office for processing. 
Communications were initially by telephone via the PACE messaging system, direct calls from 
the superintendent and the assistant superintendent for middle schools, and later mainly through 
the email system. Principals would receive notices from the central office and a spreadsheet with 
listings of students who had been processed and assigned to the school. Ms. Torres, the school 
counselor, also noted that early information was gained through the media, but once advised of 
the plans for sign-up, the school would follow the system put in place by the central office. 
Throughout the year the school and administrators tried o keep to the system and make it 
function. Before students began to arrive at the school Principal Thatcher proactively set up 
mock schedules in effort to make the registration and scheduling of displaced students go faster. 
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She, an assistant principal, and the school secretary attempted to prepare schedules for all the 
students thought to be arriving the following week. The effort proved partly successful because 
the shifting of families often led to many students attending schools in other parishes or out of 
state, and only some of the carefully planned schedules were used. Assistant Principal Teel 
recalled that before the hurricanes there was no plan for large numbers of students to arrive at the 
school, but after being informed in a faculty meeting of the district’s plan to register all displaced 
students, the school, its faculty and staff “just went with it” and utilized the system that was 
already in place. Several faculty members also recalled the meetings. Mr. Winston recalled being 
cautioned about how to speak to the children coming in; Ms. Denman recalled being warned that 
the children would be traumatized; and Ms. Deering commented that no one was prepared for 
what happened.  
Placement 
 Placement of the students proceeded as with any new student arriving at the school with 
one exception in this case: All office personnel took a hand in helping register parents into the 
system and then registering the students into the sc ool. If a counselor was busy the principal or 
an assistant principal entered the student information into the computer system. Secretaries 
helped greet parents and tried to make them feel comfortable at the school. The counselor, Ms. 
Torres, indicated that one factor that played into the registration process in addition to the normal 
questions was to be certain to determine if the family registering for the school had any concerns 
or needs that needed addressing. Such is not usually the case in registering children. In this 
instance, the staff of the school made it a point to determine what needs still were not yet 
addressed, made the process as easy as possible, waiv d all fees for items that would normally 
require a small fee, and generally “as a school” did whatever they could to make the incoming 
parents and students feel welcome. Ms. Torres also noted that the first meeting with students and 
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parents was crucial to develop relationships. Although there were no large assemblies or 
meetings with displaced families, the initial contact set the tone. Generally, the first meeting was 
sufficient to get the new students into the atmosphere and feel of the school. Materials were 
provided to the students, one counselor drove across town to secure a number of uniforms so the 
new students would not be immediately recognized as isplaced for lack of uniforms, and in the 
words of Assistant Principal Teel, the students “came in and went to class and followed the rules, 
they made it easy for us.” Even faculty members took a hand in helping out; on their own 
planning time they came to the office and helped with uniforms, materials, meeting parents and 
taking them on tours of the school. They reported that he new students were well received and 
that everybody tried to help them. 
Support 
 Helping the displaced students and supporting them in their troubles came naturally at 
PS-813 Middle School. Once the faculty and staff learn d what their needs were, materials and 
assistance were found for the students. Community support was vigorous with loads of materials 
arriving in the district from numerous sources: chur  groups, civic groups, individuals, and even 
schools from other states. One California school adpted PS-813 Middle because one of the 
employees of PS-813 had attended that school as a child in California. Counselor Torres recalled 
receiving “tons and tons” of materials and paper. 
 In addition to the arrival of physical materials, the school received help from the St. 
Vincent de Paul Society for school uniforms, clothing, underwear, and other personal needs. 
Donations “all came in at one time.” If families needed information or school materials they got 
what they needed. 
 Counseling services were available through a variety of sources. The district’s I CARE 
program sent counselors to the school on a regular basis. School counselors, although very busy 
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scheduling and adding and dropping students, had to monitor and screen students for signs of 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and referred stu ents to counseling services provided to 
the children and their parents at no charge. Several outside agencies were part of that effort, 
some coming to the school on a routine basis, some receiving referrals outside of the school.  
 Routinely expected services at the school were not ig red as the school counselors also 
had to monitor Individual Educational Plans (IEPs) of incoming students when they were made 
aware of them. Such services are mandated and the school had no option but to provide any and 
all services to which the students were entitled. In some cases this was a problem, and that point 
will be discussed in more detail below. At this point, the problem was finding out who needed 
services, and that was determined at the time of regist ation.  
 Several faculty members contributed other pieces to the puzzle of how to support the new 
students as they settled in. Ms. Teel remembered counselors bringing in a State Trooper to 
address the students, later a faculty member from a local university also arrived to talk to the 
students. Other faculty members recalled the assistnce of the peer buddies from the Student 
Council Club and football team who took the new students around and introduced them to 
teachers, coaches, and other students. Still others t oughtfully recalled their impromptu role as 
counselors in the classroom. When faced with students who were not at the same point 
educationally with their local students, some faculty assigned peer tutors and occasionally 
relaxed their usual classroom routines or expectations based on the apparent state of mind of 
some of the students.  Other faculty recalled the supplies, uniforms, and lab fees that were 
waived for the displaced students. 
Leadership 
Several instances of the leadership qualities of the aculty and principal at the school 
were in evidence. Principal Thatcher and her staff worked pro-actively to prepare schedules for 
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the incoming displaced students. Visitors were greeted cordially and staff members and faculty 
stepped in and helped, clearly a sign that they were “buying in” to the process. Cooperation and 
coordination were in evidence as everyone participated in the welcoming of new families to the 
school, to knowing and supporting the goals of the school, and resisting parental efforts to 
change the standards of the class instruction and of the whole school. 
“We ran school status quo,” Principal Thatcher stated, “we expected those students to follow the 
rules and regulations just like – like we had all students follow.” Expectations were clear and 
students were expected to follow the rules.  
 From the discussion about this school, which was conducted in a group session with the 
school counselor who served at PS-813 and a counselor who was at another school at that time, 
the general tone that comes across was one of a determination to preserve the status quo, 
maintain the rules and try to stay afloat as the students came and went. Managerial emphasis on 
stability preserved the school when everything elsewas in constant flux. “I did what I needed to 
do…[I had to] look at the big picture,” Thatcher stated, “you have to do what you have to do 
because it’s right.” 
Problems  
By the start of October the school had taken in about a hundred displaced students, a 
number that represents about 11% of the total school population. Such a large influx of students 
in a school that was already over a hundred students above the consent decree cap could easily 
lead to problems. The problems encountered by the sc ool fell into several categories. The initial 
concern began with the start of the year since the sc ool was over the consent decree cap. 
Principal Thatcher noted they were already crowded, a concern that could only grow as the 
hurricane-displaced students began to arrive at the sc ool. Overcrowding in classrooms, shortage 
of teachers, lack of classroom space, more “floaters” – teachers without a classroom of their 
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own, and concomitantly, the lack of office space for the “floaters,” a lack of teaching materials 
and textbooks, all were problems that could be anticipated as the school readied to receive the 
new students. By the first week of October, the school ad already received a hundred eighty-
eight new students, of which 99 were identified as K trina-displaced. The other students were 
Majority to Minority or School of Choice transfers. That number was somewhat offset by the 
departure of 75 students. The student counts here do not indicate how many of them were 
Katrina displaced students. The shortages were real, but the problem already existed to some 
degree before August 28th. The school staff did what they could to solve the problems. Some of 
the problems were solved with the passage of time in various ways. Some students transferred 
out for a variety of reasons, others were shifted to other schools as their parents found more 
permanent accommodations, and materials began to flood in from donations around the state and 
the nation. Classrooms sets of books were shared to cover the lack of texts. A problem involving 
a shortage of calculators was solved when the school received a grant for new calculators.  
 A second major problem surfaced when the students began to arrive without records to 
indicate their grade placement in their former school, and the records regarding services that they 
were receiving in their former schools were also missing. Later, when some records arrived from 
the State Department of Education, the records werenot in the same format as those used by the 
district’s counselors. The fear that counselors shared was that they would not be providing the 
services that the students deserved either due to the lack of records, or because parents “were not 
involved or they didn’t understand the type of services that they [the children] were receiving.” 
Secondarily, school counselors could not be sure that they were providing the appropriate 
services because the IEPs were written differently. 
 Another problem that manifested early in September and continued for months was the 
problem of dealing with parents who were shuffled from school to school; whose questions 
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school personnel could not answer; who did not understand the process of registration into the 
system; and for whom school personnel literally hadno answers. Many of the interactions were 
characterized by frustration.  Several interviewees from the school used the word “draining” to 
describe the interactions with parents.  The Assistant Principal for Discipline, Ms. Teel did not 
recall any major issues involving discipline, a characterization that was contradicted by the 
casual reference to conflicts by the school counselor. The counselor and assistant principal both 
agreed that when problems occurred, they would “pull them [the students] in with their parents 
and settle the issues. The parents co-operated “100%,” noted Ms. Teel. Ms. Torres also noted 
that there were more conflicts that year because there were more students, dissociating Katrina-
displaced students from increased discipline issues at the school. Examination of expulsion 
hearing records at the Child Welfare and Attendance Office revealed that PS-813 Middle had a 
total of 102 expulsion hearings that year, the plurality of which - 44 (43.1%) were for disrespect 
and similar related offenses. Fighting or other forms of violence accounted for 40 expulsions 
(39.2%). The total 102 expulsions, when compared to the October 3rd counts, represented 9.89% 
of the population. Of that number only five hearings (0.48%) involved Katrina-displaced 
students. 
 Distinguishing between normal mobility at the school and mobility induced by the 
hurricanes of 2005 was difficult. The district policy of Majority to Minority transfers and School 
of Choice transfers meant large numbers of students came and went early in the school year at 
PS-813. Ms. Torres commented that the school would never know what its population was. Ms. 
Teel noted also that when the school reopened after the hurricane, there was some unease in that 
they did not know how the Katrina displaced students would adjust to the new environment, but 
because of the empathy and maturity of the seventh and eighth graders that year, the new 
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students were welcomed and made to feel that they were PS-813 students, just like everyone 
else. 
 Testing at the school occurred in March. It is always a stressful time and many students 
normally get more tense and fearful as testing timeapproached. With the normal coming and 
going of students in any given year, the tensions wear on the students, particularly the eighth 
graders who knew they were facing high stakes testing in the spring or 2006. With the hurricanes 
that year, everyone interviewed expressed that they kn w they would be getting students, some 
of whom were from low performing schools in the New Orleans district. The constant movement 
of students made it difficult for the faculty to know who was displaced or who was local; who 
was just moving to a new apartment or moving in with a grandmother.  
 Faculty members at the school recalled the incoming students as being “in shock,” 
“solemn,” massively depressed, “overwhelmed,” not well prepared for the level of work they 
were trying to do, or uncooperative. Other students were variously described as dazed, 
despondent, quiet, or withdrawn. Some refused to work, or as Mr. Winston noted: They had 
more serious things to worry about. Some faculty noted that there was some resentment between 
local students and the displaced students; other studen s were somewhat frustrated at the slower 
pace that year; some displaced students seemed to have a “low current” of anger with no one 
upon which to focus or release that anger. Some studen s, Ms. Denman noted, did not want to be 
accepted, they just wanted to go home. She did not see he “504” area code identification as a 
challenge, as most others and especially the press that year and the next viewed it. Rather, it was 
a means used by displaced students to maintain their own identity. They could not return to their 
former homes as though nothing had happened – though many dearly wished it. Anger, she noted 
was the first stage of grief. Mr. Jeffries noted that some parents attempted to get the school to 
lower their standards or change policy that year, unsuccessfully. Teachers at the school did not 
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want to bring their standards down to what some displaced parents wanted; rather, they wanted 
to raise all of the students to a higher standard. Faculty members themselves were under great 
stress because of their own personal struggles after the hurricanes.  Some had family and friends 
living with them at home, some homes may have had ten or more relatives in the same house. 
Ms. Deering remarked that the school was “ill-prepad” for what happened that year. She also 
described one student in particular who was angry and seemed to go out of his way to “not fit 
in.”  
Accommodations and Changes 
Questions concerning administrative changes made becaus  of the hurricanes yielded 
little data. Dress codes were relaxed somewhat, but the timely arrival of uniforms took care of 
that issue. Registration requirements were relaxed in light of the lack of records or 
documentation and requirements of McKinny-Vento. What was mentioned was what had not 
changed that year, the expected tightening of grading standards for the LEAP tests that year. The 
state decided to let the districts choose whether or not to toughen grading standards. The district 
kept the standards where they were the year before. As Ms. Torres also stated, there was a plan, 
they stuck to the plan and tried to keep the system intact. Only one member of the faculty noted 
specifically that he was tempted to alter his usual classroom routine because he recognized that 
some students’ state of mind was altered by circumstances. Classroom standards and 
expectations generally were not lowered and any exceptions to the usual routine were temporary. 
The research question of whether any changes were institutionalized at the school did not 
yield any answers, but most of the interviewees did share personal lessons learned. Ms. Thatcher, 
the principal, noted that sometimes a person has to make a decision because it is the right thing 
to do, whether or not it was popular. Her comment sprang from an incident after Hurricane Rita 
passed leaving a serious mold problem that was not detected until the students began arriving at 
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the school. The students had to be sent home again until the school was cleaned. Criticism, 
rightly or wrongly blaming the principal for exposing the children to the mold, left Ms. Thatcher 
shaken, but with the lesson not to take criticism personally, especially after dealing with 
frustrated or angry parents struggling to find a safe place for their children. School Counselor 
Torres noted that she learned never to take things for granted and that the lesson she learned was 
to use the system in place, and strive to keep the system intact. Assistant Principal Teel was 
grateful and appreciative of what she had. Faculty members commented that the school needed 
more counselors or therapists to handle the emotional needs of the children, that sometimes 





District Case Summary 
 This study of the administrative effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita started with the 
interviewing of principals, counselors, faculty, and selected central office personnel in November 
of 2007, two full years after the events occurred. Few differences could be identified in the 
experiences of the study schools and from the interviews of the central office personnel. The 
experience was remarkably similar across all of the interviews and most differences could be 
traced to blurring memories of events two years earlier or to differences in perspective. 
Planning 
Comparing schools across the district in relation to the research questions yielded a fair 
degree of consistency. Driven by the requirements of he Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act 
(1987), the district had a legal obligation to take in all displaced students, enroll them into a 
school, and provide the students with transportation, and free lunch and breakfast. In addition to 
the legal requirements, most of the interviewees from the superintendent down the chain of 
command to principals, counselors and faculty members also mentioned the ethical view that 
doing so was the right thing. Although there was some concern that the school system could not 
handle the influx of thousands of students, the system did receive over 11,000 applications, 
enrolled and placed over 6,800 students into schools, and ultimately provided some degree of 
education to about 5,000 “warm bodies” who actually ttended schools in the district on any 
given day. Based on school populations that year across the state, in two weeks the district added 
a student population that was larger than forty of the 68 school districts in the state. The board 
vice president stated in a school board meeting in October that the average district size in the 
nation was under 3,000 students, in which case, the district opened two school districts in two 
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weeks. Policy was devised at the central office because that was where the information could be 
found and the expertise resided to make the kinds of ecisions that had to be made. Initially, the 
earliest decisions were driven by McKinney – Vento requirements while at the same time, 
decisions regarding the placement of the new studens meant that new supplies had to be located, 
new vendors had to be found to replace defunct vendors from New Orleans, new faculty and 
staff had to be hired to handle the increase in student population, new drivers and buses were 
needed, and changes to the enrollment caps placed by the district court had to be approved by the 
district judge.  
Placement 
 Placement of the students was problematic because of th  Stewart B. McKinney-Vento 
Act (1987) that requires local educational authorities (LEAs) to provide transportation for 
students to a school that non-homeless students in the same attendance zone would attend. 
However, the shifting nature of the population in the Post-Katrina and Post-Rita weeks and 
months challenged the abilities of the transportation department. According to the law, if the 
student’s guardians move, the child must remain in the original school that he or she entered. In 
the event of a dispute, the student must be placed in the school which the student’s guardians had 
requested until the resolution of the dispute. As families moved from shelter to shelter or shelter 
to trailer park, they moved from attendance zone to attendance zone, but the children had to 
remain in the school that they first entered. This created difficulties with transportation efforts 
already stretched beyond their capacity. The district made every effort to accommodate the 
requests of the parents and guardians and as the populati n shifted the district began to allow 
transfers reflecting the new addresses, easing someof th  burden on the transportation services.   
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 School attendance zones were also routinely violated that year because as schools filled 
beyond capacity students had to be transported to the next available school. That meant, in some 
cases, that school buses passed several schools befre dropping off the students. All of the 
interviewees in the schools noted the crowded nature of their campuses and the struggle to find 
room for the classes and students. This was also a concern of the school counselors who were 
charged with locating spaces for the iLEAP and LEAP testing in March of 2006. The crowding 
was somewhat lessened by the arrival of FEMA portable classrooms and trailers, but at that point 
the district had already absorbed over 6,500 new students and had already begun to lose some. 
Average class sizes increased that year from pre-hurricane levels but remained less than the 
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) authorized increases in class size for that 
year.  
 A third concern for placement of students was the registration process itself that 
complicated the efforts of the district to assign students to schools. Some enrollment forms were 
incomplete when submitted, requiring repeated attemp s to contact the families for missing 
information. Some families registered their children then left the shelter, city, or the state for 
shelters elsewhere and did not notify the district. Others tired of waiting and registered their 
children again at a different location. It took time to sort through and identify students who 
would not be attending (“No Shows”) so those seats could be reassigned to another child. 
 A fourth issue of placement derives from the apparent eluctance of some families to let 
go of their children. Scarred by the trauma of separation that some families faced or witnessed in 
other families around them, some parents did not want to let their children out of their sight. 
Central office personnel spent much time trying to reassure parents of the safety of the schools; 
the superintendent spent hours at shelters trying to reassure parents. Eventually the 
superintendent decided to let parents accompany their c ildren to the schools to see for 
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themselves how their children were being cared for. This reassured some, but in a few cases 
created other problems – parents wanted to accompany their child to all the classes. On the other 
side of the issue were the parents who did not let their children attend school at all, or who failed 
to ensure that their children actually attended the school. Several interviewees related stories of 
students who had dropped out of school before the hurricane and saw no need to attend school 
after. Several interviewees at the central office, particularly the director of child welfare and 
attendance, were also sensitive to the charge that not all displaced children were enrolled. Both 
the superintendent and the CAO noted that the buses went to the shelters and trailer parks, but 
not all children got on the buses. The superintendent commented that in trailer parks no children 
were seen playing until after the buses unloaded, but that “as soon as the buses unloaded you 
would see more kids playing that you had seen…getting off the bus.” Every effort was made to 
contact and register all the children for school. “Many students did not get registered,” the 
superintendent concluded, but “it was by the parents’ choice and not because we were turning 
any students away.” 
Support 
 Many examples of the support that displaced families and students received were found 
in the interviews and in numerous emails. Two instaces of support that surfaced incidentally 
from interviews with counselors revolved around concer s about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). One was the effort early in the fall to develop protocols to identify PTSD among the 
students in the schools. Counselors across the district were brought together to develop 
instruments that were then sent to all of the schools. Once the schools received the “kits” the 
school counselors began using the kits at various pints during the year to identify early signs of 
PTSD among the students. Later, teachers and staff members were warned that they were also 
likely to fall prey to stress and needed to be vigilant of the signs that accompany PTSD.  
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 Support also came in the form of various grants for equipment and tutors for the schools. 
Several participants mentioned the grants that awarded schools with calculators; others 
mentioned smart boards and Elmo cameras. FEMA trailers and portable classrooms arrived or 
were constructed later in the fall and early spring to alleviate the crowded conditions at 30 
schools. The largest and most surprising source of support was the generosity of hundreds or 
thousands of individuals, organizations, and schools b th within the city and from other states 
and countries. Donations flooded into the district within a week of the hurricanes and continued 
for more than a month after. The speed and volume of assistance was stunning to principals, 
teachers, and district staff members who had to find ways to respond. Materials arrived in the 
district from as far away as the Bermuda, London, and Taiwan. 
Leadership  
 Although this particular research question was intended -to address the leadership 
qualities of the principals in the study schools, it is appropriate to mention the leadership 
qualities observed in the key participants in the central office as well, particularly the leadership 
of the superintendent. The superintendent of the district did not arrive at that job through the 
usual route of academic practice: usually characterized by service as a principal and/ or academic 
supervisor. This superintendent was elevated from the position of chief financial officer. That 
event necessitated the creation of the chief academic officer (CAO) position in the central office 
to provide the academic experience that the superintendent lacked. It was the experience of the 
financial side of the district that provided the superintendent the advantage that helped the 
district weather the crisis and deal with the exacting requirements of state and federal assistance, 
particularly FEMA. In addition,  the superintendent xerted a firm, steadying influence in the 
hectic weeks after the hurricane. Many of the participants in this study made a point to praise the 
superintendent’s leadership. Several comments stand out as indicative of a strong administrator 
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firmly rooted in an ethic of care similar to that of Noddings (1992). The first: “Because 
everybody said ‘we can’t take any more kids, we can’t, we can’t.’ ‘Yes you can; we will; you 
have no choice’. And so every barrier that was almost a barrier, we had to figure how we would 
get over, around, or through it.” The question of why the district did things the way it did 
prompted the response:  “First of all, it’s the law, but most importantly it’s the right thing to do.” 
The superintendent’s response called to mind echoes of Murphy (2002), who urged a return to 
older notions of education as being value-laden. Black (2007) reminded us of the actions taken 
by effective superintendents to improve student achievement, three of which were securing 
school board cooperation, monitoring progress, and securing resources, all of which were found 
in the actions of the superintendent.  
The superintendent also insisted on process and procedure first, action second. The 
organization of the ELT and DLT proceeded from the pr mise that everyone must know what 
their job is and to whom they reported. Rather than create a new layer of bureaucracy, the 
superintendent appointed individuals to assume responsibility for receiving, coordinating, and 
responding to all offers of help coming into the district office. 
 Another important point was the superintendent’s insistence that all children would have 
a uniform – if not the first day, at least by the second day at school. Children would not be seen 
as displaced children in the schools, they would be seen as “our children.”  
 This concern was echoed by every participant interviewed, particularly the principals of 
the study schools. The principals of PS-802, PS-814, and PS-813 all expressed in their stories 
that the students entering their schools were “our kids” regardless of how they came to the 
school.  Each was determined to maintain control of their schools, preserve an orderly learning 
environment, and protect their faculties from the caos outside so the teachers could focus on 
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teaching. The manner in which each principal accomplished that was unique to the personality of 
the principals and each had a comfortable fit with their school.  
 PS-802 was a small but crowded school that year. The staff was involved in planning and 
problem-solving with the principal, had her confidenc , and was buffered from the worst of the 
intrusions into the school. Her leadership was transformative in nature, both within her staff and 
in her efforts to include the families in her community in the social activities of the school, but 
the principal had taken on too much herself, and could not take more opportunities to involve the 
community around the school in helping sort through the donations arriving from other states and 
schools out of the country. She was concerned that dissention would result from seeing so much 
going to displaced families when the other families in the district were also impoverished.  
Transformative characteristics were visible in the school, but not to as great a degree as could 
have been possible.  
 PS-814 was a larger school, got a larger percentag of displaced students early in the fall 
of 2005, and found ways to include displaced students in their culture. The school was tightly 
organized into grade level committees and cross curricular committees that cooperatively 
planned using diagnostic and formative test results. The principal took advantage of every 
opportunity to involve the community in the activities of the school, utilizing the Parent-Teacher 
Organization in helping sign up displaced families and later during the subsequent registration 
process. The principal also took advantage of every opportunity to acquire the materials, 
calculators, and electronic equipment that could make a difference in instruction at the school. 
They applied for grants for tutoring for the students, regular tutors were hired using district and 
state, and grant funds and the school pushed hard to get the students ready for the testing in 
March. This school improved their test scores by over nine points, though the scores that year 
were calculated without the displaced students’ scores included. However, the following year, 
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when all students were counted in the calculations, a d many of the displaced students were still 
in attendance, test scores dropped only 0.2 points. 
 The largest school examined was PS-813, a middle school that was considerably above 
their consent decree caps at the start of that year. Within weeks of Katrina the school was 
swamped by an additional hundred thirty displaced stu ents. Discipline issues spiked with the 
crowded conditions early in the year and several times later during the late fall and spring. The 
principal worked hard to be proactive as plans were b ing formulated at the central office to send 
displaced students to the school and she and her staff were focused on maintenance of order as 
the students continued to arrive. Faculty were warned of anticipated problems and supported in 
their teaching, but there were no indications of collaborative efforts either between the 
administration and faculty or within the faculty.  
 In general, there appears to have been an interesting mix of techniques in play in the 
district, at the central office level and at the various study schools. As described earlier, 
transformative leadership practices usually involve characteristics like collaborative planning, 
concern for professional development, and providing clear vision and achievable goals as 
described in many research journals, particularly in the work of Leithwood, Begley, and Cousins 
(1990) and Hallinger and Heck (1996). These characte istics were clearly in evidence in the 
schools studied and at the central office. Where each fell on the continuum of transformative-
transactional practice was largely dependent upon the character of the principal or central office 
participant and upon the contingency prevalent at th t site. In general I found the principals much 
more transformative than not, and central office personnel somewhat less transformative than the 
principals. Temper that assessment with the knowledge that I did not spend a great amount of 
time in their offices or observing their day to day activities. What I did glean from interviews 
though suggests a tremendous concern for the care of th children and empathy for the staff and 
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school employees who bore the heaviest burden of direct contact with thousands of displaced 
families and children. Care for procedures and policies do not automatically make a principal or 
supervisor transactional; their attitude and actions proclaim their transformative nature. The 
complex nature of the interaction between principals and their faculties and staffs suggest that 
the leadership of the principals is contingent upon several factors, not the least of which is the 
situation, but also their understanding of whether ir faculty and staff have mastered the 
necessary knowledge to be more participative or whether the principal needed to be more 
directive (Somech and Wenderow, 2006). The elementary schools also evidenced a positive 
climate of high expectations for their students and atmosphere of collaborative, distributed 
leadership like that reported by Anderson (1982). Somech and Wenderow also noted that teacher 
expectations of their relationship with and the leadership style of the principal played a role in 
their performance. “Principals did not involve teachers in every decision”, particularly in the 
managerial domain in the school; instead, teachers may be expected to participate in the 
technical domain (2006, p. 764 – 765). 
Problems 
Problems included the obvious issues of space, materials, and personnel, but also include 
locating new suppliers, issues with the media, and the overwhelming flood of donations that 
caught the district completely by surprise. Lesser i sues in the district were discipline issues, 
anger and other emotional issues both among the stud nts, their parents, and the staff members, 
and also the possibility of resentment among local students and parents. 
 In addressing the expected problems of finding space and materials the district leaders 
and schools were forced to make an early assessment of what spaces and materials they had and 
what would be needed. The issue was recognized at the district level as early as the Wednesday 
after the hurricane and staff members began to workon the problems immediately. Warehouse 
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inventories were checked, principals were asked to evaluate what they had and what they could 
supply to other schools and all of that had to be done within a week of the hurricane’s passage. 
Shortages were expected and suppliers were contacted within days, but the surprising flood of 
donations and money alleviated some of the pressure to purchase new equipment. 
 Locating staff to help was also made easier by the flood of teachers and administrators 
from the stricken region who could not return home. Within days of the hurricane, the district 
began to get applications from teachers looking for w k. Ultimately the district hired 314 new 
employees of which 269 were employed as teachers. Of that number, 286 were interviewed and 
hired just to be able to accommodate the arrival of the displaced students on September 12, 2005. 
Two schools were completely staffed, both teachers and administrators, by displaced personnel 
from the hurricane ravaged areas of Louisiana.  
One serious and persistent problem that year was in staffing the transportation fleet. The 
superintendent had anticipated that many of the displaced employees of the New Orleans area 
would be bus drivers looking for work, but in fact no drivers from the region could be found. The 
district had to make do with the drivers they had, had to modify temporarily some of the normal 
training procedures for the new drivers – holding training sessions nightly to get drivers ready to 
start transporting children – and had to make use of buses that ordinarily would not have been 
used. Bus routes grew in mileage and time; new routes had to be created; students were crowded 
or arrived at their schools late. In addition to the new and longer routes, the district created a 
third tier of routes, delaying the start of classes at ome schools by an hour so some of the buses 
could unload their charges and start their new routes. The situation prompted the superintendent 
and human resources director to make an appeal for drivers and buses on national and local news 
programs. This problem meant that until things stabilized some parents were asked to try to get 
their children to school on their own until buses could be found. Later, as families began to move 
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back towards New Orleans and the other devastated areas, or shifted to new housing 
accommodations, bus routes had to be re-evaluated and some routes were consolidated while 
other routes were added to alleviate overcrowding. 
Discipline was also an issue, but not for the reason that most parents or members of the 
media were ready to cite. There was speculation among faculty and many administrators that 
children from New Orleans would come into the district and be a disruptive influence in the 
schools. Media reports frequently emphasized that the “225s” versus the “504s” angle in 
reporting any breaches of discipline that occurred. In the schools examined in this study, 
particularly the middle school, there was a noticeabl  increase in breaches of discipline, but 
when viewed specifically in terms of expulsions, the problem did not involve large numbers of 
displaced students. In the three study schools a total of 110 expulsion hearings resulted in 66 
expulsions, the remainder had modified results or were not upheld. Of that number only six 
students were Katrina-displaced, one in an elementary school and five in the middle school (only 
5.45% of the total hearings, and only 0.27% of the population of those schools). The great 
majority of incidents were local students dealing with local issues. Two of the Katrina-displaced 
students had their expulsion recommendations modified and remained in the school the rest of 
the year. There was very little bad news to report, even though, as many interviewees in the 
school system commented, the media were expecting problems. What problems existed in large 
measure were local turf issues, rivalries between neighborhoods, and traditional middle school 
issues. Teachers, counselors, principals as well as the central office personnel routinely noted 
that many incidents in the schools were more the result of media hype than the cause. Problems 
did not start on the campus – particularly the middle school campus until after a media report of 
a disturbance somewhere else. Sanderson (2003) noted the hostile attitude among some mobile 
students, but in the interviews and examinations of the expulsion records, no evidence of 
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hostility was found until a year later, and that occurred at the high school level. Expulsion 
records substantiate the lack of expulsion level issue  between displaced students and local 
middle and elementary school students. 
 Emotional issues were foreseen by central office personnel early in the planning phase. 
Several in-services were held to bring supervisors and principals an awareness of what kinds of 
behaviors could be expected. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was anticipated and staff members 
were told of what behaviors could be expected weeks and months later. Students exhibiting high 
levels of stress were referred to counselors or outside agencies at no charge. Staff members were 
also warned to “take care of the caregivers” – meaning that they were to be aware of the effects 
on themselves of the high levels of stress dealing with traumatized children, crowded school 
conditions, or the higher levels of stress in the city in general. Staff and teachers were not above 
the fray – many of them were hosting evacuee families and friends, some mentioning living in a 
house with many friends and relatives. Coffee shop sessions became occasions to de-stress, re-
group, and go on. Such events were to some degree predictable. What took many by surprise was 
the unexpected manifestations of the stress: The studen  who burst into tears for no apparent 
reason and later confided that she was remembering her deceased grandfather, the child whose 
poems recalled the fear of dying on the roof of her flooded home and who watched as an 
alligator took her pet dog as she clambered aboard a rescue boat, or children who exhibited cases 
of “fall on the floor crying.”  They lacked “emotional resiliency” and some of those behavior 
problems persisted two years later in those displaced children still at the schools in 2007.  Some 
students seemed to be dour and unresponsive to the offer d support of the schools; they simply 
wanted to go home. 
Another facet of the problem was the concern that tere would be a reaction against the 
displaced students by the local population, either in direct confrontations or resentment for all the 
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materials that displaced families were receiving through donations. Some principals assigned the 
problem of keeping track of donations to staff membrs, others, out of concern for their already 
overwhelmed faculty, tried to bear the load themselves. Neither solution proved entirely 
satisfactory. The volume of materials, requests to render aid, and cash donations quickly 
overwhelmed the district and many schools. Principals were told to acknowledge every donation. 
They and central office personnel spent hours addressing thank you notes and responding to 
emails. 
Through the entire year, however, was the constant, unrelenting problem of the mobility 
of the students. The causes were complicated, but the results were predictable. Kerbow (1996) 
noted that constant moving can cause the child to lose as much as a year of instruction within six 
years. Black (2006) noted that constant mobility was linked to truancy and increased likelihood 
of dropping out of school. Additionally, in research on community effects and intergenerational 
closure reported by Hunt, Hirose-Hatae, and Doering (2000), Coleman (1985, 1987), and 
Carbonaro (1998), a close association between the school and its surrounding community are 
associated with improved school climates. Close associations with community were reported in 
PS-814 and to a lesser degree in PS-802, and it could be coincidental that PS-814 had a large 
gain in School Performance Scores that year while PS-802 declined significantly, or that PS-813, 
which had no obvious evidence of close involvement with its external community, suffered the 
greatest declines in SPS. 
Accommodations and Changes 
 As noted earlier, Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act (1987) largely set the limits of what 
the district could and could not do. Immediate changes to class sizes, school attendance caps, the 
timing of bus routes, the availability of text books and other materials, how soon students should 
be fed breakfast, who could attend what school – alof these were stressed immediately after the 
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displaced students began to arrive at their assigned schools. Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act 
(1987) mandated that homeless students must be registered immediately regardless of any 
lacking documentation and must be fed, regardless of their income level. The district and study 
schools struggled to meet the needs of the students in their charge. Students were registered on 
the basis of whatever information their parents or guardians could supply. Immunizations had to 
be scheduled later that fall to make sure all students were up to date on their shots. Whether it 
was the increased length of the route or the increased traffic in the city, bus routes increased 
some 30% in terms of time. Some drivers demanded ovrtime pay. The district not only had to 
quickly find new suppliers for food services, but had to feed nearly 6,500 more students than 
they had two weeks earlier. Students could not always be fed within fifteen minutes of their 
arrival on campus, but they were fed. Not every student had a text book when they stepped onto 
campus, classes shared sets of books until more could be located and delivered.  
No school visited in the study had a trained counselor dedicated to working with 
traumatized children; some schools had to make do with visits two or three times a week from 
outside agencies. Not every federal or state regulation was completely met in the first chaotic 
weeks after Katrina, but as several counselors and administrators stated, the children had their 
needs met. Class times were shifted to accommodate the third tier of bus routes, class sizes grew, 
teachers had to struggle to determine where the new students stood academically; then struggled 
to keep track of students who came and went throught t e year in their classrooms. Schools 
handed out policy manuals and handbooks and had to reorder new supplies as they exhausted a 
year’s worth of supplies in a matter of weeks. Some teachers felt they had to relax some of their 
standards to accommodate the fragile state of their students, others refused to give in to 
demanding parents. Dress codes were not officially re axed, but on the rare occasion student 
dress code infractions were overlooked.  
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What was remarkable under the circumstances was what had not changed. For the most 
part the district managed to maintain its dress code, discipline, and academic standards 
throughout the year. Some parents demanded relaxation of standards, but teachers and 
administrators refused to budge on that matter. The firm stance led to tense moments and 
occasional threats of physical violence, but the counselors and teachers who bore the brunt of the 
bluster and threats were determined not to be bullied. 
There were no permanent changes of importance to report. Throughout the project, 
comments about the plan, the program, all pointed to the confidence in the procedures 
established in the central office and followed by the schools. There were no major changes in 
school board policy – other than the brief emergency powers granted to the superintendent. 
There were no changes in the basic school district policy other than those required by Stewart B. 
McKinney-Vento Act (1987) or born of necessity because of circumstances in play at the time. 
Any deviations from policy reverted back to normal as things settled into a routine more akin to 
a normal school year. What few changes were noted were all on the school level changes, but no 
mention was made of how those changes would be passd long to other administrators at other 
schools in the district. In that respect there was no organizational learning occurring. 
Different Views 
Viewed from a slightly different perspective, the remarkable events of the 2005 – 06 
school year had some curious differences. Based on the four main research questions, the 
summaries revealed not so much a difference in recollecti ns or deceptions, but rather a 
difference in emphasis, clearly based on each participant’s area of responsibility and interest that 
fit together as pieces of a puzzle. As the director of child welfare and attendance noted, it’s “like 
the story of the people, the blind people feeling the elephant; everybody got a different taste of 
what an elephant is.” By reexamining comments in terms of who was interviewed and which 
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schools were studied, the responses settled into four distinct patterns: What was revealed only in 
elementary schools, what was revealed only in middle schools, what was revealed in central 
office interviews, and what themes were shared. The following comments should also be taken 
with the caveat that the comments that surfaced in the interviews may have been felt by all 
personnel interviewed, but were only voiced in interviews at elementary, central office or middle 
schools. Figure 6.1 represents the three broader units of the study and the various themes that 
emerged from each unit. 
 
Figure 6.1 Emergent themes. 
 The units of analysis in this case study were the central office and each of three schools. 
However, many themes that emerged from the analysis grouped in three general broader units of 
analysis represented as three overlapping circles: e mentary schools, middle schools, and the 
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central office. Some themes were specific to one unit – the elementary schools, the middle 
school, or the central office, but most themes were common to two or all three of the units. The 
Venn diagram in Figure 6.1 represents the overlapping themes visually. A brief description of the 
themes follows. 
Elementary Schools 
Two related issues that surfaced only in elementary school interviews were the almost 
year-long struggle to establish classroom routines and the collaborative nature of the planning 
among the faculty at the school. The level of collabor tion within the schools, and within the 
grade level teams was as surprising to the new teachers as the level of emotional and classroom 
support from principal and the faculty. Several displaced teachers interviewed at the elementary 
schools complimented the way teachers worked together to plan and who provided a support 
system for new teachers. This was especially noted at PS-802 Elementary. At PS-802 the 
collaboration applied to interactions with the principal as teams of teachers typically were 
consulted for suggestions before major decisions were made.  
Teaching the displaced children the structure – the routines – associated with attending 
school proved to be an elusive goal, particularly at PS-802. For many of the displaced students 
and their families, both faculty and administrators noted, structure was not something to which 
many had been accustomed in their former schools. Because of the continuous mobility 
elementary teachers spent an inordinate amount of time trying to re-establish basic classroom 
routines and procedures, a task that was essential to he maintenance of order, but which did not 
seem to settle in – especially at PS-802 – as late as May of 2006. 
Middle Schools 
One middle school theme in the study that did not surface in the elementary school 
interviews was a strong sense of striving to maintain control and discipline. The mobility of the 
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students constantly challenged the “system of things,” kept things stirred up, and may have 
contributed to the increased discipline issues that occurred at PS-813. As noted before, expulsion 
referrals spiked that year, almost than doubling the number of the previous year. 
Central Office  
 The one main theme that emerges only from the interviews and the emails examined from 
the central office is the theme of accountability. Particularly in respect to the actions and 
statements of the superintendent, the plan had to be carefully thought through before being 
implemented. Order, a clear chain of command – the plan had to be in place before anything 
could be accomplished. Individuals were assigned spcific duties and the hierarchy was clearly 
spelled out to relieve the superintendent of the need for constant oversight and allow her the 
freedom to attend to the myriad other meetings and communications with the OEP, the mayor’s 
office, and State Department of Education that conditions necessitated. 
Commonalities 
 Considerable overlap of themes was found in the study of middle and elementary schools 
and with the central office. Common themes shared across the schools are discussed first, themes 
shared between the different schools and the central office are discussed next, and finally the 
commonalities found across the entire case. 
 Elementary and middle school faculty participants i  the study noted the efforts displayed 
by the faculties and administrators in supporting their new hires, and also providing the support 
and peer bonding that the displaced students needed. Displaced faculty members were employed 
at each of the study schools and in each school there was at least one specific mention of the 
support and guidance provided to the new faculty members by the principal and within the 
faculties of the schools. The support was not just academic in nature, but was also emotional and 
empathetic. Students also received support from the sc ools and students in a variety of ways. 
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New students and their families were greeted by faculty and staff members when they registered; 
students were escorted their first day at the school by student “welcomers,” and were then paired 
with peer “buddies” who sat with and helped them learn the procedures of the classes, or who 
helped tutor the new students who were far behind their classmates.  
Elementary schools were concerned with maintaining the dignity of the children and their 
families. This concern was also shared by several cntral office participants and clearly revealed 
in the insistence of both the superintendent and princi als on keeping the children from 
appearing different when they arrived at their new schools. School “T’s” were handed out and 
donned immediately. School uniforms had to be provided to the children so that they could be 
properly attired on their first day to school – by the second day at the latest. Teachers made sure 
that children had materials, loaning the children spare boxes of crayons and other materials, for 
example, so the children would not be seen without. The concern for the dignity of the families 
was evident from the earliest communications with the families at the shelters, and persisted 
even in the face of increasingly hostile interactions later in the year.  
The middle school shared with the central office an insistence on process and procedure. 
While the procedures had to be taught to the very young in elementary schools, middle schools 
were concerned with the maintenance of order and keeping to the system when interacting with 
older students and especially in the face of increasing discipline issues that plagued the schools 
that year and the next. When Ms. Teel mentioned that s e and the school “just tried to keep the 
system of things intact,” she was speaking on more than one level. The processes and procedures 
that enabled the schools to absorb hundreds of new students in a matter of weeks challenged the 
system, but the policies and procedures in place wer a source of stability, a familiarity in 
routines and duties, that seemed to provide a reassurance that everything was going to be all right 
in the end. In addition, when dealing with pre-teens a d some students who were older than their 
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classmates, the system and structure worked to establish  consistency of routine that may have 
been lacking in the students’ personal lives. 
Finally, three themes surfaced in every school and at the central office as the interviews 
progressed, and were reinforced in several emails sent to all principals, ELT, and DLT members. 
It was remarkable that from the faculty members struggling with large classes all the way up the 
chain of command to the superintendent, every participant in this study understood the need to 
establish as close to normal a routine as possible. Th  superintendent noted that the city needed 
to return to normal. Principals and counselors noted that parents needed “normalcy” for 
themselves and especially for their children, and that “normalcy” meant having children within 
in the safe, familiar boundaries of a school. Inclusion was a second theme that surfaced in almost 
every interview. In addition to the comforting feel of familiar halls, classrooms, and peers, every 
school responded to the superintendent’s insistence, reinforced by the CAO and assistant 
superintendents, that once the displaced students arrived at their assigned schools, they were “our 
students.” When they were in the halls, classrooms, and playgrounds, they were “[insert 
mascot]” just like anyone else. When there were discipline issues, it was not a case of “us” 
versus “them,” it was “our” problem. Finally, successful communications pervaded the entire 
case. In the central office communications described th  meetings, email memos, and frequent 
contact with ELT, DLT, and principals keeping everyone informed of what was happening, what 
had been decided, and what was still to be considered. At the school level, communications 
meant the formal and informal contacts between the principals, their staffs, and their faculties; 
the constant efforts to “rally the troops” or praise them for their efforts especially in the crucial 
first months. In more general terms, communications between the district and the media in the 
early weeks and the utilization of the PACE telephone system served to keep families and the 
public informed.  
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A Model of Crisis Planning 
Among the comments made in preparation of this proposal and when approaching 
principals for permission to conduct the study in their schools was the common implied question 
“How will we benefit from this project?” It is not an unreasonable question.  Organizational 
research suggests that organizations “learn” from the experiences that challenge them (Argyris 
and Schon, 1996). How this “learning” is translated into improved practice and policy largely 
determines the success of those organizations to grow and adapt. One concrete way that an 
organization can exhibit its “learning” is to be found in a well conceived and up-to-date crisis 
plan. The district in this study had a crisis plan that was designed around the threats common to 
urban school districts including such threats as weather events like storms or tornadoes, events 
like students with weapons, or drive-by shootings, and even external issues that would require a 
shelter-in-place strategy such as crime near the scool or strangers on campus. No mention is 
made of any event on the scale of the calamity that was the hurricanes of 2005; of how a district 
could absorb hundreds or thousands of new students isplaced by such an event; or how the 
district or school is supposed to identify and respond to the need for materials, desks, faculty and 
staff members, and medical or psychological support for traumatized children or their families.  
Planning for a crisis is an exercise in hope in that e planning that takes place is always 
based on past experience and the hope that the next crisis will be similar. Unfortunately, no two 
crises are the same. At best we can analyze what happened, what worked, and what went wrong 
then attempt to take that into account when planning for the next event. What follows is a brief 
list of current practices in place and recommendations suggested by the participants of the study. 
The list will be followed by more detailed explanations of the salient points. 
• Maintain a budget surplus of at least 10% 
• Maintain current contact information on all department heads and employees 
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• Conduct a pre-event planning meeting in all departments to clarify plans and 
update contact information 
• Create a secure, powered backup/mirror site for IT department capable of 
operating at a minimal level all the critical operations of the district 
• Backup all data to two off-site data storage providers out of state. 
• Hold a post-event meeting to begin planning responses to the crisis 
• Initiate an immediate post-event evaluation of facilities and personnel 
• Maintain contact with multiple vendors in event of l ss of service providers 
• Negotiate pre-approval payment agreements in event a new provider is needed 
suddenly 
• Provide multiple forms of communications for personnel including electronic, 
land line, cellular, and text messaging 
• Grant emergency powers to superintendent when warranted by circumstances 
• Daily meetings of crisis leadership teams and daily reports to all stakeholders 
• Establish an state level on-line database on all children and employees 
• Plan a site for centralized registration of students wi h on-line resources 
• Establish closer coordination between HR and state and federal databases to 
facilitate background screening of new hires 
• Prepare a flexible training schedule to certify new hires quickly 
• Establish a program of mentors at the school level to assist in integrating and 
supporting new faculty and staff into the culture of the school 
• Daily “Warm Body Counts” to document actual student rollment and track 
mobile students 
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• Central office personnel ready to assist with task of acknowledging and 
responding to offers of assistance or donations 
• Deliberate efforts to provide visual and hardcopy documentation of events in the 
district to assist in public relations efforts in support of the district and to facilitate 
after-event evaluation of district effectiveness in responding to the crisis 
Crisis communications plans exist for many other organizations and go beyond the above 
items particularly in the area of establishing clear ines of communications with media and 
stakeholders, pre-plan some basic responses, and establish a clear set of guidelines in order to 
respond effectively in the middle of events that are ordinarily chaotic. An example of such a 
crisis plan is available at the Louisiana State University website. One notable feature of the plan 
is the comment that echoes the attitudes found in this district and each of the study schools: do 
the right thing (Louisiana State University, 2007). 
The following pages describe each of the points mentioned above in more detail. Some of 
the comments were specifically suggested as recommendations to improve the way the district 
responded to the hurricanes of 2005. 
Financial planners, among them popular radio talk-show host and author Dave Ramsey, 
urge their clients to set aside an emergency fund and also to have in savings an amount equal to 
three to six months of expenses for emergencies (2003).  It is unrealistic to expect a public 
school district the size of this district to mainta n emergency fund balance equal to a quarter 
of the annual budget of over $300 million. However, within reason, a healthy budget surplus 
amounting to about 10% would go a long way to helping absorb unexpected expenses like those 
that hit the district in September of 2005. This sort of planning involves strict adherence to a 
budget and tight control of spending, both characteistics of the district that year.  
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It is always a good policy to have current contact information on all district employees as 
of the start of the school year, especially for central office personnel involved with the executive 
and district leadership teams and the heads of each of the departments in the district. In any sort 
of emergency these groups and their staff would nee to be in communication with each other 
immediately to begin planning responses to emergencies. In addition, there were specific 
individuals that needed secure forms of communication for the immediate responses to the crisis, 
not the least of which were district employees respon ible for maintenance, food service, 
transportation, human resources, technology, and the chief academic officer, in addition to the 
superintendent. In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina communications were 
unreliable for several days. Power outages disabled many electronic forms of communications 
including electronic phones and email throughout the city. Cell phones were unreliable because 
cell towers were damaged or overwhelmed by the highvolume of calls, but remarkably, text 
messaging was fairly reliable. The district must recognize and make use of the unique nature of 
text messaging as an alternative in its overall communications plan. It is also important that 
current contact information be available to all department heads, and principals so that an 
immediate assessment of the availability and safety of all employees be available. It may seem 
superfluous, but departmental meetings before the arrival of any foreseeable problem would 
allow the departments to coordinate plans and update contact information.  There were no 
departmental meetings mentioned on the academic side of the central office and it took up to 
three days to get in contact with all the district leadership team members and many of the 
principals; on the other hand, auxiliary services, food service, and maintenance departments met 
the Friday before the storm to update their contact information and make plans. They went into 
action as the storm swept past, examining power status of the kitchens and arranging for 
refrigerated trucks to transport perishables from unpowered schools.  
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A backup system for data and a secure, powered command center must be established in 
the event of serious disruption to power and communications.  Planning and foresight helped the 
district recover quickly from the loss of power. Several vital areas of the system were still 
powered and available for use after the passage of the storm, not the least of which was the 
warehouse and storage facilities for food service and the IT department. The technology director 
indicated that the district was planning to construct a back-up site that would perform daily 
backups of all vital systems in the event of a disruption to the main computing center. Although 
the main computing center had backup systems already in place, a mirror site would be able to 
keep the district minimally running in the event of a serious problem at the main computing 
center. In addition, daily backups are sent to two offsite electronic storage facilities out of state, 
but different departments used different storage sites in 2005, a problem that had been 
recognized since the storms. Given sufficient electrical capacity, an alternative command center 
with power, communications, and cooling/heating would help school board personnel keep the 
district running until repairs could be completed at the central office or any other departments 
across the city.  
After the passage of a storm or other catastrophic event department heads and principals 
must immediately reestablish communications with the central office. Once the main 
departments have checked in, principals and department heads need to assess the safety and 
availability of their own staffs. If communications are available, phone trees should be utilized to 
assess the conditions and well-being of all school b ard and school employees. Alert messages 
must be sent out via email, text messaging, and the PACE messaging system requiring all 
personnel to check in to their immediate supervisors.   
Facilities must be inspected for loss of power and damage before secondary issues like 
mold or water intrusion can complicate repairs. While the physical plant is being assessed, 
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inventories must be checked in the event that materials need to be replaced. A comprehensive 
inventory of the district took almost three days to complete after the passage of Hurricane 
Katrina. Food stores had to be secured from school sites that had lost power. Fortunately the 
warehouse for storing perishables was next to an electrical substation that did not lose power 
during Katrina. That circumstance may have been more se endipitous than planned. Districts 
must assess facilities or sites with power requirements in mind in addition to security or easy 
access – or have sufficient power backup or generation systems in place. 
Districts need to have multiple vendors available in the event that one vendor is closed by 
catastrophic events. The district found itself needing food not only for its 48,000 local students, 
but also for potentially an additional 6,800 students, but their distributors were flooded in the 
New Orleans area. Because of its size, there are few vendors who can supply the entire needs of 
a large district. New vendors had to be able to supply food for an entire district of over 50,000 
students. Backup lists of vendors capable of supplying the needs of the district must be 
maintained with any requirements like pre-approval for purchasing taken care of in advance.  If 
practical, the request for proposal should include pre-approval agreements from any bidders so 
that, in the event that one supplier becomes unable to fulfill their obligations, the next available 
bidder can step in and begin supplying materials quickly. 
District leadership must meet immediately after the passage of the crisis at a secure site. 
The academic side of the district failed to meet th day after the hurricane, partially due to the 
extensive damage to electrical service and dangerous driving conditions, but they lost a day of 
assessing, planning, and organizing. At least two sites must be designated for the first planning 
meetings – a primary site and a secure backup site. 
Clear lines of communication and authority must be established early in the crisis as the 
nature of the problem becomes apparent. Everyone must know who is tasked and to whom to 
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report or from whom to get needed information. One str ngth of the Katrina experience 
frequently mentioned was the clear channels of communication and delegation of authority that 
prevented paralysis or overload on key personnel. The superintendent was constantly in meetings 
with city, state, and federal emergency agencies and could not be everywhere at once. But, 
having established clear lines of delegated authority, when issues surfaced team members knew 
to whom they needed direct questions or report findings. The CAO also commented that, given 
the nature of the problem, there are resources – individuals – with specialized knowledge that 
need to be available to share their expertise with the central office. After Katrina, the key 
individual was the homeless liaison who quickly focused the district’s efforts on meeting the 
exacting demands of McKinney – Vento (Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act, 1987).  
Delegation of authority may, if the crisis is severe, include a grant of extraordinary power 
to the superintendent by the school board. In the exp rience of Katrina the superintendent was 
granted emergency power to get past the worst of the crisis. As mentioned earlier, this allowed 
the school district to devote all of their time to s lving problems rather than generating reports 
and formulating requests for board approval. It wasfortunate that the board acted as it did 
because getting school board approval before attemping to replace the defunct vendors 
supplying food to the students may have meant serious shortages of supplies while 6,800 plus 
additional students needed to be fed.  
Depending on the nature of the crisis, leadership team meetings must be held daily to 
update information and coordinate responses. Communications with team members, staff at the 
central office, principals, and the press is crucial. The nightly “Midnight Missives” provided a 
vital link between the leadership teams and the rest of the district. Updated data were transmitted 
by the technology director from the first week of the crisis and continued until matters settled 
into a routine. The “Midnight Missives” continued for nearly three weeks. These messages also 
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provided lists of registered students and their school assignments and were sent to each school in 
the district. As the lists changed, updates kept the principals aware so they could plan the 
materials, furniture, and textbook needs. Daily updates prepared the lunch personnel for the 
number of students for whom to prepare meals. The massive numbers of emails overwhelmed 
the system and required precious time to review, read, or discard.  
A centralized system in which all students’ data are maintained and made available 
online to all appropriate personnel would reduce the numbers of emails and provide an on-
demand source of data as needed. This recommendatio was made by several individuals, and 
would contain all academic data, all special needs, and what accommodations had been provided 
for each child. Using a layered system of passwords, data would be available to teachers, 
administrators, and counselors depending on their position and need to know. Whereas some 
administrators spoke of this as a district-level datab se, the homeless coordinator and the 
superintendent saw this as a statewide system that would have been more valuable in the Katrina 
aftermath where the greatest deficits were in complete up-to-date information on children and 
potential hires from distant schools and districts; information that was not available in September 
of 2005. 
Depending on the nature of the disaster, centralized registration of displaced applicants 
would have streamlined the process resulting in faster turnaround of the application process. The 
method used in the Katrina crisis reached thousands of families within days of their arrival, but 
the chaotic nature of the relocation also meant that some families registered multiple times at 
different shelters or trailer parks because they did not get prompt replies with school assignment 
information. As recommended by the director of child welfare and attendance, a “one stop shop” 
would include a facility large enough to accommodate hundreds of families. Inside, connected by 
computer networks directly accessing the district (or ultimately, the state) database, employees of 
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the school system would be able to assist families in inputting or verifying data using a 
simplified form similar to the homeless forms readily available at the homeless liaison office. 
Before leaving the table, the family member would be advised which school closest to their 
address had room for their children and which bus would take their children to school. Nearby 
tables could serve as stations to assist families wth housing, food, clothing or other needs, or 
simply be there to answer questions or direct families to counseling, public assistance, or any 
other services appropriate to the circumstances.  
Staffing and transportation were seriously challenged by the dislocations of Hurricane 
Katrina. Human resources had to locate sufficient faculty, staff, and administrators to open or 
expand schools to accommodate over 6,800 new students in less than two weeks. A database of 
retired, but willing, former employees should be maintained in the event that part or full-time 
staff  become necessary. Human resources had to locate ver three hundred employees, mostly 
faculty, to staff the schools through the 2005 – 06 school year, but most importantly, most of 
those employees were needed within two weeks. It was fortuitous that many employees of the 
school systems devastated by the hurricanes of 2005were in the area and had applied to work. 
Many applicants lacked documentation at the time of their application so the district could not 
perform much needed background checks. A statewide register of certified personnel would have 
removed some of the uncertainty from the interview and employment process. Improved 
coordination with local and federal law enforcement agencies is also essential to prevent the 
employment of individuals with criminal records, and such coordination must be especially close 
in times of crisis when coordination is typically difficult and criminals may be tempted to use the 
chaos to their own advantage. 
Human resources also expanded training and supervision of new hires in the period 
because the need for drivers and teachers was so great. Mentoring in the classroom and 
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appropriate training for employees new to educationl settings is necessary and should be 
expanded in times of crisis. Mentoring of new teachers has been discussed in research as, among 
other issues, a way to prepare pre-service teachers and to improve the skills of newly employed 
teachers (Rushton, 2003; Whitehead, 1995; Zimpher & Rieger, 1988), mentoring should already 
be in place in any school district. Such master teach rs or mentors would help ease the transition 
to entering the new school and school system, and provide a valuable support system to 
individuals who may be in the throes of their own personal crises. 
Assigning students to new schools is not the end of the process for the school or the 
family. Students and their parents must also complete registration at the schools. Families that do 
not make timely registrations at the assigned schools stress the system and deny seats to children 
who fully intend to attend the school. Katrina exposed a serious problem in the system as seats 
were assigned to children who never arrived, or whoarrived weeks or months later. Identifying 
“No Shows” and getting accurate “Warm Body Counts” was essential for the system to provide 
materials, food, and other essential services. The problem with identifying “No Shows” is that 
schools are already fully engaged in the business of teaching with little in the way of spare 
personnel to try to track down “No Shows.” To alleviate this problem schools need to maintain a 
list of local supporters, churches, or civic groups that can volunteer time to perform part time 
work at the school. Businesses and civic groups can be encouraged to “adopt a school” to 
provide such charitable services. Similar services may have been available to some schools after 
Hurricane Katrina, but not all schools had access to that type of assistance. 
 Charity and unexpected offers of assistance caught the district by surprise and is a tribute 
to the generous and compassionate nature of people across the nation and in Katrina’s instance, 
the world. Appropriate responses required a central agency to receive, categorize, and 
disseminate donations. In Katrina this was accomplished through the efforts of the business 
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operations office of the district, but also by an administrator who was assigned as chief contact 
person in accepting offers of help and materials. In addition to the larger offers directed to the 
central office schools were also deluged with materi ls shipped directly to the school and by 
individuals who stopped in person to offer donations f money or materials. Prompt 
acknowledgement of what was received was attempted, both as a matter of courtesy, but also by 
directive from the superintendent.  One creative way to express gratitude occurred at PS-802 
Elementary as an open house for the displaced families that was filmed to give the recipients an 
opportunity to express their gratitude, and when burned to DVD and sent to donors, provided 
audio-visual feedback to donors. Given sufficient interest, many schools could have made similar 
efforts. The public information office of the district could coordinate documentation of events 
both visually with still camera and video, and with maintenance of backup copies of 
correspondence to accomplish two purposes. One, it would document, for media sources, the 
accomplishments of the district under trying circumstances which will work to the district’s 
advantage by stimulating additional sympathy and support. Second, and more importantly, such 
documentation would provide the grist for a thorough examination of the actions and help 
identify areas of weakness in the system’s response to crisis. 
Implications for Practice 
Community 
 Greenfield, Sergiovani, and Furman – among others – wrote of the moral and ethical 
purposes of leadership, usually, but not always found in the person of the principal of the school. 
Evidence of those purposes exists within the study schools I observed and within the words of 
their interviews. The methods used at the different schools varied, but worked to the advantage 
of the school because of the personality of the principal and the particular mix of faculty and 
staff at the school. The principal of PS-814 had long experience in the school and a staff that – as 
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she expressed it – she would have wanted to teach her own children, working in close 
association, using data from diagnostic testing to direct their lesson planning to teach to the 
needs of the individual child. Murphy (2002) wrote f value laden activities in schools and 
principals who led from within a web of associations – faculty, staff, and community. All three 
elements appeared to be in place in PS-814. The climate of the school was no-nonsense, no frills, 
but very professional approach to teaching. 
 If the experience of PS-814 is indicative of the actions of the principal and her staff and 
faculty and not some coincidence or random combinatio  of factors, the implications for other 
schools would seem to be fairly clear: Build a tight association with parents and the local 
community in the form of a PTO that helps plan and host numerous activities to involve as many 
parents as can be attracted to the school. Plan grade level meetings for every grade and 
encourage cross-curricular activities to build a tight-knit community of teachers who cannot fall 
back on that all-too-common isolation of the classroom that separates teachers and minimizes 
innovation and lasting change. Gooden (2000) warned that collaboration requires time to develop 
and a comfortable fit between the principal and staff at any given school. That requires stability 
fostered from the district level that does not shift principals after only a few years in any 
particular school, and also requires a stable faculty that is a fit for the school and community. 
Staff members also spoke of the insulated societies that schools try to build; reminding 
students that “here” they do not need to fear violence, even if violence is present in their 
environment outside of school. Schools are supposed to be “safe” places. Schools are also 
supposed to reflect the shared values and common activities of their larger community. Urban 
schools suffer from constant demographic changes as families grow older, property values in 
“nice” neighborhoods eventually decline inviting poorer families to “move up” and move in. 
Changes in zoning encompass dissimilar and occasionlly mutually hostile neighborhoods whose 
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children bring their parent’s biases into the school halls and playgrounds. Urban schools cannot 
always be communities in the sense that Bryk and Driscoll (1988), Raywid (1993), or Royal and 
Rossi (1997) describe; nor can they always model the kind of inclusive communities that Strike 
(1999, 2000, 2004) suggests is possible. 
What is needed in schools that have students from divide  communities is a connection 
through social services or some other community organization to bridge the perceived 
differences between neighborhoods and reduce the opportunities for strife or violence. 
Mobility 
In retrospect, the real lesson learned from this project was the discovery of the extent of 
the silent crisis of student mobility highlighted by the circumstances surrounding hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. Apartment and housing agencies that offer “first month free” inducements to 
fill empty units with new tenants contribute to student mobility because impoverished families 
take advantage of the free month’s rent and move frequently, dragging their children from school 
to school. Katrina briefly ended that practice as refugees from storm-devastated areas seized any 
accommodations they could find and housing was simply no longer readily available. However, 
in the years since the hurricanes housing developments have blossomed again in the city each 
with hundreds of new units. The result is likely to be another wave of “first month free” housing 
inducements and more student mobility. As long as mobility continues, the weaknesses that we 
know exist (low test scores, students falling a full year behind within six years) will continue.  
The director of IT mentioned efforts in the past to limit the effects of mobility, one of 
which was an attempt to communicate with developers and management of large housing units to 
limit the utilization of “first month free” inducements. Staying Put, a measure mentioned in 
Kerbow, Azcoitia, and Buell (2003) in the Chicago system, did not force students to leave 
schools when their parents left the attendance zone. The chief problem with an accommodation 
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of that nature in this district is the expense on tra sportation systems to bring children across the 
city. As the system struggled with the recent desegregation case, however, students were picked 
up by one bus from their neighborhood, brought to a central location in the city, and were 
switched to different buses going to specific schools. Research by Kerbow (1996) discovered 
that students who moved frequently tended to move between a few specific schools in similar 
socio-economic neighborhoods. If that is case, dividing the city into several regions and utilizing 
a central transfer point in each region may alleviat  a significant portion of the mobility in the 
system resulting in extended contact between studens and their teachers, and that should lead to 
improved learning opportunities for urban poor children. 
Curriculum  
The comprehensive curriculum, initiated that year ws too recent an innovation for its 
effectiveness to be evaluated properly at the end of the 2005-2006 school year. One principal 
confided that she believed that it helped. For students within the district the initiative may have 
supplied some needed stability.  Unfortunately, most of the new students who arrived in the 
system were from different districts and were not at all on the same academic “page” with their 
local peers. Several years have passed since the impl mentation of the comprehensive 
curriculum. The efficacy of that innovation should be formally evaluated. 
Organizational Learning 
The focus on this research effort was to detect the presence or absence of organizational 
learning resulting from the lessons of the hurricanes of 2005. Throughout the interviews in 
November, 2007 and follow-up interviews through the summer of 2008 no obvious examples of 
any permanent adjustments to policy or procedures surfaced. In that sense, there was little or no 
organizational learning. Argyris and Schön (1996) distinguish between the practitioner-advocate 
and the aloof researcher in the field of organizational learning literature. The one is immersed in 
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action and practical application while the other is aloof and scholarly, dealing with abstract 
issues like questioning whether organizations can le rn. School districts in most respects are in 
neither camp. Issues that are on-going, everyday matters are handled mainly by rote, following 
procedures that are rarely changed, and almost never questioned. In this particular instance, no 
procedural changes resulted from the challenge of Katrina and Rita; school processes continued 
within the schools in which students followed the pr scribed routines with few minor deviations. 
There is some evidence that within the individual cl ssrooms there was more flexibility in 
handling the day to day crises that arose. Traumatized children found themselves in learning 
spaces that were at once familiar and yet alien. Teach rs spoke of spending time discussing the 
Pre-Katrina lives of their displaced students, but most students were reluctant to dwell on those 
memories and soon the necessities of class work returned teachers and students back to learning 
their prescribed lessons.  
At the school level there may have been minor changes that, because of their efficacy, 
persisted into the following years’ activities, but they do not appear to have been shared with 
other schools. There still appears to be the feeling that each school is unique and that innovations 
in one school would not transfer to other schools. The district may have a mechanism to 
promulgate successful innovation, but none was mentioned when that point was raised in the 
interview. There should be a mechanism whereby principals, particularly principals new to the 
position, can learn what amounts to best practices. It may be naïve to suggest a system of 
mentorships could go a long way to lessening the problems of first year principals, considering 
the demands that the position already place on princi als. 
At the district level there were no innovations or adjustments mentioned; no lessons 
learned encoded into policy for future years. Any lessons learned were individual revelations, 
settling in as another layer of personal reflections that may or may not influence future decisions, 
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but which, at any rate, would fade from organizational consciousness when the individual left the 
position they held in 2005. None of the interviewees mentioned any after-action debriefings, and 
only when prompted specifically, did one central office administrator recall the statement, made 
almost as an aside, that someone should write down what they had just done; but it never 
happened under the constant press of new problems. The HR director hoped that when she left 
her current position promotion from within would help some of the lessons learned in 2005 
persist because it was her policy to keep everyone in the office aware of everything that was 
happening. Should someone from outside be hired to replace her, she expressed the hope that the 
experienced staff members in the office would provide the depth of experience that the new 
director would lack. In retrospect, however, much would depend on the quality of character of 
the new director and whether there was a willingness to learn from the staff.  
Peter Senge (1990) noted that mental models of how t ings are done exist in 
organizations. In this district, the mental models that are shared in the central office are basic, 
broad images of what a district should be like, but there are subtle differences present that only 
an insider could fully appreciate. One participant noted that when people leave their egos outside 
of the meeting room great things could be accomplished. Upon reflection, I suspected that when 
they left the room, their egos – and agendas – werestill outside waiting. There is nothing wrong 
with agendas and differences of opinion. In an organization the size of an urban school district 
there will – and should be – a broad diversity of thought and opinion. Such diversity ensures that 
any problems will be viewed from many sides and soluti ns can be developed from a broad, 
thoughtful perspective. The real danger for this, as in any school district, is that the holders of the 
“history” of the district will depart and take any lessons that they learned with them. Like the 
blind men trying to understand the “elephant” that w s Katrina and Rita, each holder of a part of 
the history of that year had a unique perspective that, hough not always in full agreement with 
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any of the others in that organization, was at least de cribing the same “elephant.” When enough 
of the leadership changes, the vision of this particular “elephant” will fade and vanish. At this 
writing, the CAO has already departed, as have several assistant superintendents. Others in the 
organization have been promoted or transferred to different posts; several of the participants in 
this study have retired or announced their impending retirement – in particular, the 
superintendent. For all the apparent strengths, the sup rintendent did not establish a routine of 
debriefing and preserving lessons learned.  
Finally, in conducting this project I did not spend months or years in the school system 
and could not comment from experience on the nature of the culture that pervaded the district in 
2005-2006. The district was in the final stages of ending a desegregation case that had persisted 
for over 40 years and cost the district thousands of students and their families who moved out of 
the city to neighboring districts, established and ttended many private schools, or whose 
communities successfully separated from the district to establish small town school systems of 
their own. At this writing, a third district has successfully separated and reduced the student 
population by several thousand children. With the decline in population in New Orleans and its 
environs, this district has become the largest in the state outside of the New Orleans area and is 
still home to roughly a third of the displaced students from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Hard 
work and local support have helped the study schools build and maintain positive school 
cultures. More hard work is needed to establish stronger connections between the schools and the 
school neighborhoods and families.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
 There were many gaps in the study that could have been filled given more time and 
resources. Only three schools of the over ninety in he district were studied. Some schools, 
particularly schools that received large numbers of displaced students, opted not to participate for 
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various reasons. I did not push the principals for reasons, but did notice that there was some 
emotional baggage still present. Follow up interviews including many additional schools are 
needed to reinforce the above findings. Other district  also experienced large influxes and 
displacements of students. Their stories should also be sought and any lessons learned sought. 
Several other areas of interest could be pursued spcifically in the area of counseling. 
Several participants mentioned the role of the I CARE program in the district. It would be 
interesting to study the nature of assistance that was provided and whether anything else could 
have been done to improve the quality of mental healt  assistance provided to children, their 
families, and school personnel. One other feature of this study that did not receive much mention 
was the role of school counselors already on campus as the storms arrived; their roles at the 
schools appeared to be focused more on admissions and testing; they mentioned nothing about 
their role in matters of discipline or emotional crises. That aspect needs further examination. 
Another interesting angle on the story of the storms of 2005 would be an oral history 
treatment of the lives of displaced families, particularly those who moved into the district and 
remained. Since the hurricanes some of the families have since watched their older children 
graduate from the district. Learning how families coped with difficulties and managed to get 
their children through school would be useful in developing more effective programs to help 
urban families who move frequently. 
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Years experience as superintendent: _____ 
Years experience in the district: _____ 




1. Can you explain what you remember of the days immediat ly before the hurricane struck 
and when and how you began to plan for what you thog t would happen to the district? 
 
2. Who was included in planning for the arrival of thestudents? How did you communicate 
with your staff and the schools? What problems of communication occurred? 
 
3. How many days were school(s) closed following the hurricanes? 
 
 
Arrival and Integration Phase: 
 
4. What do you recall happened as families began to arrive in the district and needed to be 
placed in schools? How did that proceed?  
 
5. What problems did you anticipate? What problems appe red that you did not anticipate? 
 
6. What sources of support did you have available to help accommodate the arrival of new 
students? What unexpected sources of support offered to help? 
 
7. What issues or problems arose that required adjustments in policy or procedures in the 
district? 
 
8. How effective were any emergency plans or procedures in helping cope with the arrival 
of displaced families and students? Were any changes e ded to the emergency plans? 
 
9. Were any new administrative structures/committees needed? 
 
10. How did the district help new students and their parents fit into the culture of the schools? 
 
11. What issues of discipline arose in the schools and how did the schools handle those 
issues? 
 
12. Were there any particularly vulnerable groups within t e school system that was 
impacted more by the arrival of so many displaced stu ents? How did the district act to 
help those groups? 
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14. After over a year, about what portion of the school population still consists of formerly 
displaced students? 
 
15. What – if any – accommodations has the district had to make this year compared to 2005 
year? 
 
16. Are there still issues of displaced student mobility n the current year?  
 
17. What problems have you found associated with student mobility in general in the district? 
 
18. Has the school developed any means of dealing with problems associated with student 
mobility? 
 
19. How would you describe your style of leadership? Do you feel that had an impact on how 
you responded to the challenge of 2005-06? 
 
20. What did you learn from the experience of last year th t you are applying to this year and 





• Summarize what was discussed. 
• Review the purpose of the project 
• Ask if there are any closing comments or if any important points were missed. 
• Thanks and exit. 
• Turn off recorder and switch off microphone. 
• Length of recording: ______ 
• Time and Date ___________ 
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District assignment in 2005 ______________________________________ 
Years experience in that position: ______ 
Years experience in the district: _______ 




1. Can you explain what you remember of the days immediat ly before the hurricanes 
struck and how you began to plan for what you thougt would happen to the schools? 
 
2. Who was included in planning for the arrival of displaced students? How did you 
communicate with the staff and schools? What problems of communications occurred? 
 
3. What were the specific responsibilities of your department? 
 




Arrival and Integration Phase: 
 
5. What do you recall happened as families began to arrive in the district and needed to be 
placed in schools? How did that process proceed?  
 
6. What problems did you anticipate? What problems appe red that you did not anticipate? 
 
7. What sources of support did you have available to help accommodate the arrival of new 
students? What unexpected sources of support helped? 
 
8. What issues or problems arose that required adjustments in policy or procedures in the 
district? 
 
9. How effective were any emergency plans or procedures in helping cope with the arrival 
of displaced families and students? 
 
10. Were any new structures/committees needed to handle the planning for the arrival of new 
students? 
 
11. Were any particular schools within the district impacted more by the arrival of so many 






12. What accommodations has the district made this year compared to the 2005 school year? 
 
13. Are there still any issues of “displaced” student mobility this year? If so, what is the 
cause of continuing mobility? 
 
14. What problems have you found associated with “normal” student mobility in the school? 
 
15. Has the district developed any policies of dealing with problems associated with student 
mobility? 
 
16. What did you learn from the experience of the 2005 school year that you are applying to 





• Summarize what was discussed. 
• Review the purpose of the project 
• Ask if there are any closing comments or if any important points were missed. 
• Thanks and exit. 
• Turn off recorder and switch off microphone. 
• Length of recording: ______ 
• Time and Date ___________ 
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Interview Questions: Principals: 
 




Years experience as principal: _____ 
Years experience as assistant principal: _____ 
Years here at the current school: _____ 




1. Can you explain what you remember of the days immediat ly before the hurricanes 
struck and how you began to plan for what you thougt would happen to the school? 
 
2. Who was included in planning for the arrival of displaced students? 
3. What plans were made to prepare for the storm and its aftermath? 
 
4. How many days was the school closed following the hurricanes? 
 
 
Arrival and Integration Phase: 
 
1. What do you recall happened as families began to arrive in the district and needed to be 
placed in schools? How did that process proceed?  
 
2. What problems did you anticipate? What problems appe red that you did not anticipate? 
 
3. What sources of help did you have available to helpaccommodate the arrival of new 
students? What unexpected sources of support did you find? 
 
4. What issues or problems arose that required adjustments in policy or procedures in the 
school? 
 
5. How effective were the emergency plans or procedures in helping cope with the arrival of 
displaced families and students? 
 
6. Were any new structures/committees needed to handle the planning for the new students? 
 
7. How did the school help new students and their parents fit into the culture of the school? 
 




9. Could you tell if there was a particular group within the school that was impacted more 
by the arrival of so many displaced students? What did he school do to serve that 
population? 
 
10. What did you think would be the largest problem when testing for the 2005 then the 2006 
LEAP tests? 




15. Two years later, what portion of the school population still consists of formerly displaced 
students? 
 
16. What accommodations has the school made this year compared to the 2005 school year? 
 
17. Are there any continuing issues of “displaced” student mobility this year? If so, what is 
the cause of continuing mobility? 
 
18. What problems have you found associated with “normal” student mobility in the school? 
 
19. Has the school developed any policies for dealing with student mobility? 
 
20. How would you describe your style of leadership? Do you feel that had an impact on how 
you responded to the challenge of 2005-06? 
 
21. What did you learn from the experience of the 2005 school year that you are applying to 
this year and for the future? Have you made any changes to school policy or procedures 
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Interview Questions: Counselors 
 




Years experience as counselor: _____ 
Years here at the current school: _____ 




1. Can you explain what you remember of the days immediat ly before the hurricanes 
struck and how you began to plan for what you thougt would happen to the school? 
 
2. Who was included in planning for the arrival of thestudents? What plans were made? 
 
 
Arrival and Integration Phase: 
 
3. What do you recall happened when families began to arrive in the district and needed to 
be placed in schools? How did that proceed? What was your role? 
 
4. How many of the school population were displaced stu ents in 2005-06? 
As of: Oct. 3? 
 Jan 2? 
 Last day of school? 
 
5. What issues or problems arose in the 2005 – 06 year that equired your expertise? 
 
6. How did the school help new students and their parents fit into the culture of the school? 
 
7. What issues of discipline arose in the schools and how did the school handle those 
issues? What role did you play? 
 
8. Could you tell if there was a particular group within the school that was impacted more 
by the arrival of so many displaced students? Why? What did you do to help that group? 
 
9. What did you think would be the biggest problem with the 2005 or the 2006 LEAP tests? 








11. What accommodations has the school made this year compared to the 2005 school year? 
 
12. Are there still issues of “displaced” student mobility this year?  
 
13. What problems have you found associated with “normal” student mobility in the school? 
 
14. Has the school developed any procedures for dealing with problems associated with 
student mobility? 
 
15. How would you describe your principal’s style of leadership? How did the principal’s 
leadership style influence the way you responded to the challenge of 2005-06? 
 
16. What did you learn from the experience of the 2005 school year that you are applying to 
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• Review the purpose of the project 
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• Thanks and exit. 
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Interview Questions for Teachers: 
 




Years experience as teacher: _____ 
Years here at the current school: _____ 
Highest degree held: _____ 
Courses in which certified: _______________________________ 
Courses taught 2005-06___________________________________ 




1. Describe your thoughts as you saw the arrival of the hurricanes and how that might affect 
you and your work. 
 
2. Were there any meetings or planning information about what to expect when new 
students would begin to arrive? 
 
Arrival and Integration Phase: 
 
3. What do you remember of the early weeks in September 2005? What happened in your 
classes? 
 
4. How did your classroom routine change as a result of the arrival of the students displaced 
by the hurricanes? 
 
5. What issues of discipline arose and how did you handle them? 
 
6. How often did your classroom head-count change in the Fall of 2005? How did you deal 
with that? 
 
7. At what point did you feel you were back to some kind of normal routine? What made 




8. How would you describe your leadership style in the classroom? What impact did that 
have on the way you responded to the challenge of that year? 
 
9. How would you describe the leadership style of your principal? What impact did that 
have on the how the school responded to the challenge of the hurricane year? 
 




11. As a classroom teacher, what did you learn from the experience of the 2005 school year 
and are applying this year and for the future? 
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Participant Consent Form 
Project title:  Administrative Responses to Katrina-I duced Mobility 
Performance Site:  Selected Schools in East Baton Rouge Parish 
Research Investigator:  Christopher J. Fontenot, LSU (any questions may be addressed to 
Christopher J. Fontenot, M-F after – 5 PM, 225-936-2736) or Dr. 
S. Kim MacGregor at 225-578-2150 
 
Purpose: Determine how the arrival of large numbers of displaced students affected District 
administration and how schools responded to the influx of students. 
Inclusion Criteria: Schools, nine % or more of whose student population contained students 
displaced by Hurricanes Katrina or Rita at some point during the 2005 School year. 
Exclusion Criteria: Schools which did not have nine % or more of its student population 
identified as students displaced by Hurricanes Katrin  or Rita. 
Number of subjects: Three or four individuals in each school (including Principal, Counselor, 
and teachers in the selected schools), District superintendent and key personnel at 
School Board office. 
Description of the Study: Administrators, staff, and faculty members will be interviewed in order 
to understand what factors helped the schools to minimize the disruption or helped the 
schools improve in the face of the influx of students. 
Benefits: By identifying what policies, procedures, or qualities of leadership that exist among the 
administration and staff have enabled schools to flourish under conditions of high 
student mobility, schools faced with similar problems may be able to respond better to 
mobility issues and prevent unnecessary declines in test scores. 
Risks:  The only study risk is the inadvertent release of sensitive information. Every effort will 
be made to maintain the confidentiality of the study records by containing all files in a 
secure location and by using pseudonyms of individuals interviewed unless authorized 
in writing. 
Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or may withdraw from the study at any 
time without penalty or loss of any benefit to which they may otherwise be entitled. 
Privacy: Although results of the study may be published, all n mes and any identifying 
information will be changed to protect the identity of the individuals and the schools 
involved. Subject identity will remain confidential unless disclosure is required by law. 
 
 
This project has been explained to me and all my questions have been answered.  If I have any 
additional questions I may call the research investigator. If I have questions about subjects’ 
rights or other concerns, I can contact Robert C. Matthews, Institutional Review Board, (225) 
578-8692. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the investigator’s 
obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent form 
 
 
__________________________________________________        ______ 
Participant Signature:       Date 
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Christopher J. Fontenot 
15514 Riverdale Ave. E. 
Baton Rouge, LA  70816 
 
 




1050 South Foster Drive 





The hurricanes of 2005 did more than damage schools in East Baton Rouge, they provided valuable 
lessons in how districts and schools cope with the influx of thousands of families and students into the
system. Lessons learned will prove quite valuable to districts and schools throughout the Gulf Coast and 
in general to any school system that undergoes catatrophic change from natural or man-made causes. I 
am requesting permission to investigate how your district met the challenges of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita and what was learned from the process. 
  
This investigation will take place this October-November. The purpose of the study is to investigate the 
effects of mobility on the district and schools to illuminate any successful coping strategies used by the 
district and schools to minimize the harmful effects of mobility. The project will involve interviews with 
the superintendent, key personnel in the central office, principals of selected schools, counselors, and 
some faculty in the schools. Every effort will be made to minimize disturbances to the schools. 
 
Any personal information garnered will be held in strict confidence. Anything that could identify the 
parish, schools, or any individuals will be altered or removed to protect their confidentiality. All findings 
from this investigation will be shared with all parties involved. 
 
You can contact Prof. MacGregor for more information regarding this project at the following address: 
College of Education 
Louisiana State University 
111-H Peabody Hall 
Baton Rouge, LA  70803 
225-578-2150 






Christopher J. Fontenot 
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Christopher J. Fontenot 
15514 Riverdale Ave. E. 
Baton Rouge, LA  70816 
 
 




2330 Aspenwood Ave.  





The hurricanes of 2005 did more than damage schools in East Baton Rouge. They provided valuable 
lesson in how districts and schools cope with the influx of thousands of families and students into the 
system. Lessons learned will prove quite valuable to districts and schools throughout the Gulf Coast and 
in general to any school system that undergoes catatrophic change from natural or manmade causes. I am 
requesting permission to investigate how your school met the challenges of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
and what was learned from the process. 
 
This investigation will take place this fall. The pur ose of the study is to investigate the effects of 
mobility on the schools and any successful coping strategies used by the schools to minimize the harmful 
effects of mobility. The project will involve interviews with the principal, school counselor, and some 
faculty in the schools. Every effort will be made to minimize disturbances to teaching schedules and the 
school. 
 
All information garnered will be held in strict confidence. Anything that could identify the parish, school, 
or any individuals will be altered or removed to prtect their confidentiality. All findings from this 
investigation will be shared with all parties involed. 
 
You can contact Prof. MacGregor for more information regarding this project at the following address: 
College of Education 
Louisiana State University 
111-H Peabody Hall 
Baton Rouge, LA  70803 
225-578-2150 






Christopher J. Fontenot 
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Christopher J. Fontenot 
15514 Riverdale Ave. E. 
Baton Rouge, LA  70816 
 
 




1225 Sharp Road 






The hurricanes of 2005 did more than damage schools in East Baton Rouge. They provided a valuable 
lesson in how districts and schools cope with the influx of thousands of families and students into the 
system. Lessons learned will prove quite valuable to districts and schools throughout the Gulf Coast and 
in general to any school system that undergoes catatrophic change from natural or manmade causes. I am 
requesting permission to investigate how your school met the challenges of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
and what was learned from the process. 
 
This investigation will take place this fall. The pur ose of the study is to investigate the effects of 
mobility on the schools and any successful coping strategies used by the schools to minimize the harmful 
effects of mobility. The project will involve interviews with the principal, school counselor, and some 
faculty in the schools. Every effort will be made to minimize disturbances to teaching schedules and the 
school. 
 
All information garnered will be held in strict confidence. Anything that could identify the parish, school, 
or any individuals will be altered or removed to prtect their confidentiality. All findings from this 
investigation will be shared with all parties involed. 
 
You can contact Prof. MacGregor for more information regarding this project at the following address: 
College of Education 
Louisiana State University 
111-H Peabody Hall 
Baton Rouge, LA  70803 
225-578-2150 






Christopher J. Fontenot  
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Christopher J. Fontenot 
15514 Riverdale Ave. E. 
Baton Rouge, LA  70816 
 
 




15000 Harrell's Ferry Rd.  






The hurricanes of 2005 did more than damage schools in East Baton Rouge. They provided a valuable 
lesson in how districts and schools cope with the influx of thousands of families and students into the 
system. Lessons learned will prove quite valuable to districts and schools throughout the Gulf Coast and 
in general to any school system that undergoes catatrophic change from natural or manmade causes. I am 
requesting permission to investigate how your school met the challenges of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
and what was learned from the process. 
 
This investigation will take place this fall. The pur ose of the study is to investigate the effects of 
mobility on the schools and any successful coping strategies used by the schools to minimize the harmful 
effects of mobility. The project will involve interviews with the principal, school counselor, and some 
faculty in the schools. Every effort will be made to minimize disturbances to teaching schedules and the 
school. 
 
All information garnered will be held in strict confidence. Anything that could identify the parish, school, 
or any individuals will be altered or removed to prtect their confidentiality. All findings from this 
investigation will be shared with all parties involed. 
 
You can contact Prof. MacGregor for more information regarding this project at the following address: 
College of Education 
Louisiana State University 
111-H Peabody Hall 
Baton Rouge, LA  70803 
225-578-2150 






Christopher J. Fontenot 
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Christopher J. Fontenot 
15514 Riverdale Ave. E. 
Baton Rouge, LA  70816 
 
 




9650 Goodwood Blvd.  






The hurricanes of 2005 did more than damage schools in East Baton Rouge. They provided a valuable 
lesson in how districts and schools cope with the influx of thousands of families and students into the 
system. Lessons learned will prove quite valuable to districts and schools throughout the Gulf Coast and 
in general to any school system that undergoes catatrophic change from natural or manmade causes. I am 
requesting permission to investigate how your school met the challenges of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
and what was learned from the process. 
 
This investigation will take place this fall. The pur ose of the study is to investigate the effects of 
mobility on the schools and any successful coping strategies used by the schools to minimize the harmful 
effects of mobility. The project will involve interviews with the principal, school counselor, and some 
faculty in the schools. Every effort will be made to minimize disturbances to teaching schedules and the 
school. 
 
All information garnered will be held in strict confidence. Anything that could identify the parish, school, 
or any individuals will be altered or removed to prtect their confidentiality. All findings from this 
investigation will be shared with all parties involed. 
 
You can contact Prof. MacGregor for more information regarding this project at the following address: 
College of Education 
Louisiana State University 
111-H Peabody Hall 
Baton Rouge, LA  70803 
225-578-2150 












 Although the memories were vague and confused, most inf rmants recalled a meeting of 
the District Leadership Team (DLT) the following day, Wednesday, August 31st, at the central 
office. The email was sent out in mid afternoon the 30th. By that point, the superintendent and 
other members of her staff were aware of the growing crisis in New Orleans. The levees had 
breached as early as 9 AM Monday the 29th, and throughout the day Monday, Tuesday, and 
Wednesday water from Lake Ponchartrain and Lake Bourne continued to pour into the city until 
by September 1st, the levels within the city and the lakes equalized. Some areas of New Orleans 
were flooded to a depth of nearly 20 feet. The extent of the inundation was being understood as a 
long-term problem, not just a short term annoyance.  The CAO recalled that the first impulse [by 
the mayor and OEP?] was to use public schools as shelters but that the superintendent was 
passionate in her efforts to convince the Mayor to move the displaced families to the River 
Center convention complex. School buses assisted in moving displaced families out of the 
several schools that had been opened as shelters. Sometime the day of the 30th the coordinator for 
the education for homeless children and youth program, recalled that she called the 
superintendent and explained that the guidelines of the Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act (1987) 
required that all homeless children be enrolled in school without restrictions. She was invited to 
the meeting planned for Wednesday morning at the central office. According the Federal law, 
any family in inadequate living conditions – particularly the conditions present in shelters, 
churches, or temporary trailer parks– is considered a homeless family. Children of such families 
are required by law to be accepted in public schools and provided all the benefits, uniforms, 
books, meals, and services available to all the othr school children.  
School personnel were also encouraged to call each other because power was still out 
across town and the central office could not be surthat emails were reaching everyone. Payroll 
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checks were going out the next day, but the power situation required the payroll to be processed 
manually. 
 The superintendent moved the meeting Wednesday, August 31st, to a nearby school 
because they still had power. Members of the DLT included the chief academic officer; 
information technology officer (IT); the head of facilities; legal counsel; the superintendent; 
chief finance officer (CFO); head of instructional support services (ISS); human resources 
director (HR); director of equal educational opportuni ies (EEO), and assistant superintendent 
(AS I). Also at the meeting were homeless coordinator (HC), and head of child welfare and 
attendance (CWA). The CAO recalled the meeting as being “a bit chaotic” and very emotional, 
but they did a quick analysis of the situation and got down to work. Prompted by the 
superintendent and HC, the need to document and track everything drove the group to quickly 
get down to the work of preparing forms and procedur s so that the district could report 
accurately what was being done in the event that some reimbursements would be forthcoming 
from state and federal sources. After the meeting the superintendent met with the press to share 
information about the coming plans to enroll all the children in the district displaced by the 
hurricane. Although the plans were not yet finalized, the press was told to spread the word that 
registration for new students would begin Thursday at the central office and at the “Station.” [the 
CAO recalled moving to the “Station” that afternoon.] 
 Thursday, September 1st, began with a meeting at the “Station” to continue planning for 
the arrival of what was assumed to be a few thousand children. Teams of central office personnel 
were assigned to the various shelters around the ciy to begin the process of registering new 
students and help the central office determine what the actual numbers would be. Later that day 
an emergency meeting of the school board voted the sup rintendent extraordinary powers to 
conduct business without formal board action. These powers extended for thirty days and were 
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renewed twice. The superintendent was in constant touch with the school board president and 
vice president, alerting them of her actions. The CAO recalled that it was a crucial and fortuitous 
action that helped the district act and react to changing conditions rapidly. A great deal of staff 
time was normally taken up in preparing reports and requests for the school board to approve 
before the school system could act. The CAO estimated that nearly half of staff time was 
occupied in those types of activities. With the superintendent granted emergency powers and 
needed only apprise the board leadership of her intntions, nearly half of the central office 
workday was freed to focus on other activities.  It was “like giving 30 hours of your productivity 
time back [in a typical 60 hour week],” he stated. A great deal of productive time was spent in 
the first two days of planning, the Wednesday and Thursday after the hurricane. Staff members 
were briefed in the proper procedures required by the Stewart B. McKinney-Vento Act (1987) 
and reminded that many of the displaced families may have been traumatized by what happened 
in New Orleans. New suppliers were needed because the food service suppliers for the district 
had operated out of New Orleans. Those suppliers wee no longer viable and the district had to 
locate new suppliers quickly. Fortunately, ARAMARK, a company contracted with the district 
for repairs and maintenance was contracted to supply food services as well. More food would be 
needed, more supplies, furniture, books, uniforms – more of everything would be needed.  
 After Thursday’s meetings registration continued at the central office. Registrations also 
were accepted in the schools in the district. Forms were provided to the schools and completed 
forms returned to the central office each evening. The forms were based on the one page 
homeless form utilized by the homeless office and were color coded according to elementary, 
middle, or high school level in order to assist staff in sorting Katrina children, and to distinguish 
them from local children. Some staff members went to homes to register children; others worked 
in teams and went to every shelter that they knew housed Katrina-displaced families.  
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 Work proceeded to plan for the opening of the schools n the Tuesday following Labor 
Day, September 6th.  Work was proceeding on converting a school that had been closed for into 
an elementary school. Another school slated for closure was also quickly restored and made 
operational. Both schools were to be used exclusively for displaced students; most of the 
children were bused from the convention center and other shelters. The schools were also staffed 
with displaced administrators and faculty who were thought to be the best prepared to deal with 
the sense of loss both students and staff would be feeling. The rest of the students would be 
assigned to the nearest schools to their current address. 
 Friday, September 2nd, was busy continuing the planning and enrollment of students. A 
letter from the state department of education (DOE) circulated around the offices and was 
carefully studied for any potential impact on the plans already in motion in the district. 
Enrollment continued with some schools planning to open on the Saturday to accommodate 
parents. Announcements went out via email to meet at one of the local magnet schools the 
following day, Saturday to get away from the large crowds at the central office. The last assistant 
superintendent (AS I) rejoined the executive leadership team (ELT), having been trapped in her 
Mississippi home by the storm. Other staff members came and went as they struggled with 
personal issues and recovery efforts from the storm. 
 On Sunday, September 4th, the Superintendent informed the school board and ce tral 
office staff that the school buses had been returned to duty after having been commandeered by 
the governor to help transport displaced families from New Orleans. Fifty school buses had been 
on the road since Thursday and were released back to the district. Five schools were still without 
power as of Friday afternoon, but the district was planning to reopen Tuesday. There was some 
concern that parents would have to be asked to help transport their children, but with the return 
of the school buses there would be a sufficient number to reopen the schools. By Monday, Labor 
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Day, power had been restored to all campuses and the media was informed that schools would 
resume operations. 
 A major problem was developing that weekend as literally tons of materials were 
beginning to arrive in Baton Rouge and needed to be stor d. By Tuesday, September 6th, word 
was circulating to forward deliveries to a warehouse for storage and later distribution. Other 
issues included the registration of new students. Word went out by noon on Tuesday that no 
schools were to register new students, but rather send the forms in to the central office. The 
procedure had been established at a principal’s meeting the Thursday before. Only parents 
requesting a “choice” enrollment and possessing the proper paperwork/letters could be directly 
enrolled by the schools. Registration forms were requested from all sites registering students and 
sent to the instructional resource center (IRC) next door to the central office. Future forms were 
to be sent to the director of CWA for processing. By this point many staff members of the school 
board were helping process the forms and entering the data into the system. These staff members 
worked all day on data processing, and many worked as late as 9 PM. Some administrators, 
including the director CWA, left their regular work assignments and after hours drove to the IRC 
to help screen the forms and make calls to applicants to locate missing information. As the 
registration process proceeded, alterations to the forms became necessary and the modifications 
were added. The ELT met daily in the afternoon to assess the progress of the registration and 
make changes as needed. Tuesday dragged on as the CAO appointed two “seconds” to assistant 
superintendents who were struggling with their own personal recovery issues.  The IT director 
was repurposing some of the office space to accommodate several working teams including 
student assignment team. Later emails noted the apparent smoothness of the first day of school 
after the storm. By Tuesday, September 6th, the central office had received approximately 3,200 
enrollment forms from the schools and data entry teams had already keyed in the data from 700 
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forms. At this point the CAO began what came to be called the “Midnight Missives.” These 
emailed notices were to continue for several weeks advising all principals, ELT and DLT, and 
school board members of activities each day, problems that arose, and decisions made by the 
ELT. Decisions had to be made regarding the sports rograms that had been interrupted by the 
storms. Games would resume as scheduled (the state later resolved the issue of displaced player 
eligibility by allowing displaced students to participate in sports in the first school to which they 
were assigned and attended – subsequent transfers would then render them ineligible). Other 
issues to be resolved after the afternoon ELT meeting included designing registration packets for 
new students, verification forms for contacting parents still in shelters, a plan to get ICARE 
counselors into the schools, furniture needs, faculty shortages and the need for substitutes until 
enrollment numbers stabilized, and notifying principals as potential faculty were identified. At 
that point the biggest issue was keeping track of displaced families and keeping them separately 
identified from local students who were moving from ne school to another. This issue was 
illustrative of the concern that the district would have to accurately track any displaced students 
in order to receive full reimbursement from state or federal sources.  
 By the afternoon of Wednesday, September 7th, the district had begun to feel the pressure 
of rising registrations and authorized principals to register any children at their own schools 
under the conditions that the student was a local student, that they already existed in the system 
database, that they were transferring from another att ndance zone in the district or had a valid 
“choice” letter, or had an approved proof of residency from the hearing office. By 8:13 PM the 
“Midnight Missive” went out noting the arrival of more enrollment forms raising the total to 
about 4,000 of which 2,700 had been processed. Data entry teams continued to work until 9PM 
to input the data into the system. At that point 500 students had been assigned to schools with the 
goal of completing the assignments by the 12th of September. This was also the first notice that 
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announced the opening of PS-816 middle school as a K-8 facility. Issues still under consideration 
included an ICARE support plan, anticipated furniture shortages, anticipated need for new 
faculty to be hired as “substitutes” until student population stabilized,  advising of principals as 
new faculty applications became available for interviews, and a decision to set a number (6000) 
when new facilities would need to be opened or split chedules would have to be implemented. 
Notice also went out to advise principals to prepar adequate numbers of new student 
handbooks, transportation forms, and brochures for parents. “The question is how many?” This 
indicates that there was still no firm handle on the total numbers expected to enter the school 
system. 
One other issue of importance at this time was making adjustments to the pacing guides 
and curriculum to compensate for the week missed because of the storm. Unit tests would have 
to be rescheduled and the curriculum department was working to address concerns from teachers 
under the new conditions. 
 General update number 3 was posted at about 7 PM Thursday September 8th, noting the 
fairly smooth return of district students to schools. The school system was preparing for the 
arrival of the first displaced students into the schools planned for the following week. By the end 
of the day an additional 500 enrollment forms had arrived for processing. The total count of 
forms was about 4,500, of which 3,200 had been processed and about 1,100 had been assigned to 
schools. The plan was to have all students assigned a d notified by the end of the day September 
12th. The district announced again that PS-816 middle was repurposed as a K-8 school, and that 
three additional schools would be prepared as additional space. Principals were now told that 
they would have to contact the parents of students assigned to the schools (except for parents still 
in shelters). Forms and procedures were being developed to guide the schools in contacting their 
new students. Issues to be resolved included the need for furniture, teachers, and bus drivers to 
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transport students to the schools. Spreadsheets with students being assigned to schools would be 
provided to all the principals who were instructed o create teams in their schools for the purpose 
of contacting displaced parents. The district would have the telephone contact scripts ready the 
following day. There were also some general concerns about conflicting information provided to 
the data entry personnel about their compensation. The superintendent directed that overtime 
compensation would be paid appropriately. She also ddressed the issue of enrolling students 
“independent of the process” established by the district; any such enrollments were “un-
enrolled.” Shortly after 7 PM the IT director advised ELT members of the updated numbers: 
4,027 input into the database and 1,627 assigned to schools. Two hours later the students input 
into the system numbered 4,325 and that 1,869 had been assigned. 
 By Friday, September 9th, IT director advised the ELT that PS-816 – now a K-8
elementary – would have functional phone lines by Monday, September 12th, in time for opening 
the school. Shortly after noon several forms were passed on to administrators. Tactics for 
attempting to contact parents were suggested, including the use of the reverse look-up feature of 
the Whitepages.com website and a reminder to update the district database with any valid 
numbers and addresses obtained. Enrollment counts by 8 PM Friday reached 5,650 forms of 
which 3,530 had been registered as students. At 9 PM the enrollment forms entered into the 
database had topped 5,850. 
The CAO was advising principals in his fourth update that teams would be contacting 
parents at the larger shelters, but that currently there was no way to transport parents from 
smaller shelters to schools to register. PS-816 and PS-8124 (school designations changed) 
Elementary schools, repurposed to handle displaced students, constituted a third tier for the 
purposes of transportation because of the shortage of buses and drivers. Both would start at 9:30 
in the morning and end school at 4:30. Two other schools had been identified as having space for 
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more students, but were being held in reserve untiladditional space was needed. Issues still 
being considered included the lack of furniture, th need for more teachers and staff, the need for 
more bus drivers, and the anticipated shortages in textbooks. An additional warning was also sent 
to principals to accept students with or without uniforms. Procedures for notification and 
registration for displaced families were reviewed. Transportation issues continued to plague the 
system as drivers were overwhelmed and no new drivers w re forthcoming. Uniform orders were 
discussed and contact person from St. Vincent de Paul was identified. Again, staff members were 
reminded that students must be allowed to attend schools without uniforms until the uniforms 
could be secured. Updated lists of students registered and assigned were sent out daily, 
sometimes several times a day. Students not on the lis  were encouraged to get registered either 
at the homeless office or at the IRC. Parents were to be advised that if the student was on the list 
but not assigned yet, the assignment was coming; the parents did not need to register again. 
 Update five from the CAO went out shortly after 7:25 Monday September 12th. On this 
date the displaced students began to arrive at their ass gned schools; PS-816 and PS-8124 opened 
as planned. Principals were warned to watch the next day for adjustments in the assignments and 
anticipated adjustments in the process. As of the close of school that day 6,525 forms had been 
processed and 4,455 students had been assigned. The system was discussing issues concerning 
shifting addresses, procedures to remove “No Shows” from the rosters to keep accurate numbers 
of students actually in school, issues about documentation to enroll students in the appropriate 
courses and accepting credits from prior school classes, and issues concerning the appropriate 
placement of Gifted and Talented (GT) students as well as Special Education (SpEd) students. 
Central office decisions for that day included notice to prepare PS-8127 (6 – 12) and PS-809 (6 – 
12) to receive students. Schools were to continue to no ify parents of the enrollment of their 
children in the schools. New forms would be disseminated the next day to allow changes in 
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enrollment. Katrina “no show” forms would be sent the following day to identify parents of 
students assigned to the schools, but who would not be attending the school. Students with 
verified Individual Education Plans (IEPs) as GT or SpEd would be assigned to appropriate 
schools; those schools would then contact the parents to register the students there and the 
former school would then drop the student from its at endance rolls. By Monday at 6 PM the 
number of students entered into the student database w  6,525 and 4,455 had been assigned to 
schools. That day the superintendent received a communication from the Board of Elementary 
and Secondary Education (BESE) advising the superintendents that BESE would be meeting 
Tuesday, September 27th, to examine disaster issues. They wanted ideas about how the state 
BESE and the State Department of Education (State DOE) could assist the state superintendents 
in the disaster. Specifically requested were suggestions as to changes in testing policy, assistance 
in locating furniture and books; any perceived need for waivers, or something that could be 
addressed at the state or policy level to help the districts. As of September 12th, they could not 
“see the light at the end of the tunnel yet.”  In a rel ted issue, the superintendent requested 
clarification about enrolling students from private schools. State DOE policy in that area treated 
students from approved private schools the same as students from public schools. In the event 
that the student was enrolled in an unapproved private school or was home schooled, then the 
“receiving school should follow the policy in their Pupil Progression Plan…[This] usually 
involves some kind of testing.” 
 By Tuesday it had become clear that many students who had been enrolled would not 
actually be attending the schools. On September 13th, the central office was attaching a form to 
emails to the principals. This form, entitled “Katrina No Shows,” was to be completed so the 
school system could have an accurate count of studen s actually attending the schools. The 
principals were to complete the form for each student that was assigned to that school and whose 
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parents had been contacted but who stated that the child would not attend the school. The form 
was not intended to apply to students whose families had not yet been contacted, only families 
that could definitely state that the children would not be attending. Students wishing to change 
schools would use a different form. Principals were also warned that changes of school 
assignments would not be allowed until the district reached some level of stability. Principals 
were also told to prepare a “Warm Body Count” for assistant superintendents. The warm body 
count was designed to reveal the actual numbers of enr llees in the schools so the assignment 
teams would have a better idea of how many seats were actually available in the schools. By the 
end of the school day the district had entered 6,825 children into the database and assigned 5,228 
students to schools. Later that day a list of new or unassigned students was disseminated. The 
various support arms of the district, food service, transportation, and human resources were still 
struggling to resolve the problems of supplying the district. One problem noted by the 
superintendent was the near impossibility of contacting many parents because of shifts in address 
or incomplete information on the enrollment forms. 
 Getting accurate numbers became the focus Wednesday, September 14th, with two 
separate warm body counts, one for Katrina displaced students, a separate count requested by the 
HR director to include all students in the school. An email from the superintendent suggests that 
many parents in shelters had yet to register their children. With the assistance of the American 
Red Cross, word continued to spread that students needed to be registered for schools “or their 
continued residency may be in jeopardy.” Warm body counts were collected and compiled by 
mid afternoon. The first set of numbers indicated that 7,518 applications had been entered into 
the database, 5, 573 students had been assigned to scho ls. Confirmed “No Show” counts for the 
day were 237, but the warm body count was only 2,708 for the district, a very low number 
considering the 5,573 who had been enrolled and assigned. In his seventh update the CAO noted 
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that some of the challenges faced by the schools were emotional. By this point various 
descriptions of the students were categorized as hurtful and needed to be avoided. Banned from 
use in the schools were the terms “homeless kids,” “Katrina Kids,” “those New Orleans kids,” 
and the like. Principals were urged to make the newstudents welcome and help the “indigenous” 
students “live and learn together.”  The CAO warned that tensions would likely build and school 
leaders were expected to be proactive in preventing flair-ups between displaced students and 
local students.   
Update seven, September 15th, urged principals to continue to contact families of tudents 
assigned to their schools or who had not yet been conta ted and to turn in “No Show” forms of 
students that had been contacted and who had confirmed they would not attend district schools. 
There were many cases in which the parents had not yet been contacted and thus their children 
were not yet attending the schools. Also included was a list of continuing activities at the central 
office including discussions on how to keep track of displaced families that moved, how many 
warm body counts would be needed, and how to handle requests for changes in school 
assignment. Decisions reached by the central office in luded the selection of Monday, September 
19th, as a day to start considering accepting requests for school reassignment, and the decision to 
make another warm body count Friday, September 16th. Special issues mentioned included more 
reminders to allow students to attend school even if not in uniform, and a reminder not to require 
parents to use specific vendors for their uniform purchases. Principals were also urged to 
reexamine their use of space in the schools to discern whether there were more efficient ways to 
utilize the spaces they had. 
 Thursday, September 15th, continued with a reminder from IT director to continue to 
submit Katrina “No Show” forms before noon each day. The superintendent thanked the staff for 
their efforts under trying circumstances, but also noted that quality would not be sacrificed 
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because of the difficulties in the district. Distric  officials were waiting for guidance from the 
state DOE on many matters and urged patience from the staff. The CAO reminded the principals 
of the coming warm body count the next day. Friday’s WBC would include a breakdown by 
grade level. At this point two incidents had occurred in one of the high schools in the city. The 
CAO noted that when incidents occurred, all students should be treated as district students, not 
singled out as displaced. Efforts continued to document all expenses so the district could be 
reimbursed for its extra expenses. Also, principals were urged to get into contact with all families 
of students assigned to their schools. As of Thursday, September 15th, the system had input data 
on 7,737 students, had assigned 6,008 to schools, had a WBC of only 2,808 students and had 
confirmed “No-Shows” numbering 350. One final reminder to the principals involved counting 
students who were physically enrolled at the school even if they were absent from the school. 
The IT Director sent daily updates of students who had applied but where not yet assigned to a 
school.  
 Early emails from the IT director on Friday, September 16th, reminded principals to 
submit their daily “No-Show” forms and not to drop the student from the database, that activity 
would be handled at the central office. Principals were also reminded not to enter students into 
the database when they arrived to enroll because they were already in the database. Update 
number nine from the CAO laid out the procedures for all wing students to transfer. The 
following week would mark the beginning of student transfers. Updated student counts as of 
5:08 PM were a rough count of applications – 8,015; 6,310 students assigned to schools; a warm 
body count of 3,733; and a confirmed “No-Show” count of 500. 
 Monday, September 19th, marked the second full week in which displaced stu ents were 
attending schools in the district. Monday morning rosters went out as usual from the IT 
department with a notification that teams from the central office would be visiting campuses to 
 220
study space and capacity issues for each campus. List  of unassigned students also went out, and 
an afternoon enrollment update was emailed after 5 PM. The CAO’s tenth update warned 
principals about the district’s decision to start accepting transfer requests based on changes of 
address. Rough counts of applications stood at 8,084, the assigned student count was 6,411, the 
last warm body count stood at 3,733, and there werestill 500 confirmed “No Shows.” Central 
office issues for the day included adding more students to PS-8127 and PS-809, considering 
questions to be forwarded to the Louisiana DOE, and partitioning spaces in gyms to create more 
space. Decisions made in the last ELT meeting included allowing 20 more 9 – 12 grade students 
to be admitted to PS-8127 and an additional 100 in grades 6 – 8. PS-809 would be prepared to 
accept an additional 180 students in grades 9 – 12.Principals were asked to prepare questions for 
the principals meeting the next day. Procedures were also outlined to make school transfers more 
reliable, assigning specific individuals to receive transfer forms and evaluate the request before 
passing the approval to the Program Analyst in charge of school assignments who would then 
enter the new assignment into the database.  
 Warm body counts continued Tuesday, September 20th. Information forwarded by IT 
director was disseminated to principals in the CAO’s update number 11. Few other items were 
listed in the update beyond the latest numbers and an attachment detailing a reorganization of 
administrative areas. There was some consideration of transferring two Pre-K classes from PS-
802 to a neighboring school to free up space for more K-5 seats. The latest counts indicated the 
enrollments were at 8,304, assigned students numbered 6,470 with 4,301 warm bodies, and still 
500 “No Shows.” No other meetings were held that day. 
 Routine emails of lists of enrolled and unassigned stu ents went out Wednesday, 
September 21st.  No meetings were held Wednesday and the routine co tinued. Discussions 
continued concerning the movement of Pre-K Classes from PS-802. PS-802 began to use the 
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auditorium for additional classroom space. Two additional classroom spaces were prepared at 
PS-8124. 
 Wednesday, September 21st, followed the routine of previous days.  The IT director 
informed staff not to drop unconfirmed “No-Shows” because of continuing transportation issues. 
Another warm body count was scheduled for Thursday, the 22nd of September. The CAO’s 
twelfth update corrected mistakes in the previous update. Principals were reminded to count as a 
student any student who physically enrolled and whoattended the school at any time. Student 
counts reported 8,460 entered into the database; 6,806 students were assigned to schools; the 
warm body count stood at 4,201, and there were still 500 confirmed “No Shows.” Discussions 
continued about moving Pre – K classes and the central office formally decided to use the 
auditorium at PS-802 and two additional classrooms at PS-8124. 
 The superintendent notified board members on September 22nd, of her intention to 
request portable classrooms unless the district judge objected. This followed a message from the 
State Superintendent concerning a FEMA communication regarding information about 
temporary mobile classrooms. The CAO’s update number 13 mentioned meetings to plan 
strategically for the Katrina challenge by starting to “triage” the rolls to determine which 
students were attending, had withdrawn, had left th area, or who could not or refused to attend 
schools in the district. Dropping these students would free up assigned but unused seats for other 
students who were attending. Latest counts were an enrolled student count of 8,689, 6,821 
assigned to schools, a warm body count of 4,548 and co firmed “No Shows” totaling 980. Drop 
codes to drop students were attached to the update and, in a special note at the bottom, the CAO 
announced the closure of the school system to avoid pr blems with any evacuations in 
preparation of Hurricane Rita. The system hoped to reopen Monday, September 26th. 
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After closing the system for the potential evacuation problems from Hurricane Rita, the 
superintendent noted that there was some discussion about sending lists of enrolled students to 
the state department and the districts the students originally came from so everyone would be 
aware of where the students were.  
Hurricane Rita came ashore Saturday morning September 24th, along the Louisiana-Texas 
border. Winds from the storm knocked power out across central Louisiana again and caused 
problems throughout the city. The superintendent was in contact with ARAMARK and facilities 
personnel and by 10:30 PM Saturday was contacting saff with lists of schools and facilities that 
had no power. The IT director reported the central office was again without power Sunday, 
September 25th. The computing center in the central office was again operating on generator 
power while the rest of the building was dark.  
Power issues kept the district closed Monday, September 26th, as power recovery efforts 
continued. As night fell Monday evening most power as restored to schools, but the central 
office, the IRC, and several other schools and administrative centers were still without power. 
Staff members were instructed to report to the “Station” Tuesday. An hour and a half later power 
to the central office was restored. 
ARAMARK reported on damages sustained from Hurricane Rita shortly after 2 PM on 
the 26th of September. Damages to several schools, a warehous , and an administrative center 
totaled just over $800,000. Schools were to reopen on the 27th. The CAO announced the need to 
enroll displaced families from Hurricane Rita as they began to settle in the area. The procedures 
already in place did not need to be changed, but staff members were told to ask if the entrant was 
a Katrina or a Rita-displaced student. Staff members were told to write Katrina or Rita at the top 
of the form so the enrollee could be properly identified. The homeless forms were sent to child 
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welfare and attendance and from there to the school assignment officer. Displaced student 
enrollment rosters were sent out morning and evening that day.  
By nine PM September 27th, the fourteenth update was sent to principals and staff. 
Several new challenges were identified that day. Although all schools were supposed to open 
that day some cases of mold appeared. The worst mold infestation was in PS-813 middle school. 
Thorough examination, cleaning, and retesting were ord red and school was expected to reopen 
Thursday, September 29th. An administration building lost its roof and water damage in another 
school was discovered. Hurricane Rita–displaced stuents began arriving to sign up for school 
and required special handling to distinguish them from Katrina-displaced students. Schools also 
started the process of dropping students from theirrosters, a change that would be reflected in 
the day’s counts. Drop procedures were attached to the update email and warned school 
personnel not to change the Katrina marker (Building 6000) on the school database forms. 
Displaced student counts that day were: 8,754 enroll d, 6,655 assigned to schools, warm body 
count stood at 4,548, and 983 students were confirmed “No Shows.” The assigned count was 
lower than the previous count because schools had started dropping students. The CAO 
announced that the school board had been contacted by an out-of-state elementary PTA with a 
cash donation for textbooks. A request for pen palsfor displaced elementary students was 
directed to the schools with the most displaced stuents in the system. Five elementary schools 
were identified and the contact information and mailing addresses were sent to school’s PTA 
representative. 
Displaced rosters went out to school personnel morning and evening September 28th. 
Update number 15 announced the reopening of PS-802 and another warm body count for the 
29th. Staff members were told to begin thinking of the s ort and long term changes in the school 
system and developing plans and cost estimates for a future planning meeting. Since the mold 
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issue surfaced the previous Tuesday a clarification was made in the procedures of how to assess 
and remediate mold problems in the schools. Enrollment counts as of 7 PM that day were: 8,754 
enrolled, 6,655 assigned, 4,548 warm bodies, and 983 confirmed “No Shows.” The numbers had 
not changed and may have reflected the lack of a warm body count that day, or a transcription 
error. 
Warm body counts were taken again Thursday, September 29th. Students were shifted 
from damaged schools until roof repairs were complete. The numbers for Thursday: 8,976 
enrolled; 6,821 assigned, 4,926 warm bodies, and 983 “No Shows.” 
Comment 
 From the emails it is apparent that things had started to settle into something of a routine 
by Tuesday, September 20th, when the attention at the central office began to focus on shifting 
students around to equalize space requirements. Decisions reported in the updates had begun to 
taper off to a few scattered issues and plans were in the process for identifying which students 
were simply not going to attend school so their seats could be reassigned to other displaced 
students. Plans were already underway to allow transfers to new schools based on residency 
changes. The system had absorbed over 8,000 new student applications and would eventually 
house over 5,000 new students. The district had turned the corner with respect to new enrollees, 
but the shifting of students did not subside for some time as the shelters began to close and trailer 
parks were opened to provide more permanent housing for displaced families. 
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